Hill v. York County Natural Gas Authority

682 S.E.2d 809, 384 S.C. 483
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedAugust 31, 2009
Docket26713
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 682 S.E.2d 809 (Hill v. York County Natural Gas Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill v. York County Natural Gas Authority, 682 S.E.2d 809, 384 S.C. 483 (S.C. 2009).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

A group of York County landowners challenge the power of the York County Natural Gas Authority to condemn land to construct a natural gas transmission pipeline. The landowners appeal from the trial court’s determination that the York County Natural Gas Authority has the statutory authority to condemn their property and construct the pipeline. We affirm.

In July 2006, the York County Natural Gas Authority commenced proceedings to condemn real property in York County for the purpose of constructing a natural gas transmission pipeline. Eleven of the affected property owners (Landowners) answered the notice of condemnation by filing a complaint in August 2006 challenging the authority of the York County Natural Gas Authority to condemn their real property. The case went to trial under various causes of action, and the trial court found that the York County Natural Gas Authority had the authority to condemn Landowners’ property.

ISSUES

Landowners appeal, raising two issues for review:

1) “The evidence and statutory interpretation do not support the [trial] court’s findings that Blacksburg is a new *486 source and thus, that Respondent did not exceed its authority under the Enabling Act.”
2) “The trial court erred in finding that the Notices of Condemnation based on incorrect statutory authority can be amended.”

DISCUSSION

I.

The York County Natural Gas Authority (Authority) is a special purpose district and corporate entity created by Act No. 959 of 1954. In 1957, by Act No. 694, section 1 of the original Act was amended to read as follows:

It shall be the function of the authority to purchase, lease, acquire, build, construct, maintain and operate natural gas distribution systems within the service area hereinafter defined and such transmission lines as may be necessary to transport natural gas to the distribution systems from the transmission lines to be constructed by [South] Carolina Pipeline Company or other sources from which natural gas may now or hereafter become available ....

Act No. 694, 1957 S.C. Acts 1427 (emphasis added). By Act No. 193, which became effective on June 12, 1995, the Act was amended in several respects, including expansion of the Authority’s service area beyond York County. Section 1 of the Act was amended to read as follows:

It is the function of the authority to purchase, lease, acquire, build, construct, maintain, and operate natural gas distribution systems within the service area defined in this act and such transmission lines as may be necessary to transport natural gas to the distribution systems from the transmission lines owned by South Carolina Pipeline Company or other sources from which natural gas may become available after the effective date of this act.

Act No. 193,1995 S.C. Acts 1569 (emphasis added).

Because the outcome of this case turns on the meaning of the statutory term “other sources,” we need not delve extensively into the detailed factual history prior to the 1995 Act, including the Authority’s once exclusive reliance on the South Carolina Pipeline Company (SCPC) and the reasons that prompted a change in that relationship. We simply note the *487 Authority joined with its sister special purpose districts in Lancaster and Chester counties to form a joint agency called Patriots Energy Group (PEG) pursuant to the Joint Agency Act. 1 The goal of PEG was to “enable these natural gas special purpose districts to jointly undertake the acquisition and construction of natural gas facilities.”

Under the authority provided in the Joint Agency Act, PEG issued bonds to cover its acquisition and construction costs. One of PEG’S construction projects was to integrate its transmission system with the Town of Blacksburg’s natural gas system. Blacksburg is in Cherokee County. Blacksburg is connected to the Transcontinental Pipeline Corporation’s interstate pipeline (the Transco pipeline). 2 Thus, linking in with Blacksburg’s natural gas system would allow the Authority (and its sister authorities, all under the umbrella of PEG) to connect to the Transco pipeline.

Pursuant to this plan PEG and Blacksburg entered into a capacity sharing agreement. The agreement included upgrading five miles of Blacksburg’s system from Blacksburg, eastward to the Town of Kangs Creek. This upgrade, which has been completed, involved replacing the existing 6-inch distribution line with an 8-inch high-pressure steel transmission pipeline.

In order to link up with the pipeline at Kings Creek, the Authority began condemnation proceedings (the proceedings being challenged in this lawsuit) to acquire rights-of-way to lay down 42.2 miles of 12-inch steel transmission pipeline. The transmission pipeline will run from Kings Creek, eastward across York and Chester Counties.

Landowners challenge the Authority’s power of eminent domain, contending the connection to the Blacksburg natural gas system and the Transco pipeline is not statutorily authorized. Specifically, Landowners rely on that part of Act 193 that restricts the Authority to “other sources from which natural gas may become available after the effective date of this act.” The Act became law on June 12,1995. Because the *488 Transco pipeline existed prior to June 1995, Landowners contend the Authority lacks statutory authorization to connect to the Transco pipeline and thus may not condemn their property.

The trial court did not read “other sources” so narrowly. The trial court noted that, “[t]he Act references the pre-1995 sources as ‘the transmission lines owned by South Carolina Pipeline Company.’ The source is not the South Carolina Pipeline Company, but rather its transmission lines.”

In discerning legislative intent, “[a]ll rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute.” McClanahan v. Richland County Council, 350 S.C. 433, 438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002). “[Wjords in a statute must be construed in context.... [T]he meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with them in the statute.” S. Mut. Church Ins. Co. v. S.C. Windstorm & Hail Underwriting Ass’n, 306 S.C. 339, 342, 412 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1991) (internal citations omitted). “The language must also be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose.” Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. v. Leathennan, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
682 S.E.2d 809, 384 S.C. 483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-york-county-natural-gas-authority-sc-2009.