Hill v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

66 F.2d 45, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1127, 12 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 917, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 2534
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJune 15, 1933
Docket3459
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 66 F.2d 45 (Hill v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 66 F.2d 45, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1127, 12 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 917, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 2534 (4th Cir. 1933).

Opinion

ERNEST F. COCHRAN, District Judge.

The petition to review the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in this case raises the question whether the sum of $25,000, received by the taxpayer from Union Bleaehery, a South Carolina corporation, in the year 1927, should be considered a dividend under section 201 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 10, 11 (26 USCA § 932 (g), or a distribution in partial liquidation of the corporation, under section 201 (c) of that act (26 USCA § 932 (e).

Union Bleaehery was incorporated on or about July 1,1922, with an authorized capital stock of the par value of $400,000. On December 29, 1922, an increase of the capital stock of the corporation from $400,000 to $1,200,000, to consist of an issue of preferred stock of the par value of $800,000, was duly authorized by the stockholders. At the same time the directors were authorized to declare a stock dividend of 100 per cent., being $400,000, to the stockholders of record on December 30, 1922, payable in preferred stock of the corporation. The remaining $400,000 of authorized preferred stock was to remain in the treasury of the corporation subject to the further orders of the board of directors. On September 12, 1922, the petitioner acquired by inheritance 250 shares of' the commonstoek having a value at that time of $100 per share, or a total of $25,000. On Deeem *46 ber 30, 1922, the board of directors declared a dividend of 100 per cent, on its common stock, then of the aggregate par value of $400,000 payable in preferred stock, and the petitioner received 250 shares of preferred stock as a dividend on the said 250 shares of the common stock previously acquired and then owed by her. Said preferred stock was entitled to dividends at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum, payable semiannually, and was redeemable by the corporation at any dividend period after two years on payment of its par value, together with all dividends then accrued and unpaid thereon, in such manner and upon sueh notice as the board of directors might determine for the redemption thereof. It was also provided that, except with the consent of the holders of 75 per cent, of the preferred stock, no mortgage or lien should be placed on the real estate, plant, or equipment of the company; no bonds, notes, debentures, or other similar evidence of indebtedness maturing later than five years should be created or guaranteed; and no stock ranking ahead of or equally with said issue of preferred stock should be issued.

On October 31, 1925, a further stock dividend of 100 per cent., payable in common stock of the corporation of the aggregate par value of $400,000, was declared. As her share of this dividend, the petitioner received common stock of the par value of $25,000.

On April 26,1927, the board of directors of Union Bleaehery passed a resolution that all of its said preferred stock be redeemed and retired on July 1, 1927, and at the same time the board resolved that a stock dividend of 50 per cent, upon the common stock of the corporation, payable in common stock, to all common stockholders of record as of July 1, 192(7, be declared. Pursuant to this resolution, the petitioner on or about July 1, 1927, surrendered the certificate for 250 shares of preferred stock held by her, and received in return therefor the amount of $25,-000 in cash.

In her income tax return for the calendar year 1927, filed under the Revenue Act of 1926, the petitioner included as capital gain from the redemption of said 250 shares of preferred stock of Union Bleaehery the amount of $16,666.65, representing the difference between the sum of $25,000 received by her in the redemption of the stock, and that portion (amounting to $8,333.35) of the cost basis of 250 shares of common stock acquired by her in September, 1922¡ which was allocated by her to said 250 shares of preferred stock.

On December 31, 1922, after the issuance of the stock dividend, the undivided profits of the company amounted to $432,284.68; and on December 31, 1926, to $731,584.52; and on December 31,1927 (after the issuance of the stock dividend) to $462i,641.85; without considering certain reserves established, which may or may not have been proper appropriations of surplus. Each year from 1922 to 1927, both inclusive, the corporation paid cash dividends ranging from $36,000 to $40,000 a year.

The corporation was not in process of dissolution at the end of 1927 or at any subsequent date.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue made a determination, later approved by the Board on appeal, that the income tax return for the year 1927 showed a .deficiency of $2,-726.65 in the tax liability on the ground that the sum of $25,000, received by the taxpayer in that year, was equivalent to the distribution of a cash dividend within the meaning of section 201 (g) of the act, which is 'as follows: “If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at sueh time and in sueh manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend. In the case of the cancellation or redemption of stock not issued as a stock dividend this subdivision shall apply only if the cancellation or redemption is made after January 1, 1926.”

The taxpayer, on the other hand, contends that the sum of $25,000 represents an amount distributed in partial liquidation of the corporation under sections 201 (c) and 201 (h) of the act, which are as follows:

“(e) Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for the stock. The gain or loss to the distributee resulting from sueh exchange shall be determined under section 933 [202], but shall be recognized only to the extent provided in section 934 [203]. In the ease of amounts distributed in partial liquidation (other than a distribution ’within the provisions of subdivision (g) of section 934 [203] of stock or *47 securities in connection .with a reorganization) the part of such distribution which is properly chargeable to capital account shall not he considered a distribution of earnings or profits within the meaning of subdivision (b) of this section for the purpose of determining the taxability of subsequent distributions by the corporation. * * *'

“(h) As used in this section the term 'amounts distributed in partial liquidation’ means a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all or a portion of its stock.”

We think that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals must be affirmed. It is true, as the taxpayer contends, and the Board found,

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Bluebook (online)
66 F.2d 45, 3 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1127, 12 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 917, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 2534, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca4-1933.