Hill v. City of American Canyon

Opinion

Andison Hill and Veronica Hill, No. 2:23-cv-00349-KJM-KJN Plaintiffs, ORDER v. City of American Canyon, et al., 1S Defendants. Andison and Veronica Hill allege several police officers entered and searched their home without a warrant or consent, aiming weapons at them in the process, and detained them outside during the search. They assert several claims under § 1983 against the officers and the City of American Canyon, where the officers work. The officers and the City move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. As explained in this order, that motion is granted in part with leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND The Hills were at home with their eight-year-old grandson on a February afternoon a few years ago when they saw several armed police officers at their front door. Am. Compl. □□ 16-17, 23, ECF No. 20. Without asking, the officers came in, guns drawn and aimed at the elderly couple. /d. 418. The officers ordered the couple and their young grandson out of the home, and they kept them outside for half an hour without jackets or shoes until officers had searched every

room in the house. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22–24. Mr. Hill’s recent heart surgery made it an especially distressing experience for him. Id. ¶ 21. According to the Hills’ complaint, the officers had no warrant, no consent, no reason to suspect any serious or violent crime and no reason to believe they would be met with violence or danger inside the Hills’ home. See id. ¶¶ 26–27. As the Hills were waiting outside, a sergeant explained to them their son, who lived with them at the time but was not home, had been arrested. Id. ¶ 19. He was on probation, and officers had found him with a gun, so they had come to the Hills’ home “to perform a probation compliance search.” Id. To be clear, the officers were not looking for the Hills’ son or his gun. He was already in police custody when officers came to their home. Id. ¶ 26. What or who the officers were looking for in particular is unclear from the Hills’ complaint. See id. ¶ 19. Their search was not confined to the son’s room, or even the home’s shared rooms; they searched every room, even the Hills’ own bedroom. Id. ¶ 22. The Hills claim the officers used excessive force, falsely arrested and detained them and illegally searched their home, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. See id. ¶¶ 28–34 (excessive force); id. ¶¶ 35–45 (false arrest); id. ¶¶ 46–53 (unlawful search); id. ¶¶ 54–62 (unlawful detention). They assert claims against the individual officers, the supervising sergeants and the City of American Canyon, which employs the officers. See id. ¶¶ 63–68. The officers and the city now move to dismiss these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally Mot., ECF No. 23; Mem., ECF No. 23-1. The motion is fully briefed and the court submitted it without oral arguments. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 25; Reply, ECF No. 26; Min. Order, ECF No. 27. In response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court begins by assuming the complaint’s factual allegations are true, but not its legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The court then determines whether those factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” under Rule 8, which is a context-specific task based on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A. Excessive Force (Claim 1) When a person alleges officers have used excessive force during an investigation or arrest, courts measure the description of the officers’ actions against the Fourth Amendment. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam); Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2018). There are three steps to the analysis. First, the court must consider the “type and amount of force inflicted.” Thompson, 885 F.3d at 586 (quoting Espinoza v. City & County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010)). Second, the court must assess the “government’s interests.” Id. (quoting Espinoza, 598 F.3d at 537). For example, how serious was the suspected crime? Did the suspect pose an immediate threat to the officers or public? Was the suspect resisting arrest or attempting to escape? See id. And third, the court must decide whether the government’s interests justified the force used. See id. This is an objective test that assesses the officers’ conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In this case, at the first step, many officers did point guns at the Hills. That was a “high level of force.” Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537. Second, although the government did have an interest in finding and preserving any evidence the Hills’ son had violated the terms of his probation, the government’s interests in using force to accomplish that end were minimal. The Hills’ son was already in custody without a weapon. The elderly Hills were suspected of no crime, were not resisting and were not attempting to flee or destroy evidence. They were compliant and unarmed. Nothing in the complaint suggests the officers had reasons to fear for their safety or to suspect a violent crime was about to be committed, let alone a crime that required the threat of deadly force. Officers had virtually no need to use force, if any. See, e.g., Thompson, 885 F.3d at 586– 87. In all, at the third step, the government’s interests in searching for evidence of probation violation did not justify their decision to use their weapons and aim them at the Hills. Defendants argue it was reasonable for officers to aim their weapons at the Hills because the Hills’ son had been found with a gun while he was on probation. See, e.g., Reply at 6. But the son was not in the home. He was in custody. No allegations in the Hills’ complaint suggest more illegal weapons hid in the Hills’ home, or the Hills were likely to have weapons at the ready. The allegations do not suggest any reason to fear the Hills or their young grandson were at the time armed or dangerous. The court must accept the Hills’ allegations at this stage and must not draw inferences in the officers’ favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. The complaint lays out a plausible claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The defendant officers also assert qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity is a judge- made doctrine designed to ‘balance[ ] two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The doctrine is intended to “give[ ] government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al- Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Courts use a two-part test to decide whether officers are protected from liability under § 1983 by qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. The first part requires the court to “decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, 50, 56; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (internal citations omitted). The second requires the court to “decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Courts may decide which of these parts they will analyze first. