IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SADGE A. HILDEBRANDT,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3043-JWL
JEFF RICHARDS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Sadge A. Hildebrandt is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time of filing, Plaintiff was in custody at the Franklin County Detention Center in Ottawa, Kansas (“FCDC”). Plaintiff is currently housed at the Osage County Jail in Lyndon, Kansas (“OCJ”). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court assessed an initial partial filing fee in the amount of $36.50 that is due by April 23, 2025. The failure to submit the initial fee by the deadline may result in the dismissal of this matter without further notice. Plaintiff alleges that FCDC jail administration is denying him access to church. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that the jail’s justification was that an inmate that is related to Plaintiff’s case is housed in the area where church services are held. Id. As Count I, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his First Amendment right to exercise his religion and right to assembly. Id. at 4. He alleges that since November 16, 2024, he has been denied access to group services, placing a substantial burden on his religion by restricting him from access to group worship. Id. Plaintiff claims that on December 24, 2024, he was informed by staff that he could not attend church because there was a connection between an individual housed in the area where services are held and Plaintiff’s criminal case. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that the claim was not corroborated by Plaintiff’s attorney or parole officer. Id. Plaintiff claims that despite his attendance at a service on February 2, 2025, without incident, Sgt. Garner told him
on February 13, 2025, that there was a safety concern and he was removed within five minutes based on a fabricated “perception of tension.” Id. Officer Powell denied Plaintiff’s request to attend services on February 18, 2025. Id. As Count II, Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment violation, arguing that the continued denial of group worship is discriminatory and arbitrary. Id. at 4. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was repeatedly offered “one-on-one” pastor visits, but Plaintiff argues that this does not replace group worship. Id. at 5–6. As Count III, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges that he suggested to Lt. Alexander that they
could move the other inmate to a different area and have “rotating attendance” at church services. Id. at 6. Plaintiff claims that his request was denied. Id. As Count IV, Plaintiff alleges cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the denial of group worship based on an inmate’s claim to Lt. Alexander unjustly punishes Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff claims that he has not made threats or received disciplinary reports, and he is not a witness or confidential informant regarding any crimes in the facility. Id. Plaintiff alleges that inmates were transferred due to overcrowding, but although he requested a transfer, he was overlooked. Id. Plaintiff names as defendants: Jeff Richards, Franklin County Sheriff; Tammy Alexander, FCDC Lieutenant; Kyle Lasswell, Franklin County Undersheriff; Maddie Garner; FCDC Sergeant; and Dawson Powell, FCDC Correctional Officer. For relief, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief requiring Defendants to allow Plaintiff to attend group worship. Id. at 8. Plaintiff also seeks $150,000 in compensatory damages for “emotional distress,” and $75,000 in punitive damages.
Id. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)– (2). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. DISCUSSION 1. First Amendment and RLUIPA
Plaintiff asserts a First Amendment claim as well as a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.). “To state a valid constitutional claim, a prisoner must allege facts showing that officials substantially burdened a sincerely held religious belief.” Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)). “Similarly, to state a claim under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must plead that ‘he wishes to engage in (1) a religious exercise (2) motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government.’ ” Blair v. Raemisch, 804 F. App’x 909, 916–17 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1312 (10th Cir. 2010)). “If a substantial burden is shown,
officials must identify a legitimate penological interest.” Williams, 5 F.4th at 1133 (citing Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218). Our Circuit has articulated the following test to determine when the government places a substantial burden on a plaintiff’s free exercise of religion: The government substantially burdens a person’s religions exercise ... when it (1) “requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief,” (2) “prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief,” or (3) “places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.” Blair, 804 F. App’x at 916–17 (quoting Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315). The test set forth above for a First Amendment claim also applies to claims under RLUIPA. See id. (articulating Tenth Circuit’s three factor RLUIPA test and explaining that RLUIPA “test is grounded in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of substantial burden under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, ... and thus is applicable to [plaintiff’s] First Amendment claim as well.”).
