Hill v. City of American Canyon

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: January 24, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00349
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Andison Hill and Veronica Hill, No. 2:23-cv-00349-KJM-KJN 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER 13 v. City of American Canyon, et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 Andison and Veronica Hill allege several police officers entered and searched their home 18 | without a warrant or consent, aiming weapons at them in the process, and detained them outside 19 | during the search. They assert several claims under § 1983 against the officers and the City of 20 | American Canyon, where the officers work. The officers and the City move to dismiss for failure 21 | to state a claim. As explained in this order, that motion is granted in part with leave to amend. 22 | I. BACKGROUND 23 The Hills were at home with their eight-year-old grandson on a February afternoon a few 24 | years ago when they saw several armed police officers at their front door. Am. Compl. □□ 16-17, 25 | 23, ECF No. 20. Without asking, the officers came in, guns drawn and aimed at the elderly 26 | couple. /d. 418. The officers ordered the couple and their young grandson out of the home, and 27 | they kept them outside for half an hour without jackets or shoes until officers had searched every

1 room in the house. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22–24. Mr. Hill’s recent heart surgery made it an especially 2 distressing experience for him. Id. ¶ 21. 3 According to the Hills’ complaint, the officers had no warrant, no consent, no reason to 4 suspect any serious or violent crime and no reason to believe they would be met with violence or 5 danger inside the Hills’ home. See id. ¶¶ 26–27. As the Hills were waiting outside, a sergeant 6 explained to them their son, who lived with them at the time but was not home, had been arrested. 7 Id. ¶ 19. He was on probation, and officers had found him with a gun, so they had come to the 8 Hills’ home “to perform a probation compliance search.” Id. To be clear, the officers were not 9 looking for the Hills’ son or his gun. He was already in police custody when officers came to 10 their home. Id. ¶ 26. What or who the officers were looking for in particular is unclear from the 11 Hills’ complaint. See id. ¶ 19. Their search was not confined to the son’s room, or even the 12 home’s shared rooms; they searched every room, even the Hills’ own bedroom. Id. ¶ 22. 13 The Hills claim the officers used excessive force, falsely arrested and detained them and 14 illegally searched their home, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. 15 See id. ¶¶ 28–34 (excessive force); id. ¶¶ 35–45 (false arrest); id. ¶¶ 46–53 (unlawful search); id. 16 ¶¶ 54–62 (unlawful detention). They assert claims against the individual officers, the supervising 17 sergeants and the City of American Canyon, which employs the officers. See id. ¶¶ 63–68. The 18 officers and the city now move to dismiss these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 12(b)(6). See generally Mot., ECF No. 23; Mem., ECF No. 23-1. The motion is fully briefed and 20 the court submitted it without oral arguments. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 25; Reply, ECF 21 No. 26; Min. Order, ECF No. 27. 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 In response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court begins by assuming the complaint’s 24 factual allegations are true, but not its legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 25 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The court then determines 26 whether those factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” under Rule 8, 27 which is a context-specific task based on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 1 A. Excessive Force (Claim 1) 2 When a person alleges officers have used excessive force during an investigation or arrest, 3 courts measure the description of the officers’ actions against the Fourth Amendment. See Tolan 4 v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam); Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 5 2018). There are three steps to the analysis. First, the court must consider the “type and amount 6 of force inflicted.” Thompson, 885 F.3d at 586 (quoting Espinoza v. City & County of San 7 Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2010)). Second, the court must assess the “government’s 8 interests.” Id. (quoting Espinoza, 598 F.3d at 537). For example, how serious was the suspected 9 crime? Did the suspect pose an immediate threat to the officers or public? Was the suspect 10 resisting arrest or attempting to escape? See id. And third, the court must decide whether the 11 government’s interests justified the force used. See id. This is an objective test that assesses the 12 officers’ conduct “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 13 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 14 In this case, at the first step, many officers did point guns at the Hills. That was a “high 15 level of force.” Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 537. Second, although the government did have an interest 16 in finding and preserving any evidence the Hills’ son had violated the terms of his probation, the 17 government’s interests in using force to accomplish that end were minimal. The Hills’ son was 18 already in custody without a weapon. The elderly Hills were suspected of no crime, were not 19 resisting and were not attempting to flee or destroy evidence. They were compliant and unarmed. 