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). The court already has determined the complaint states a claim for excessive force, which satisfies the first part of the test, so the question is whether the relevant law was “clearly established” in February 2021, when the search occurred. The Ninth Circuit and other federal courts of appeals had held many times before 2021 that officers use unconstitutionally excessive force when they aim their weapons at people who are not suspected of violent crimes, who do not pose a threat, who have complied with the officers’ instructions, who are not resisting and who are not attempting to flee—especially when those people are elderly or young. See, e.g., Thompson, 885 F.3d 586–87; Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537–38; Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2009); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2009); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2007); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1995). In some of these cases, the potential threats to officers were greater than in this case, and even then officers were not justified in aiming their weapons. For example, in Espinosa, decided in 2010, police received a report of an open apartment door from a tipster who thought the apartment looked like a “drug house.” 598 F.3d at 532. When officers arrived, one of them found a bloody shirt inside. Id. He could not tell whether the blood was old or new, and officers saw nothing else suspicious on the first floor. See id. But on the second floor, officers found a man with a knife. Id. at 532–33. He surrendered to them peacefully. See id. The officers then heard noises in the attic above. Id. at 533. One officer went up and found a man. She held him at gunpoint. See id. This was excessive force. Although the officers had found a bloody shirt and a man with a knife, the level of threat was “low”: there was only one way out of the attic, so the attic’s occupant had no chance of escape, and officers had no reason to suspect danger from the man where he was. See id. at 533, 537–38. The Circuit’s decision in Thompson, decided in 2018, is a similar example. An officer had stopped a man in his car for suspected traffic violations, and the man produced no drivers’ license. 885 F.3d at 584. The officer then discovered the man’s license was suspended, and he saw the man had previously been convicted of a felony, including of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Id. So the officer removed the man from the car and patted him down. Id. at 585. Finding no weapons, he sat the man on the hood of his patrol car and radioed for backup, then began searching the man’s car. Id. He found a loaded revolver. Id. He decided to arrest the man for unlawfully possessing that weapon. Id. By this time a second officer had arrived and was watching over the man, who was ten to fifteen feet from the first officer and the revolver. Id. On the first officer’s signal, the second drew his gun. Id. By one account—which the court was required to accept at that stage of the case—the first officer then aimed his weapon at the man’s head and threatened to kill him if he did not surrender. Id. This was excessive force. The man was suspected of driving without a license and unlawfully possessing a gun, which were “potential crimes of low and moderate severity, respectively,” and the man had already been searched, had no weapon, was compliant, did not resist or attempt to flee and would have had to evade or overcome both officers before he could get to the revolver ten or fifteen feet away in his car. Id. at 586–87. If the officers in Espinosa and Thompson were not reasonable in aiming their weapons— in Espinosa after finding a bloody shirt and a man with a knife, and in Thompson after finding a revolver in a convicted felon’s car—then for purposes of the current motion, it was clearly established in 2021 that the officers were unreasonable in aiming their weapons at the Hills in this case. The court denies the motion to dismiss the first claim. B. Unlawful Entry and Search (Claim 3) The Hills allege the search also violated the Fourth Amendment. “It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). The Supreme Court has made a few exceptions to this general rule, including for those on probation: warrantless searches of a probationer’s home can be reasonable and thus constitutional. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). A warrantless probation search can of course have consequences for other residents who are not on probation, such as a roommate or a family member, as in this case. For these third parties, the court must decide whether the search was “reasonable under the totality of circumstances.” Smith, 876 F.3d at 994. The court balances the intrusion on the innocent third person’s privacy against the government’s legitimate interests. See id. The Hills and the officers all rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Smith. See Opp’n at 5–6; Reply at 2–3. In Smith, a probationer was involved in a violent vehicle theft. 