Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc.

228 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20408, 2002 WL 31399088
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedOctober 22, 2002
Docket00-1362-JTM
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 228 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20408, 2002 WL 31399088 (D. Kan. 2002).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARTEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Judith A. Hill has instituted the present action against her former employer, Steven Motors. The defendant has moved for summary judgment. Upon reviewing all the pleadings and evidence submitted herein, the court finds that summary judgment is appropriate.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine *1249 all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiffs claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. “In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial’ Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Findings of Fact

Plaintiff Judith Hill is 57 years old. She was born March 3, 1945. She began working for Steven Motors on August 8, 1994.

Steven Motors is owned by Mike Steven, who owns several separate dealerships in the Wichita area. The CEO of Steven Motor Group is Harold Johnson.

In 1994, Hill was 49 years old, and worked for Conklin Cars. The General Manager at Steven Buick called to see if she would be interested in working for Steven Motors. Harold Johnson and Mike Steven were involved in the decision to hire Hill.

Hill wanted a written contract from Steven Motors. She has testified that Steven Motors had a reputation of going through employees and of changing pay plans. She was told that Steven Motors did not typically have written contracts, but she insisted, and was given a one-year written contract. The contract provided for renewal at the end of one year, if both parties were satisfied.

Hill’s first position with Steven Motors was that of Finance and Insurance Manager. F & I Managers are responsible for arranging vehicle financing, credit life insurance, extended warranties, and other similar products. They are typically paid by commission.

When she began work, Hill was paid 3% of combined new and used vehicle gross profit. In addition, she had a guaranteed minimum salary of $4300 per month. Employees of Steven Motors do not typically have long-term salary guarantees. Most F & I Managers have a guarantee for an introductory period of around 90 days, during which they get their income stream started.

During her first year, Hill had commission earnings in excess of her $4300 guarantee in one month only, August of 1994. *1250 During her first year, Hill earned only $32,253 in commissions. Her minimum salary guarantee during this period was $51,600. In 1995, Hill’s written employment contract was not renewed, and she became an employee at will.

On August 8, 1995, Hill was reclassified as a Fleet and Leasing Manager. She was thus responsible for making sales contacts with companies and credit unions. Her pay plan was for 20% of vehicle gross, or a $3500 guarantee. She held this position until August of 1996. During that period, her commissions never exceeded her guarantee. She earned commissions of only $23,588. Hill’s minimum salary guarantee during this period was $45,500.

It is uncontroverted that the defendant was not satisfied with Hill’s performance. Mike Steven testified that his practice has been to try unsuccessful employees in other positions, moving them around the various dealerships in an effort to find a good fit.

Hill is married to Mike Hill, who was Sedgwick County Sheriff during this time. Mike Steven served with Sheriff Hill on the executive committee of the Wichita Crime Commission, and wanted to maintain a good relationship with him. As a result, Steven testified, he did not terminate Hill even though her performance remained unsatisfactory.

In 1996, Steven Motors had the opportunity to buy a lawn tractor facility in west Wichita. Since it was unsure an automobile dealer franchise would be available, it entered into a three-year lease with an option to buy the property at 11028 W. Kellogg Avenue. For a short period of time, Don McMahon, who was then the General Manager of Steven Buick, oversaw the west Wichita location. McMahon was responsible for advertising and inventory control.

Hill was promoted to General Manager of the west Wichita location on September 2,1996. At the time, she was 51 years old. She was paid 6% of the combined sales and F & I gross profit, with a $4000 minimum guarantee.

Hill had never before been a General Manager of one of the Steven dealerships.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mondaine v. American Drug Stores, Inc.
408 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Kansas, 2006)
Smith v. Blue Dot Services Company
283 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Kansas, 2003)
Krauss v. Catholic Health Initiatives Mountain Region
66 P.3d 195 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
228 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20408, 2002 WL 31399088, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-steven-motors-inc-ksd-2002.