TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a Florida district court’s ruling that the Federal Constitution requires that indigent parents in child dependency proceedings be provided with counsel in all cases unless they waive that right, beginning immediately following service of a petition on the parent or seizure of the child. The trial court also ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee, pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, P.L. No. 94-559, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as amended. We affirm the holding of the trial court except as to the award of attorney’s fees.
On January 30, 1976, Hilary Davis, the mother of Carl Thor Davis left her husband after he hit their 14-month-old child and broke the child’s arm. After she turned to the state for assistance, the State initiated a dependency proceeding under Fla.Stat. Ann. § 39.01 et seq. (West 1974) seeking to obtain custody of the child. At the initial hearing on February 4,1976, in the Juvenile and Family Division of the Dade County Circuit Court, custody of the child was granted to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pending a formal hearing on March 4. Hilary Davis was indigent and was unable to obtain counsel for this preliminary adjudicatory hearing. The judge did not offer to appoint counsel for her at this hearing, but he did advise her to have counsel present at the formal hearing.
The plaintiff, because of her poverty, was unable to hire counsel for the March 4 hearing. She tried to secure an attorney through a legal services office, but was unsuccessful. Thus she appeared at the formal hearing without counsel. The circuit judge never asked her at the hearing about the failure to obtain counsel.
Under Florida law, pursuant to Fla.Stat. Ann. § 39.05(4) and 39.09(l)(b), while the state is represented by counsel at such a [376]*376proceeding, the judge is not required to appoint counsel to represent indigent parents.1
According to the district court opinion, “without benefit of counsel, Hilary Davis was little more than a spectator in the adjudicatory proceeding. She was ignorant of the law of evidence, and of the substantive law governing dependency proceedings. She sat silently through most of the hearing, and fearful of antagonizing the social workers, reluctantly consented to what she believed would be the placement of her child with the state for a few weeks.” Davis v. Page, 442 F.Supp. 258, 260-61 (S.D.Fla.1977). Ms. Davis evidently thought the state would take custody of the child for a few weeks while she found a new place to live and a job. She was unaware that a finding committing the child to the temporary custody of the state pursuant to Fla.Stat.Ann. § 39.10(4) and 39.11(1)(c) left the child in the state’s custody “until terminated by the court or until the child reaches 18.” See Davis v. Page, 442 F.Supp. 258, 261 (S.D.Fla.1977). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court told Ms. Davis to contact a lawyer. She was not informed, however, of her right to appeal under Fla.Stat.Ann. § 39.14(1).
After the hearing, the child was adjudicated dependent and custody was given to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (D.H.R.S.). Ms. Davis subsequently obtained counsel and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court seeking return of her son. That petition was denied. She subsequently filed suit in federal court on two counts. First, she sued officials of the D.H.R.S. in order to regain custody of her son. Second, she filed a class action on behalf of all indigent parents who were defendants in child dependency and neglect proceedings seeking a declaratory judgment that counsel must be afforded to them at state expense in these proceedings. Named as defendants in the second count were the judges of the Juvenile and Family Division of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, acting in their official capacity. The plaintiff also sought to enjoin dependency hearings in which counsel was not provided to indigent parents.
During the course of the proceedings in the United States court, custody was restored to Ms. Davis, subject to supervision by the state and the continuing jurisdiction of the state Circuit Court. By the time the child was returned to her, she had been deprived of custody for a full year.
On the second charge, the United States court found first that the “right of family integrity” given constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, see May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), required strict scrutiny of the procedural safeguards required in these proceedings. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). Applying strict scrutiny, the court reasoned that the right to counsel was an essential element of the procedural due process required in these proceedings. The court then concluded that while a dependency proceeding was not a criminal proceeding, it was substantially similar and that therefore, as in criminal cases, counsel had to be provided to indigent parents. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). Finally, the court ruled that counsel should be provided to indigent parents in all dependency proceedings, rather than assigned on a case-by-case basis. The court said such a right could not be waived prior to notice and that such a waiver to be effective had to be “knowing and intelligent.” See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The court also said that counsel had to be made available “immedi[377]*377ately following service of the petition or seizure of the child.2” 442 F.Supp. at 265.
An amended final judgment was entered in this case on January 25, 1978. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services’ officials acquiesced in the judgment and are not parties to this appeal.