876 F.3d at 989. Officers investigating the crime went to the address she had listed, hoping to find her, but instead found only her mother. Id. The mother, who lived in the home, refused to let the officers in, but they forced their way in and searched the house. Id. The Ninth Circuit held the search was reasonable under the circumstances: the probationer had previously committed a serious crime; police had probable cause to believe she had been involved in a new crime, i.e., the violent vehicle theft; she was still at large and police had probable cause to believe she lived at the address. See id. at 994, 995–96. The court stressed its conclusion was limited to the facts of that case. Id. at 994. This case is unlike Smith. If the court assumes the Hills’ allegations are true, as it must at this stage, the officers’ search was not reasonable under the circumstances. The Hills’ son was already in police custody when officers came to the Hills’ home, he was not suspected of a violent crime, no allegations suggest officers would find contraband or evidence of another crime at the Hills’ home and no allegations suggest a search was necessary to protect the public from gun violence or a similar danger. Officers also searched the entire home, not just the room where the Hills’ son was staying, including the Hills’ own bedroom. The intrusion on the Hills’ privacy was great. It outweighed the government’s interests in protecting the public. The officers argue their search was justified by their need to protect the public from illegal guns. They hypothesize the Hills’ son might have received his gun from someone else living in the Hills’ home, and they argue a search was necessary to ensure there were no more illegal guns in the home. See Reply at 3. These arguments rely on speculation with no foundation in the complaint’s allegations. The officers also argue the Hills’ allegations are “consistent with” a lawful “protective sweep.” Reply at 3 (quotation marks omitted). It is irrelevant at this early stage whether the complaint’s allegations are “consistent with” a theory, even a plausible theory, that would exonerate the officers. “If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible,” then the “complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The officers also assert qualified immunity to this claim. See Mot. at 10. The Hills do not cite another case in which a federal court of appeals has found a similar search was unconstitutional. Neither do the officers. The court has located none; the court’s independent research suggests instead the law was murky at the time. See, e.g., Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 918–19 & nn. 9–10 (2017) (listing several “difficult legal questions” that arise in cases about probation compliance searches and holding officers were protected by qualified immunity); see also Reed v. Sheppard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 429, 450–51 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (summarizing conflicting persuasive authority and finding the law unsettled). The circuit’s decisions also suggest the government has a greater interest in conducting probation compliance searches when the probationer was convicted of a “violent” crime, but the circuit has not explained clearly what crimes are “violent” in this context. See Gomez v. City of Los Angeles, No. 19-4718, 2020 WL 4032673, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020) (collecting authority and granting qualified immunity). The court cannot conclude the officers violated clearly established law at this juncture. Based on the current pleadings, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court dismisses the third claim on these grounds, with leave to amend if possible within the confines of Rule 11. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding leave to amend should be granted unless district court “determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”). C. False Arrest and Unlawful Detention (Claims 2 and 4) The Hills allege the officers also deprived them of constitutional rights in violation of § 1983 by detaining and arresting them during the search. At the most basic level, there is no doubt an officer would violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting a person without probable cause, and a person who has been arrested without probable cause can pursue a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001); Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Amendment also forbids all unreasonable “seizures.” Even a short detention that is not technically an “arrest” can be a “seizure,” so if it was not “reasonable,” then it was not constitutional. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981). The defendants’ motion therefore poses several related questions: Do the pleadings support the conclusion the Hills were detained? If so, was their detention reasonable? And were they also arrested? If so, was the arrest without probable cause? The officers do not dispute they detained the Hills during the search, see Mem. at 6, so the court begins with the detention and whether it was reasonable. Over the years, federal courts have held that some detentions are categorically reasonable and so do not deprive people of their Fourth Amendment rights. For example, a routine border search is “by its very nature reasonable.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Dobson, 781 F.2d 1374, 1376 (1986)). Officers may also detain the occupants of a house while they are executing a search warrant for contraband within it. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005); Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. And most importantly for this case, the Ninth Circuit held in 2009 in Sanchez v. Canales that “officers may constitutionally detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search.” 574 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled in part by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).1 As explained in the previous section, the search of the Hills’ home during a probation compliance search was unreasonable. Because the defendant officers are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity from that claim, the Hills’ detention claim could be viable only if this court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sanchez, which held it is constitutional for officers to “detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search.” 574 F.3d at 1173. The Hills argue it is not, because in Sanchez, the court assumed the officers had probable cause to believe the probationer was at home. See Opp’n at 4, 7–8. In the Hills’ case, by contrast, officers knew the Hills’ son was not in their home, as he was already in police custody. That difference could be important, depending on the specific conditions of their son’s probation agreement. For example, if he had agreed officers could search his house for his person, then the officers probably could not have relied on that condition. But if he also had agreed officers could also search his property and residence, then it might not matter whether he was home. Without more information about the terms of the probation agreement, the court cannot conclude the unlawful detention claim is viable. For that reason, the Hills have not shown this case can be meaningfully distinguished from Sanchez, so their unlawful detention claim must be dismissed.