20 Nothing in the complaint suggests the officers had reasons to fear for their safety or to suspect a 21 violent crime was about to be committed, let alone a crime that required the threat of deadly 22 force. Officers had virtually no need to use force, if any. See, e.g., Thompson, 885 F.3d at 586– 23 87. In all, at the third step, the government’s interests in searching for evidence of probation 24 violation did not justify their decision to use their weapons and aim them at the Hills. 25 Defendants argue it was reasonable for officers to aim their weapons at the Hills because 26 the Hills’ son had been found with a gun while he was on probation. See, e.g., Reply at 6. But 27 the son was not in the home. He was in custody. No allegations in the Hills’ complaint suggest 28 more illegal weapons hid in the Hills’ home, or the Hills were likely to have weapons at the 1 ready. The allegations do not suggest any reason to fear the Hills or their young grandson were at 2 the time armed or dangerous. The court must accept the Hills’ allegations at this stage and must 3 not draw inferences in the officers’ favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. The complaint lays out 4 a plausible claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 5 The defendant officers also assert qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity is a judge- 6 made doctrine designed to ‘balance[ ] two important interests—the need to hold public officials 7 accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 8 harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Haley v. City 9 of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 10 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The doctrine is intended to “give[ ] government officials breathing 11 room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al- 12 Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). 13 Courts use a two-part test to decide whether officers are protected from liability under 14 § 1983 by qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson, 555 U.S. 15 at 232. The first part requires the court to “decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or 16 shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 12, 50, 56; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (internal citations omitted). The second requires the 18 court to “decide whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s 19 alleged misconduct.” Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Courts may decide which of these 20 parts they will analyze first. Tolan, 572 U.S. at 656 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). The court 21 already has determined the complaint states a claim for excessive force, which satisfies the first 22 part of the test, so the question is whether the relevant law was “clearly established” in February 23 2021, when the search occurred. 24 The Ninth Circuit and other federal courts of appeals had held many times before 2021 25 that officers use unconstitutionally excessive force when they aim their weapons at people who 26 are not suspected of violent crimes, who do not pose a threat, who have complied with the 27 officers’ instructions, who are not resisting and who are not attempting to flee—especially when 28 those people are elderly or young. See, e.g., Thompson, 885 F.3d 586–87; Espinosa, 598 F.3d at 1 537–38; Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2009); Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 2 752, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2009); Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2007); Robinson 3 v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Baker v. Monroe Township, 50 4 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1995). 5 In some of these cases, the potential threats to officers were greater than in this case, and 6 even then officers were not justified in aiming their weapons. For example, in Espinosa, decided 7 in 2010, police received a report of an open apartment door from a tipster who thought the 8 apartment looked like a “drug house.” 598 F.3d at 532. When officers arrived, one of them 9 found a bloody shirt inside. Id. He could not tell whether the blood was old or new, and officers 10 saw nothing else suspicious on the first floor. See id. But on the second floor, officers found a 11 man with a knife. Id. at 532–33. He surrendered to them peacefully. See id. The officers then 12 heard noises in the attic above. Id. at 533. One officer went up and found a man. She held him 13 at gunpoint. See id. This was excessive force. Although the officers had found a bloody shirt 14 and a man with a knife, the level of threat was “low”: there was only one way out of the attic, so 15 the attic’s occupant had no chance of escape, and officers had no reason to suspect danger from 16 the man where he was. See id. at 533, 537–38. 17 The Circuit’s decision in Thompson, decided in 2018, is a similar example. An officer 18 had stopped a man in his car for suspected traffic violations, and the man produced no drivers’ 19 license. 