Counsel for the Circuit Judges, without discussing the matter with his clients, determined on the basis of his research, not to appeal the judgment. On March 3, the plaintiff moved for civil contempt to enforce compliance with the final judgment. However, after finally discussing the matter with his clients, defense counsel for the judges decided to appeal. On March 22, the judicial defendants filed both a notice of appeal and a motion to extend the time within which to appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a). The district court granted the extension on the ground that defense counsel’s failure to appeal constituted excusable neglect.
I.
The appellee argues first in a motion to this Court that the district court’s granting of an extension to appeal beyond the usual 30 days constituted an abuse of discretion. Under the Federal Rule 4(a) applicable at the time:
. Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the district court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision. .
The appellee urges that the failure to appeal in this case was not “excusable neglect,” since the defendants’ counsel, the Attorney General’s office of Florida, reached this decision after thoughtful research and deliberation based on legal research.
We think the trial court decided this issue correctly. This standard of “excusable neglect,” incorporated into the rule in 1966, was intended to broaden the former rule that defined excusable neglect only as “the failure of a party to learn of the entry of judgment.3” The “change was made because experience has revealed that there [378]*378are a number of other situations in which tardiness is excusable and in which it is unfair to dismiss an appeal because of late filing of the notice.” Stern, Changes in the Federal Appellate Rules, 41 F.R.D. 297, 298 (1967). Although the “excusable neglect” standard is still a strict one, this Court has held that a “showing of . unique circumstances may render it unfair to dismiss an appeal because of late filing of the notice.” Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 600 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1979). It has also been suggested that the “matter rests largely in the discretion of the district court. If it finds excusable neglect and grants an extension, the Court of Appeals should not second-guess this determination. .” 16 Wright, Miller, Cooper and Gresman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3950, at 367 (1977). This standard of appellate deference to the discretion of the district court has been adopted by this Court. Gann v. Smith, 443 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1972).
We also note that effective August 1, 1979, the Supreme Court amended Rule 4(a) to provide that the time for appeal may be extended, not only for a showing of “excusable neglect,” but also for a showing of “good cause.” Although that amendment does not apply to this case since the district court made its ruling before August 1, we note that the change indicates that the standard should be interpreted flexibly. See also Chipser v. Kohlmeyer, 600 F.2d at 1063 n.2.
Although the district court filed no opinion in its decision to extend the time for appeal of this motion, its decision must have been based on the fact that counsel for the defendants never even discussed a possible appeal with his clients until after the filing date had passed. Given the standard of deference accorded to district courts in these matters and the recent broadening of the standard in the Rule to promote flexibility, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion.
II.
The state’s primary contention on appeal is that the district court erred in holding that there is a right to counsel for indigent parents in dependency proceedings. In determining this issue, our first inquiry is whether the appellee has asserted an interest which is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection: “[T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place we must look not to the “weight” but to the nature of the interest at stake.....We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2107-2108, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). There can be no doubt that Ms. Davis has a constitutionally protected liberty interest at stake in the dependency proceeding — the right to family privacy or the integrity of the family unit.
As early as 1923, the Supreme Court recognized the fundamental nature of this interest when it held that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925).
Following that pronouncement the Court in decisions involving various aspects of family life has accorded paramount importance to the familial relationship. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942). This protectiveness was illustrated by the Court’s discussion of the nature of the interest involved in Stanley v. Illinois:
[379]*379The private interest here that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children “come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.”
405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). The fundamental right of family integrity has found protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2108, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), and the Ninth Amendment see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).
Having determined that parents have a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the custody of their children we must now decide whether the process that is due a parent in a dependency proceeding includes the right to counsel. In order to make this determination, we begin with an analysis of the precise nature of the government’s interest and of the private interest involved. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court announced a general formula to be used in weighing these competing interests:
[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903.
The discussion above illustrates that a parent’s interest in the custody of his or her child is among the most basic and fundamental of the liberties protected by the Constitution. Loss of a child is one of the severest possible sanctions that can be taken against a parent; it is a deprivation which can be equated with imposition of a fine or imprisonment through criminal proceedings. Indeed it is not unlikely that many parents would choose to serve a prison sentence rather than to lose the companionship and custody of their children. In addition the determination that a parent has abused or neglected a child may lead to criminal proceedings against the parent4, and certainly carries with it a stigma which may be as traumatizing to the parent as imprisonment. Since the process that is due an individual is influenced by the extent to which the person “may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ ” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), the state’s interest in refusing to provide counsel in dependency proceedings must be great in order to overcome the parent’s interest in protecting the family unit.