1 In King, the Circuit overruled Sanchez and other similar cases “to the extent they hold that there is no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment.” 687 F.3d at 1189 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The court’s decision on the pending motion does not turn on that distinction or the overruled portions of Sanchez. The Hills also contend the detention was unreasonable because officers kept them outside in the cold without jackets or shoes for half an hour and because Mr. Hill had recently undergone surgery. Opp’n at 8. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]n officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on ‘the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’” Muehler, 554 U.S. at 98 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19). The force used, duration and conditions of a person’s detention could show officers violated a different constitutional protection, such as the prohibition against unreasonable force, see id., as summarized above. This order does not preclude the Hills from asserting in an amended complaint that defendants deprived them of constitutional or other rights by keeping them outside in the cold without jackets and shoes for half an hour, especially in light of Mr. Hill’s recent surgery. The next question is whether the detention was actually an arrest. The parties have not cited cases in which courts have considered whether a detention during a probation or parole search was a de facto arrest. In other circumstances, such as “Terry stops” and border searches, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have considered whether a reasonable person would have concluded from the circumstances the stop was temporary, and thus merely a detention, or indefinite, and thus an arrest. See, e.g., Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 883–85 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). The Hills’ allegations do not show a reasonable person in their situation would have expected indefinite detention. They do not allege they were handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained. A sergeant also explained the officers were detaining them during a probation compliance search, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, which suggested the Hills would be free when the search was complete. For these reasons, the Hills’ claims for unlawful detention and arrest are dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Hills’ allegations do not give rise to a plausible claim of constitutional violations for unlawful detention or arrest, the court does not reach the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity to these claims or consider what was clearly established law at the time. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. The court grants leave to amend the unlawful detention and arrest claims if possible within the confines of Rule 11. D. Supervising Sergeants’ Liability and Monell Liability Two of the officers at the home were supervising sergeants, Schneider and Olsen. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6. They contend they are not liable for their subordinates’ actions. See Mem. at 11–12. The Ninth Circuit has “long permitted plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually liable in § 1983 suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205. “[A] plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates.” Id. at 1207. In Maxwell v. County of San Diego, for example, the Ninth Circuit denied summary judgment to two supervising officers because they were on the scene of an allegedly unlawful detention and assault and did not intervene. 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013). The Hills have stated a claim of excessive force, and they allege the two sergeants participated in the search and directed it. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 64, 66. At this early stage, these allegations suffice to withstand the sergeants’ motion. The Hills also assert a claim against the City. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a municipal defendant can be liable under § 1983 only for its own polices, customs or practices. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a complaint must include more than “a bare allegation that government officials’ conduct conformed to some unidentified policy or custom.” Id. at 637. It must include “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Id. (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216). The Hills do not specify the policies, customs or practices behind their claim against the city. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend if possible within the confines of Rule 11. See id. at 637–38. The motion to dismiss is granted in part with leave to amend:  Claims 2, 3 and 4 are dismissed with leave to amend.  The Monell claim against the City of American Canyon is dismissed with leave to amend.  The motion is otherwise denied. Plaintiffs must file any amended complaint within twenty-one days. This order resolves ECF No. 23. DATED: January 23, 2024.