Hill v. Hill, No. Fa 99 0171402 S (Jan. 10, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 417
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 10, 2002
DocketNo. FA 99 0171402 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 417 (Hill v. Hill, No. Fa 99 0171402 S (Jan. 10, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill v. Hill, No. Fa 99 0171402 S (Jan. 10, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The parties to this sixteen-year marriage were mated in Chicago, Illinois on October 5, 1985. There are three children of the marriage: a daughter Jordan, born January 2, 1990, a sixth grade student at Greenwich Academy; a son Collin, born February 8, 1993; and a son Wyatt, born April 11, 1996. All three children live with the plaintiff wife ("wife") in the marital home located on 14 Broad Road in the Belle Haven section of Greenwich, Connecticut. The defendant husband ("husband") also lives in another part of the family home. The parties stated for the record that they had worked out a parenting plan with Dr. Jerome F. Brodlie dated August 8, 2001, and asked that it be approved and incorporated in the court decree in accordance with a stipulation as on file with the court.(#202)

The wife is 42 years old and a graduate of Vassar College with a B.A. in economics. Following graduation she went to work for Marine Midland Bank as a lending trainee for approximately one year, at which time she joined the San Francisco Morgan Stanley Office where she worked from CT Page 418 September 1982 to December 1984 in the area of municipal bonds. She later transferred to the Chicago Office of Morgan Stanley where she met the husband in May of 1984. They lived together for a short while after which they were married. Sometime after they were married, she left Morgan Stanley, according to her testimony, because it was difficult to work in the same office with her husband, and she wanted to take time off to set up a home. Other than working in an art gallery for approximately a year between 1987 and 1988 for which she was paid no salary or wages (although she did receive an occasional piece of art), she has had no work outside the home since she left Morgan Stanley. She has the day to day responsibility for the three children, however, she does have ample assistance with two housekeepers and a nanny. The oldest child, Jordan, has dyslexia. The two younger children have had a host of serious medical problems since birth and, according to the wife, require some special attention on her part. The wife has remained active and fit through her interest in rock climbing. She works out regularly and has a coach with whom she has traveled to various places in order to climb. She testified that she will probably reenter the work force sometime in the future, but that she will not make any plans until she sees the outcome of the present action.

The husband is 47 years of age and has a Bachelor's Degree as well as an MBA from the University of Chicago. He had a number of responsible positions with Morgan Stanley over the span of a twenty plus-year career with them and for which he was quite well compensated. For the years 1995-1999 his W-2 income ranged from a low of $660,000 to a high of $7,335,000. Much of his assets were reflected in Morgan Stanley stock and options, deferred income and retirement vehicles. At the time the wife filed the complaint in this action, the husband had amassed assets through Morgan Stanley of approximately $25,000,000 in value. Approximately half of this was Morgan Stanley stock which has been long since liquidated. On June 28, 1998, and prior to the time that this action was commenced, the husband quit his job to spend more time with the children, with the belief that the income from his assets would be sufficient to carry the family. This was corroborated by more than one witness. After a period of unemployment, the husband obtained an interim position which he later resigned, and is currently Managing Director at Spencer Trask for which he receives a base annual salary of $250,000. In addition, he has a bonus/commission arrangement with an override on sales. His job focus is on sales to institutions.

Basic housing expenses for Greenwich run approximately $34,000 per month. The balance of the other expenses when added to the housing expense amounts to $84,000 per month.

At the time of their marriage, the husband had been working at Morgan CT Page 419 Stanley for approximately eight years. He had at that time a brownstone and an apartment on Lake Shore Drive and according to his testimony additional assets in excess of $1,000,000. However, no evidence of fair market value at that time was offered other than his typed statement offered as Defendant's Exhibit C. The wife indicated that she had brought to the marriage approximately $30,000 in assets, including an IRA, home furnishings, a checking account, and her car. She also testified that her highest salary ever at Morgan Stanley was in 1985 when she earned $60,000.

Evidence varies as to the fair market value of the family home at 14 Broad Road in Greenwich. According to the testimony of the wife's appraiser, the property is worth $4,700,000; according to the husband's appraiser, it is worth $5,500,000. The court finds the value to be $4,900,000. The home has a $3,050,000 first mortgage balance as well as a home equity line of credit with a balance in the amount of $100,000. The disposition of the Morgan Stanley stock to pay for living expenses for over a year following his resignation, has left the family with very few liquid assets. At one point, when timing was crucial, whether from spite or pique, the wife refused to cooperate with the husband in the disposition of certain Morgan Stanley assets, thus losing the opportunity and more important, significant value. Aside from the house, the principal marital assets are the husband's interest in retirement funds and deferred compensation of approximately $2,250,000. According to the husband's testimony, the plan denominated OSEP-1, which would provide the parties with income at the husband's option at age either 55 or 65, was fully funded with premarital assets at the time of the marriage. He assigns a value of $864,000 to this asset which is more than a third of the retirement funds. In addition the husband has a one third interest in a ski house in Deer Valley, Colorado, which was acquired prior to marriage, having a value of $185,000 but carrying with it his share of the financing amounting to $433,000. All told the liabilities (excluding the mortgage and home equity) including actual and estimated taxes for years 2000 and 2001 amount to more than $1.7 million.

Following the close of evidence on August 15, 2001, the joint property in Jackson, Wyoming was sold on September 21, and the net proceeds amounting to over $1,800,000 were placed in escrow in an interest bearing account by agreement. Subsequently, on October 11, 2001, the parties entered into a Stipulation (#217) which was filed with and approved by the court. This provided, inter alia, for the payment of certain outstanding tax obligations from the escrow, as well as the wife's monthly allowance, and, in addition, each party took an advance against their ultimate equitable distribution — the wife $175,000 and the husband $125,000. The agreement left to the discretion of the court the ultimate allocation of responsibility for some of these payments and CT Page 420 advances.

The court has heard lengthy and at times emotional testimony regarding the breakup of the marriage. The wife alleges that from very early on in the marriage, the husband complained of a number of medical problems which he treated, according to her description, with "two baskets full" of prescription medications. He lost some time at work through his various complaints.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-hill-no-fa-99-0171402-s-jan-10-2002-connsuperct-2002.