Hill Assoc. v. Brookfield Inland Wetlands, C., No. 31 87 10 (Mar. 11, 1996)
This text of 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1538 (Hill Assoc. v. Brookfield Inland Wetlands, C., No. 31 87 10 (Mar. 11, 1996)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The plaintiffs allege the following facts in their appeal. On or about March 24, 1994, FRM filed with the Commission an application for a permit to conduct regulated activities on land owned by RA. The Association, a group of neighboring property owners and their families, intervened in the proceedings, pursuant to General Statutes §
At its September 12, 1994 meeting, where the Commission denied FRM's application for a permit to conduct regulated activities within and adjacent to wetland areas and watercourses via a notice of decision, and issued a cease, desist and restore order, the Commission also scheduled the General Statutes §
On January 6, 1995, the Commission filed its answer and the return of record. The DEP commissioner filed an answer on January 9, 1995.
On February 3, 1995, the plaintiffs filed their brief. In CT Page 1540 response, the Commission filed its brief on March 3, 1995. On March 29, 1995, FRM and RA filed a document entitled "Adoption of Brief" in which they adopt the Commission's brief in its entirety. The DEP commissioner filed his brief on April 7, 1995.
On September 5, 1995, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate this administrative appeal with Fairfield Resources v. BrookfieldZoning Commission, Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury, Docket No. 318767. The court, Mihalakos, J., denied this motion on September 5, 1995. Subsequent to the court's decision, the Commission filed an objection to this motion to consolidate. On November 7, 1995, the court, Leheny, J., found this objection moot as the court, Mihalakos, J., previously had denied plaintiffs' motion to consolidate on September 5, 1995.
On October 2, 1995, the Commission filed a supplemental return of record. "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tolly v. Department of Human Resources,
In their brief, the plaintiffs state that they do not contest the Commission's denial of FRM's permit application. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 3.) Rather, the plaintiffs only appeal from the Commission's cease, desist and restore order, which accompanied the Commission's denial of FRM's permit application. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 3.)
Although the plaintiffs raise several arguments in their brief, the court does not need to address the merits of these arguments because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. The court dismisses this administrative appeal regarding the Commission's cease, desist and restore order because the September 12, 1994 cease, desist and restore order, from which the plaintiffs appealed on October 4, 1994, was not an CT Page 1541 appealable final decision at the time the plaintiffs commenced their appeal, for the reasons set forth in Fairfield Resources v.Brookfield Wetlands Commission, Superior Court, Judicial District of Danbury, Docket No. 318653 (Leheny, J.) (decision to be released).
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Leheny, J.
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1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1538, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-assoc-v-brookfield-inland-wetlands-c-no-31-87-10-mar-11-1996-connsuperct-1996.