885 F.3d at 584. The officer then discovered the man’s license was suspended, and he 20 saw the man had previously been convicted of a felony, including of unlawfully possessing a 21 firearm. Id. So the officer removed the man from the car and patted him down. Id. at 585. 22 Finding no weapons, he sat the man on the hood of his patrol car and radioed for backup, then 23 began searching the man’s car. Id. He found a loaded revolver. Id. He decided to arrest the man 24 for unlawfully possessing that weapon. Id. By this time a second officer had arrived and was 25 watching over the man, who was ten to fifteen feet from the first officer and the revolver. Id. On 26 the first officer’s signal, the second drew his gun. Id. By one account—which the court was 27 required to accept at that stage of the case—the first officer then aimed his weapon at the man’s 28 head and threatened to kill him if he did not surrender. Id. This was excessive force. The man 1 was suspected of driving without a license and unlawfully possessing a gun, which were 2 “potential crimes of low and moderate severity, respectively,” and the man had already been 3 searched, had no weapon, was compliant, did not resist or attempt to flee and would have had to 4 evade or overcome both officers before he could get to the revolver ten or fifteen feet away in his 5 car. Id. at 586–87. 6 If the officers in Espinosa and Thompson were not reasonable in aiming their weapons— 7 in Espinosa after finding a bloody shirt and a man with a knife, and in Thompson after finding a 8 revolver in a convicted felon’s car—then for purposes of the current motion, it was clearly 9 established in 2021 that the officers were unreasonable in aiming their weapons at the Hills in this 10 case. The court denies the motion to dismiss the first claim. 11 B. Unlawful Entry and Search (Claim 3) 12 The Hills allege the search also violated the Fourth Amendment. “It is a basic principle of 13 Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 14 presumptively unreasonable.” Smith v. City of Santa Clara, 876 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) 15 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). The Supreme Court has made a few 16 exceptions to this general rule, including for those on probation: warrantless searches of a 17 probationer’s home can be reasonable and thus constitutional. See United States v. Knights, 534 18 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). A warrantless probation search can of course have consequences for other 19 residents who are not on probation, such as a roommate or a family member, as in this case. For 20 these third parties, the court must decide whether the search was “reasonable under the totality of 21 circumstances.” Smith, 876 F.3d at 994. The court balances the intrusion on the innocent third 22 person’s privacy against the government’s legitimate interests. See id. 23 The Hills and the officers all rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Smith. See Opp’n at 24 5–6; Reply at 2–3. In Smith, a probationer was involved in a violent vehicle theft. 876 F.3d at 25 989. Officers investigating the crime went to the address she had listed, hoping to find her, but 26 instead found only her mother. Id. The mother, who lived in the home, refused to let the officers 27 in, but they forced their way in and searched the house. Id. The Ninth Circuit held the search 28 was reasonable under the circumstances: the probationer had previously committed a serious 1 crime; police had probable cause to believe she had been involved in a new crime, i.e., the violent 2 vehicle theft; she was still at large and police had probable cause to believe she lived at the 3 address. See id. at 994, 995–96. The court stressed its conclusion was limited to the facts of that 4 case. Id. at 994. 5 This case is unlike Smith. If the court assumes the Hills’ allegations are true, as it must at 6 this stage, the officers’ search was not reasonable under the circumstances. The Hills’ son was 7 already in police custody when officers came to the Hills’ home, he was not suspected of a 8 violent crime, no allegations suggest officers would find contraband or evidence of another crime 9 at the Hills’ home and no allegations suggest a search was necessary to protect the public from 10 gun violence or a similar danger. Officers also searched the entire home, not just the room where 11 the Hills’ son was staying, including the Hills’ own bedroom. The intrusion on the Hills’ privacy 12 was great. It outweighed the government’s interests in protecting the public. 13 The officers argue their search was justified by their need to protect the public from illegal 14 guns. They hypothesize the Hills’ son might have received his gun from someone else living in 15 the Hills’ home, and they argue a search was necessary to ensure there were no more illegal guns 16 in the home. See Reply at 3. These arguments rely on speculation with no foundation in the 17 complaint’s allegations. The officers also argue the Hills’ allegations are “consistent with” a 18 lawful “protective sweep.” Reply at 3 (quotation marks omitted). It is irrelevant at this early 19 stage whether the complaint’s allegations are “consistent with” a theory, even a plausible theory, 20 that would exonerate the officers. “If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by 21 defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible,” then the “complaint 22 survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 23 2011). 