Hill v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 25-1060
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KELLY HILL, No. 25-1060 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-01246-JAT v. MEMORANDUM*

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 4, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Kelly Hill appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of

Social Security’s denial of her application for Child’s Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review the district court’s decision “de novo, and we will not overturn the

Commissioner’s decision ‘unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence

or is based upon legal error.’” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022)

(quoting Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018)). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) evaluations of the medical

reports were supported by substantial evidence. “[A]n ALJ cannot reject an

examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without

providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at

792. The ALJ summarized the physicians’ opinions and reports and assessed any

inconsistencies with the record. The ALJ appropriately acknowledged all relevant

medical testimony and provided specific reasons, supported by substantial evidence,

explaining how persuasive it found each opinion. See id. at 792–93 (holding that

substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that a doctor’s “opinion [was]

unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with the overall treating notes and mental

status exams in the record”).

2. The ALJ also articulated clear and convincing reasons for rejecting

Hill’s symptom testimony. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022).

The ALJ compared the testimony to Hill’s prior conflicting statements, including

her prior report that she had only “‘some’ social anxiety and mild depression.” The

2 25-1060 ALJ further described inconsistencies between Hill’s testimony and the medical

record, including observations by treating physicians that Hill was “cooperative,”

“pleasant,” “had good eye contact,” “normal speech,” “average intelligence,” and a

“logical thought process.” See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d

1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient

basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). Finally, the ALJ reasoned

that Hill’s allegations were undermined by her daily activities, such as regularly

shopping and going to restaurants. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040

(9th Cir. 2007) (reviewing factors that an ALJ must consider, including “whether the

claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”).

Because the ALJ described in detail Hill’s own testimony and compared it to her

contrary statements, inconsistencies in the medical record, and Hill’s daily activities,

the ALJ adequately “show[ed] his work” in discounting Hill’s testimony. Smartt,

53 F.4th at 499.

3. The ALJ’s detailed analysis of Hill’s symptom testimony also renders

harmless any error in not providing an explanation for rejecting the lay witness

testimony. The testimony of the lay witnesses substantially mirrored Hill’s

testimony about her symptoms, which the ALJ discussed at length and rejected based

on clear and convincing reasons supported by the record. See Molina v. Astrue, 674

F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ALJ’s failure to provide reasons

3 25-1060 for rejecting lay testimony was harmless error because “the lay testimony described

the same limitations as [Claimant’s] own testimony” and “the ALJ’s reasons for

rejecting [Claimant’s] testimony apply with equal force to the lay testimony”).

4. Finally, there was no error in the ALJ’s use of a hypothetical. The ALJ

posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert that accurately reflected Hill’s

limitations and was supported by the record. The ALJ noted that the hypothetical

individual was “limited to simple repetitive tasks” and “cannot work in a high

production assembly line type job.” The ALJ did not err in subsequently relying on

the vocational expert’s response that there was work in the national economy for

such an individual, including as a kitchen helper or a cleaner. See Stubbs-Danielson

v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED.

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