Plaintiff alleges that from November 16, 2024, until he was transferred to the OCJ1, he was denied access to group services, with the exception of being allowed to attend group worship on February 2, and a partial service on February 13, 2025. Plaintiff also acknowledges that he was offered one-on-one services with a pastor. In Strope, the Tenth Circuit reasoned as follows: Illustrating the distinction between substantial burden and inconvenience, we held (1) the flat denial of a halal diet with approved meats was actionable, id. at 1316–20, but (2) an incident (the panel concurrence notes “sporadic incidents”) in which a prisoner’s meal was rendered inedible by service of prohibited items contaminating his tray was not actionable, id. at 1320–21; id. at 1325; see also Gallagher, 587 F.3d at 1070 (holding isolated violation of kosher restrictions did not support Free Exercise claim). We “assume[d] that as the frequency of presenting unacceptable foods increases, at some point the situation would rise to the level of a substantial burden,” but that level had clearly not been reached.
Strope v. Cummings, 381 F. App’x 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citing Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1321). In sum, mere inconvenience, negligence, and isolated or sporadic incidents are not sufficient to show a substantial burden. Even if a substantial burden is shown, adequate justification has been found where denying group worship for inmates “would have a serious impact on (1) prison security, (2) the safety of prison staff and other inmates, and (3) prison resources.” Williams v. Miller, 696 F. App’x 862, 864–65 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.
1 On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff gave a change of address noting that he was in custody at the OCJ. Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (prison regulations requiring inmates working outside to remain outside all day did not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause even though the regulations resulted in Muslim inmates missing Jumu’ah)). Plaintiff should show good cause why his First Amendment and RLUIPA claims should not be dismissed. 2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met.2 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must allege facts showing he or she is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.; Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Amendment requires prison and jail officials to provide humane conditions of confinement guided by “contemporary standards of decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ and only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities’ are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, prison conditions may be “restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “Under the Eighth Amendment, (prison) officials must provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring inmates receive the basic necessities of adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care and by
2 The Tenth Circuit has held that a pretrial detainee’s claims regarding conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause, and that “the Eighth Amendment standard provides the benchmark for such claims.” Routt v. Howard, 764 F. App’x 762, 770 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (quoting Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Hooks v. Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1203–04 10th Cir. 2020) (declining to extend Kingsley’s exclusively objective standard for pretrial detainees’ excessive force claims to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims). taking reasonable measures to guarantee the inmates’ safety.” McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The second requirement for an Eighth Amendment violation “follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and
in prison-conditions cases that state of mind is “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’” Id. It is not enough to establish that the official should have known of the risk of harm. Id. Because the sufficiency of a conditions-of-confinement claim depends upon “the particular facts of each situation; the ‘circumstances, nature, and duration’ of the challenged conditions must be carefully considered.” Despain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson
v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000)). “While no single factor controls . . . the length of exposure to the conditions is often of prime importance.” Id. As the severity of the conditions to which an inmate is exposed increases, the length of exposure required to make out a constitutional violation decreases. Accordingly, “minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to an Eighth Amendment violation, while ‘substantial deprivations. . .’ may meet the standard despite a shorter duration.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to allege a “sufficiently serious” deprivation or facts showing he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Plaintiff has also failed to allege deliberate indifference by any defendant. Plaintiff should show good cause why this claim should not be dismissed. 3. Discrimination/Equal Protection Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment violation in Count II. Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against and denied equal protection. Plaintiff alleges that staff are prioritizing the other inmate’s rights over Plaintiff’s rights. (Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff claims that staff refused
to move the other inmate to a different area. Id. He also claims that other inmates were transferred due to overcrowding, but he was overlooked. Id. at 6. However, the Court notes that Plaintiff has now been transferred to the OCJ. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citation omitted). “An equal protection claim may challenge legislation or the conduct of an individual.” Ashaheed v. Currington, 7 F.4th 1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The claim “may be asserted with respect to a group or a ‘class
