Hill, Van Lester v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 29, 2004
• Docket: 14-03-00279-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 29, 2004

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 29, 2004.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-03-00279-CR

VAN LESTER HILL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 344th District Court

Chambers County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 11910

M E M O R A N D U M  O P I N I O N

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, appellant Van Lester Hill pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana in an amount of fifty pounds or less but more than five pounds.  The trial court assessed punishment at ten years= deferred adjudication probation and a $2,500 fine.  In his sole point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the detaining officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the investigative detention.  We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On May 24, 2001, Lawrence P. Lilly, Jr., a Texas Department of Public Safety highway patrolman, initiated a routine traffic stop after witnessing a car speeding and changing lanes without signaling.  David Hill, appellant=s brother, was driving the vehicle, and appellant was the only passenger.  After asking David to exit the car, Lilly then asked David for his driver=s license and questioned David about ownership of the vehicle.  After a brief discussion with David, Lilly then approached appellant, who remained in the vehicle.  Lilly collected appellant=s driver=s license and then rejoined David at the rear of the vehicle and requested consent to search.  David initially gave consent, but later withdrew that consent.  Lilly ran a check on both David and appellant for outstanding warrants; however, based on the responses and actions of the two, Lilly believed they might be transporting narcotics.  While Lilly was waiting for a response to his warrant request, he called a canine unit to perform an olfactory inspection of the vehicle.  The canine unit arrived approximately eight minutes after the warrant check returned clear.  The dog alerted to the vehicle, which ultimately led to the discovery of marijuana in the trunk. 

The trial court denied appellant=s motion to suppress, holding the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant further to perform an olfactory inspection of the vehicle.  After the trial court denied the motion, appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of marijuana.  On appeal, appellant alleges the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the officer was not permitted to question appellant or David concerning the purpose and destination of their trip and the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention after the warrant check showed appellant had no outstanding warrants.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court=s decision on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review.  Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).  We give almost total deference to the trial court=s determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when those facts are based on credibility and demeanor.  Id.; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  However, we review the trial court=s application of law to those facts de novo.  Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327.  When the trial court does not make any findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling, and we presume the trial court made findings necessary to support its ruling, as long as the implied findings are supported by the record.  Id. at 327B28; Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref=d).    

Discussion

Appellant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer exceeded the scope of permissible questions for a traffic stop.  Specifically, appellant argues Lilly=s questioning should have been limited to requesting identification, a valid driver=s license, and proof of insurance from the driver, and that by inquiring into the purpose and destination of their trip, Lilly exceeded the permissible bounds of questioning.  According to appellant, the officer=s additional questions are not rationally related to the traffic infractions; rather, they are more analogous to a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity.   

When an officer witnesses a traffic violation, he has sufficient authority to stop the vehicle.  Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 2003, pet. ref=d).  During a valid traffic stop, the officer has the right to check for outstanding warrants and request a driver=s license, insurance papers, and identification.  Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 & n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Villareal v. State, 116 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).  Further, the officer may ask about the detainee=s destination and purpose of the trip without infringing on Fourth Amendment protections, although neither the driver nor the passenger is compelled to answer these questions.  Villareal, 116 S.W.3d at 82; Nuttall v. State, 87 S.W.3d 219, 222 (Tex. App.CAmarillo 2002, no pet.); State v. Cardenas, 36 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref=d); Estrada v. State, 30 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Tex. App.CAustin 2000, pet. ref=d); Mohmed v. State, 977 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1998, pet. ref=d); Ortiz v. State, 930 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Tex. App.CTyler 1996, no pet.).  Here, appellant=s argument is without merit because, as we have previously held, Lilly, as the detaining officer, may in the course of a valid traffic stop question appellant regarding destination and purpose of the trip; thus, the trial court did not err in denying appellant=s motion to suppress.   

Appellant also contends the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because Lilly did not have reasonable suspicion to detain appellant after the original purpose of the traffic stop was concluded and the license and warrant checks returned clear.  We also find this argument without merit and hold that, for the reasons discussed in David Hill v. State, the companion case, Trooper Lilly had reasonable suspicion to justify the detention while awaiting arrival of the canine unit.  See Hill v. State, No. 14-03-00278-CR, 2004 WL 794426 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] April 15, 2004, no pet. h.).

Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s sole issue on appeal, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/      John S. Anderson

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed June 29, 2004.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Anderson, and Hudson.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).