24 The officers also assert qualified immunity to this claim. See Mot. at 10. The Hills do not 25 cite another case in which a federal court of appeals has found a similar search was 26 unconstitutional. Neither do the officers. The court has located none; the court’s independent 27 research suggests instead the law was murky at the time. See, e.g., Sharp v. County of Orange, 28 871 F.3d 901, 918–19 & nn. 9–10 (2017) (listing several “difficult legal questions” that arise in 1 cases about probation compliance searches and holding officers were protected by qualified 2 immunity); see also Reed v. Sheppard, 321 F. Supp. 3d 429, 450–51 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) 3 (summarizing conflicting persuasive authority and finding the law unsettled). The circuit’s 4 decisions also suggest the government has a greater interest in conducting probation compliance 5 searches when the probationer was convicted of a “violent” crime, but the circuit has not 6 explained clearly what crimes are “violent” in this context. See Gomez v. City of Los Angeles, 7 No. 19-4718, 2020 WL 4032673, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020) (collecting authority and 8 granting qualified immunity). 9 The court cannot conclude the officers violated clearly established law at this juncture. 10 Based on the current pleadings, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court dismisses the 11 third claim on these grounds, with leave to amend if possible within the confines of Rule 11. See 12 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding leave to amend should be 13 granted unless district court “determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 14 allegation of other facts”). 15 C. False Arrest and Unlawful Detention (Claims 2 and 4) 16 The Hills allege the officers also deprived them of constitutional rights in violation of 17 § 1983 by detaining and arresting them during the search. At the most basic level, there is no 18 doubt an officer would violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting a person without probable 19 cause, and a person who has been arrested without probable cause can pursue a claim under 20 § 1983. See, e.g., Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001); 21 Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Amendment also 22 forbids all unreasonable “seizures.” Even a short detention that is not technically an “arrest” can 23 be a “seizure,” so if it was not “reasonable,” then it was not constitutional. See, e.g., Michigan v. 24 Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981). The defendants’ motion therefore poses several related 25 questions: Do the pleadings support the conclusion the Hills were detained? If so, was their 26 detention reasonable? And were they also arrested? If so, was the arrest without probable cause? 27 The officers do not dispute they detained the Hills during the search, see Mem. at 6, so the court 28 begins with the detention and whether it was reasonable. 1 Over the years, federal courts have held that some detentions are categorically reasonable 2 and so do not deprive people of their Fourth Amendment rights. For example, a routine border 3 search is “by its very nature reasonable.” United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 877 4 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Dobson, 781 F.2d 1374, 1376 (1986)). Officers may 5 also detain the occupants of a house while they are executing a search warrant for contraband 6 within it. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005); Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. And most 7 importantly for this case, the Ninth Circuit held in 2009 in Sanchez v. Canales that “officers may 8 constitutionally detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search.” 9 574 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled in part by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 10 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).1 11 As explained in the previous section, the search of the Hills’ home during a probation 12 compliance search was unreasonable. Because the defendant officers are nevertheless entitled to 13 qualified immunity from that claim, the Hills’ detention claim could be viable only if this court is 14 not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sanchez, which held it is constitutional for officers to 15 “detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance search.” 574 F.3d at 16 1173. The Hills argue it is not, because in Sanchez, the court assumed the officers had probable 17 cause to believe the probationer was at home. See Opp’n at 4, 7–8. In the Hills’ case, by 18 contrast, officers knew the Hills’ son was not in their home, as he was already in police custody. 19 That difference could be important, depending on the specific conditions of their son’s probation 20 agreement. For example, if he had agreed officers could search his house for his person, then the 21 officers probably could not have relied on that condition. But if he also had agreed officers could 22 also search his property and residence, then it might not matter whether he was home. Without 23 more information about the terms of the probation agreement, the court cannot conclude the 24 unlawful detention claim is viable. For that reason, the Hills have not shown this case can be 25 meaningfully distinguished from Sanchez, so their unlawful detention claim must be dismissed.