of one.’” Id. (citation omitted). “The former is more common and concerns a ‘governmental classification[ ] that affect[s] some groups of citizens differently than others.’” Id. (citations omitted). To allege an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must state facts indicating that defendants treated him differently than other similarly situated individuals. Plaintiff does not allege that he was treated differently on the basis of class membership. To proceed upon an equal protection claim as a “class-of-one plaintiff,” there must be allegations that others similarly situated in every material respect were intentionally treated differently and that the government’s action was irrational and abusive. Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 567 F. App’x 621, 631–32 (10th Cir. 2014); Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to allege that the other inmates were similarly situated in every material respect. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In order to assert a viable equal protection claim, plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated to them.”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff should show good cause why his discrimination claim should not be dismissed. 4. Defendants It appears that Plaintiff is relying on the supervisory status of some of the defendants. An essential element of a civil rights claim against an individual is that person’s direct personal participation in the acts or inactions upon which the complaint is based. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Henry v. Storey, 658 F.3d 1235, 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (“But § 1983 imposes liability for a defendant’s own actions—personal participation in the specific constitutional violation complained of is essential.”’) (citing Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423- 24 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.”) (citation omitted)); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation . . . must be established.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Conclusory allegations of involvement are not sufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). As a result, a plaintiff is required to name each defendant not only in the caption of the complaint, but again in the body of the complaint and to include in the
body a description of the acts taken by each defendant that violated plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Mere supervisory status is insufficient to create personal liability. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008) (supervisor status is not sufficient to create § 1983 liability). An official’s liability may not be predicated solely upon a theory of respondeat superior. Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1476 FN4 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995). A plaintiff alleging supervisory liability must show “(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 960 (2011). “[T]he factors necessary to establish a [supervisor’s] § 1983 violation depend upon the constitutional provision at issue, including the state of mind required to establish a violation of that provision.” Id. at 1204 (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
Plaintiff also references “staff,” “the jail administration,” and “the facility,” throughout his Complaint. An assertion of collective responsibility fails to adequately allege a claim for relief against a specific defendant or to show personal responsibility by an individual defendant. See Walker v. Mohiuddin, 947 F.3d 1244, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1228 (10th Cir. 2013)). A plaintiff alleging civil rights violations must “isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of each defendant” such that his allegations “provide adequate notice as to the nature of the claims against each” defendant. Robbins v. State of Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). Allegations that a plaintiff’s “rights ‘were violated’ or that ‘defendants,’ as a collective and undifferentiated whole, were responsible for those violations” are insufficient to support § 1983 claims. Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1228 (citations omitted). 5. Relief Requested Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for emotional distress. Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), because Plaintiff has failed to allege a
physical injury. Section 1997e(e) provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). “The plain language of the statute does not permit alteration of its clear damages restrictions on the basis of the underlying rights being asserted.” Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001). “The statute limits the remedies available, regardless of the rights asserted, if the only injuries are mental or emotional.” Id. (citing Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir.1999)).
Plaintiff is also seeking punitive damages, which “are available only for conduct which is ‘shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.’” Searles, 251 F.3d at 879 (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff presents no plausible basis for a claim of punitive damages because he alleges no facts whatsoever establishing that any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages is subject to dismissal. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is moot. Plaintiff is no longer confined at the FCDC. Plaintiff is currently housed at the OCJ. Because Plaintiff’s request relates solely to alleged wrongdoing on the part of FCDC employees, the Court would be unable to provide Plaintiff with effective relief and his requests for injunctive relief are moot. Article III of the Constitution extends the jurisdiction of federal courts only to “live, concrete” cases or controversies. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010). “Article III’s requirement that federal courts adjudicate only cases and controversies necessitates that courts decline to exercise jurisdiction where the award of any requested relief would be moot—i.e. where
the controversy is no longer live and ongoing.” Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute on other grounds. Consequently, “[m]ootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” Rio Grande, 601 F.3d at 1109 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495 1974). The Tenth Circuit has applied this principle to § 1983 actions brought by inmates, and held that an inmate’s transfer from one prison to another generally renders moot any request for injunctive relief against the
employees of the original prison concerning the conditions of confinement. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1299–1300 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (inmate’s release from prison moots his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief); McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing prisoner’s release from prison mooted his § 1983 claim for injunctive relief); Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908, 910 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985) (noting transfer of inmate to different prison renders his § 1983 claim for injunctive relief moot); see also Pfeil v. Lampert, 603 F. App’x 665, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (holding that “RLUIPA claims regarding prison conditions become moot if the inmate plaintiff is released from custody.”) (citations omitted). The mootness doctrine is based on the reality that even if the inmate receives injunctive relief, the defendants from the former prison would be unable to provide the relief to the plaintiff. Because Plaintiff is no longer in custody at the FCDC, his claims for injunctive relief are moot and subject to dismissal. IV. Response Required
Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal without further notice for failure to state a claim. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until May 12, 2025, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated April 9, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas. S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE