Hildebrand v. Town of Menasha

2011 WI App 83, 800 N.W.2d 502, 334 Wis. 2d 259, 2011 Wisc. App. LEXIS 365
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedMay 11, 2011
DocketNo. 2010AP897
StatusPublished

This text of 2011 WI App 83 (Hildebrand v. Town of Menasha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hildebrand v. Town of Menasha, 2011 WI App 83, 800 N.W.2d 502, 334 Wis. 2d 259, 2011 Wisc. App. LEXIS 365 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

ANDERSON, J.

¶ 1. The Town of Menasha appeals from the circuit court's final judgment holding that the Town could not legally assess David and Susan Hildebrands' commercial property for the cost of installing a portion of asphalt trail which abuts the property. Because the special assessment imposed upon the Hildebrands did not constitute a valid and enforceable exercise of the Town's police power under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 (2009-10),1 we affirm.

[264]*264 Law

¶ 2. Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(l)(a) provides that a municipality may levy and collect special assessments upon property when special benefits are conferred upon that property:

[A]ny city, town or village may, by resolution of its governing body, levy and collect special assessments upon property in a limited and determinable area for special benefits conferred upon the property by any municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or improvement out of the proceeds of the special assessments.

¶ 3. Special assessments can only be levied for local improvements. Genrich v. City of Rice Lake, 2003 WI App 255, ¶ 9, 268 Wis. 2d 233, 673 N.W.2d 361. Before the correctness of a special assessment can be addressed, the circuit court must initially examine whether the improvement is local. Id. This examination presents a question of fact. Id. The "purpose for making the improvements is relevant to resolving the nature of the improvement, but not determinative because the court must also consider the benefits the property receives." Id., ¶ 10.

¶ 4. Purpose is relevant to determining the nature of the improvement because of the manner in which local improvement is defined. Id., ¶ 11. A "local improvement" is a type of improvement primarily made for the accommodation and convenience for residents of a particular locality that grants special benefits to their property. Id. The phrase "primarily made" signifies that consideration be given to the municipality's motivations [265]*265for making the improvements. Id. In so considering, the circuit court must decide what the primary purpose for the improvements was and who the primary objects of that purpose were. Id. "Specifically, the [municipality's] purpose for initiating improvements must be for reasons of accommodation and convenience (the 'what' question), and the object of the purpose must be primarily for the people in a particular locality (the 'who' question) for an improvement to fall within the local improvement category." Id.

¶ 5. Thus, if the improvement's primary purpose and effect are to benefit the public, it is not a local improvement. Id., ¶ 12. Purpose alone, though, is not conclusive; the court must also consider the effect of the improvement by examining the type of benefits conferred and their extent. Id. And this consideration should bear the greatest weight. Id.

¶ 6. With regard to the type of benefits, while general improvements grant substantially equal benefits and advantages to the property of the whole community or otherwise benefit the public at large, local improvements confer "special benefits" on property in a particular area. Id., ¶ 13. A special benefit has the effect of furnishing an "uncommon advantage" that either increases the services provided to the property or enhances its value. Id.

¶ 7. An uncommon advantage is a benefit that differs in kind rather than in degree from those benefits enjoyed by the general public. Id., ¶ 14. It can be thought of as an advantage that is in addition to that benefit enjoyed by other property owners in the munici[266]*266pality. Id. When evaluating an uncommon advantage grounded upon an alleged increase in services, the accrual of the benefits must be "certain." Id. (citations omitted). That is to say, the benefit must not be contingent on unplanned future action by the municipality. Id. If the uncommon advantage stems from an enhancement in the property's value, the court must view the benefits and their effect in light of the highest and best possible use of the property. Id.

¶ 8. Furthermore, the extent of the benefits must be substantial and capable of realization in a reasonable amount of time. Id., ¶ 15. A benefit is substantial if it provides more than incidental effects to the property. Id. Accordingly, a local improvement can incidentally grant general benefits to the public at large or the property of the whole community yet still be local, while a general improvement may incidentally provide special benefits to particular properties and nevertheless remain general. Id. Finally, the effect of the benefit must be capable of realization in a reasonable amount of time. Id. However, evidence that the property will not be developed in the foreseeable future, or that there is no present use for the improvement, will not prevent a finding of special benefits. Id.

Standard of Review

¶ 9. We review the circuit court's discretionary findings under the clearly erroneous standard. See Town of Menasha v. City of Menasha, 170 Wis. 2d 181, 190, 488 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1992); Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2).

Facts

¶ 10. In a Final Assessment Resolution mailed to the Hildebrands on May 21, 2008, the Hildebrands were [267]*267assessed $33,205.60 in construction costs for the installation of an asphalt trail abutting their commercial property. In response, the Hildebrands filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court on August 11, 2008.

¶ 11. In the notice of appeal, the Hildebrands raised eleven issues. The Town then filed a motion for summary judgment on January 28, 2009. In its motion, the Town asked the court to rule that under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703, it is presumed that the Town proceeded reasonably with regard to the assessment of the Hildebrands' property and that the Hildebrands failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact to rebut the presumption.

¶ 12. After a hearing on the Town's summary judgment motion, the court held that the method used by the Town in imposing its assessments was reasonable, but that there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether there are appropriate special benefits and as to whether the trail constitutes a local improvement. Thus, the court did not grant the Town's summary judgment motion. In its order, the court defined the three issues that remained open for trial:

a. Whether the Hildebrands' property was specially benefited by the trail segment for which assessments were imposed as required for imposition of special assessments under § 66.0703 Wis. Stats.
b.

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Related

Town of Menasha v. City of Menasha
488 N.W.2d 104 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 1992)
Genrich v. City of Rice Lake
2003 WI App 255 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2003)
State v. Swope
2008 WI App 175 (Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 2008)
Molbreak v. Village of Shorewood Hills
225 N.W.2d 894 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
2011 WI App 83, 800 N.W.2d 502, 334 Wis. 2d 259, 2011 Wisc. App. LEXIS 365, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hildebrand-v-town-of-menasha-wisctapp-2011.