1 In King, the Circuit overruled Sanchez and other similar cases “to the extent they hold that there is no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment.” 687 F.3d at 1189 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The court’s decision on the pending motion does not turn on that distinction or the overruled portions of Sanchez. 1 The Hills also contend the detention was unreasonable because officers kept them outside 2 in the cold without jackets or shoes for half an hour and because Mr. Hill had recently undergone 3 surgery. Opp’n at 8. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]n officer’s authority to detain incident 4 to a search is categorical; it does not depend on ‘the quantum of proof justifying detention or the 5 extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.’” Muehler, 554 U.S. at 98 (quoting 6 Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19). The force used, duration and conditions of a person’s detention 7 could show officers violated a different constitutional protection, such as the prohibition against 8 unreasonable force, see id., as summarized above. This order does not preclude the Hills from 9 asserting in an amended complaint that defendants deprived them of constitutional or other rights 10 by keeping them outside in the cold without jackets and shoes for half an hour, especially in light 11 of Mr. Hill’s recent surgery. 12 The next question is whether the detention was actually an arrest. The parties have not 13 cited cases in which courts have considered whether a detention during a probation or parole 14 search was a de facto arrest. In other circumstances, such as “Terry stops” and border searches, 15 the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have considered whether a reasonable person would have 16 concluded from the circumstances the stop was temporary, and thus merely a detention, or 17 indefinite, and thus an arrest. See, e.g., Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 883–85 (citing Terry v. 18 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); United States v. Bravo, 295 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). The 19 Hills’ allegations do not show a reasonable person in their situation would have expected 20 indefinite detention. They do not allege they were handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained. 21 A sergeant also explained the officers were detaining them during a probation compliance search, 22 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, which suggested the Hills would be free when the search was complete. 23 For these reasons, the Hills’ claims for unlawful detention and arrest are dismissed for 24 failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Hills’ allegations do not give rise to a 25 plausible claim of constitutional violations for unlawful detention or arrest, the court does not 26 reach the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity to these claims or consider what was clearly 27 established law at the time. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. The court grants leave to amend the 28 unlawful detention and arrest claims if possible within the confines of Rule 11. 1 D. Supervising Sergeants’ Liability and Monell Liability 2 Two of the officers at the home were supervising sergeants, Schneider and Olsen. See 3 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6. They contend they are not liable for their subordinates’ actions. See Mem. 4 at 11–12. The Ninth Circuit has “long permitted plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually liable 5 in § 1983 suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Starr, 652 F.3d 6 at 1205. “[A] plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based 7 upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her 8 subordinates.” Id. at 1207. In Maxwell v. County of San Diego, for example, the Ninth Circuit 9 denied summary judgment to two supervising officers because they were on the scene of an 10 allegedly unlawful detention and assault and did not intervene. 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 11 2013). The Hills have stated a claim of excessive force, and they allege the two sergeants 12 participated in the search and directed it. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 64, 66. At this early stage, 13 these allegations suffice to withstand the sergeants’ motion. 14 The Hills also assert a claim against the City. Under Monell v. Department of Social 15 Services, a municipal defendant can be liable under § 1983 only for its own polices, customs or 16 practices. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) 17 (citing 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a 18 complaint must include more than “a bare allegation that government officials’ conduct 19 conformed to some unidentified policy or custom.” Id. at 637. It must include “sufficient 20 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 21 effectively.” Id. (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216). The Hills do not specify the policies, customs 22 or practices behind their claim against the city. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend if 23 possible within the confines of Rule 11. See id. at 637–38. 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 The motion to dismiss is granted in part with leave to amend: 26  Claims 2, 3 and 4 are dismissed with leave to amend. 27  The Monell claim against the City of American Canyon is dismissed with leave to 28 amend. 1  The motion is otherwise denied. 2 Plaintiffs must file any amended complaint within twenty-one days. 3 This order resolves ECF No. 23. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 DATED: January 23, 2024.