We must also consider the risk that a parent will erroneously be deprived of custody of a child under the present proce[380]*380dures, and the probable value of counsel in preventing an erroneous result. A careful consideration of the Florida dependency proceeding will reveal the indigent parent’s need for the assistance of counsel.5 Section 39.09 of the Florida Statutes provides that adjudicatory hearings to determine dependency are to be conducted by the judge without a jury, applying the rules of evidence generally used in civil cases. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 39.09 (West 1974). If the petition alleging dependency is contested by the parent, the state is represented by the state attorney. Id. § 39.05. The state must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 39.09. Once a child has been adjudicated dependent, the court retains jurisdiction until the child reaches the age of 18 or is released by court order. If the court finds that the child is dependent, it may (1) place the child in his own home or the home of a relative under protective supervision; (2) commit the child to child-care agency; (3) commit the child to the temporary legal custody of the department of family services; or (4) permanently commit the child to the department of family services or to a child-placing agency. Id. § 39.11. In order to regain custody of a child after an adjudication of dependency, a parent must petition the court to return the child through a disposition hearing. See id. § 39.09(3) In a disposition hearing, the parent does not have the opportunity to relitigate the underlying adjudication of dependency; rather, the disposition hearing is an opportunity to prove that, because of subsequent developments, restoration of custody is in the best interest of the child. While the state bears the burden of proof in an initial adjudicatory hearing, the parent seeking restoration of custody bears the burden of proof in a disposition hearing. Evidence which is inadequate to sustain a finding of dependency nevertheless may be adequate to sustain denial of a petition for restoration of custody. In Pendarvis v. State, 104 So.2d 651 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1958), the Florida court refused to restore a child to the custody of its parents, holding:
Once a child has been lawfully declared to be a dependent or delinquent child, it becomes a ward of the state and a broad discretion is vested in the juvenile court to do those things which appear to the court to be in the best interest of the child. The question of who is a proper person to have the care and custody of such child is not one that can be directed by the whim, fancy, or caprice of those who had the responsibility and right under God’s, nature’s, and man’s law to nurture, care for, and support their offspring, and who by their own making have forfeited that right and cast the responsibility upon others. Evidence that may be totally inadequate to deprive a parent of the custody of his child in the first instance may bé altogether adequate to support the court’s refusal to restore custody to the parent once the child has become a ward of the state.
Id. at 652.
The dependency proceeding is complex in terms of the procedural, evidentiary and substantive law applicable to the hearing. In addition to this confusing legal framework, the parent is confronted with “the full panoply of the traditional weapons of the state.” Danforth v. State Department of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 799 (Me.1973). The state is represented by the state attorney; it has access to public records concerning the family and to the services of social workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists. Those representing the state have experience in legal proceedings and the ability to examine witnesses, present evidence, and argue skillfully that the child should be adjudicated dependent. Unrepresented parents, in contrast, will normally not cross-examine witnesses, submit evidence, call witnesses, or present a defense. They do not understand the rules of proce[381]*381dure or substantive law. They do not object to improper questions or move to strike improper testimony. As the trial court here found to be true of Hilary Davis, they may not even understand the legal significance and effect of the proceedings.
Unless the indigent parent has the tools necessary to oppose the state’s expert presentation, a finding of dependency could be based partially upon inadmissible hearsay, improper opinion evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue of dependency. A determination of dependency might be founded upon testimony that a skilled attorney would expose as biased or untrue. The parent may have a defense sufficient to prevent an adjudication of dependency, which he or she is unable adequately to present. Furthermore, once a finding of dependency is made upon such improper or insufficient evidence, the parent may face difficult problems in regaining custody of the child. According to the court in Pendarvis, evidence which was not legally sufficient to support a finding of dependency may nonetheless be sufficient to refuse a return of the child to its parents. Thus, a parent might lose a proceeding that he would have won with the assistance of counsel, and then be unable to regain custody of the child even with the assistance of counsel.6
The value of counsel in a dependency proceeding is inestimable. The words of the Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) explaining the need for counsel in criminal cases, are equally descriptive of the plight of a parent in a dependency proceeding:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69, 53 S.Ct. at 64. Just as does a defendant in a criminal ease, or a child in a delinquency proceeding, the parent in a dependency hearing “needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1448, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
The fundamental interest of the parents implicated in dependency proceedings and the possibility of an erroneous adjudication of dependency must be balanced against any interest that the state may have in conducting summary proceedings. The state’s primary interest in conducting these proceedings is to protect the health and welfare of the child — an interest which will not be affected by the appointment of counsel for indigent parents. The only interest of the state that would be seriously affected by provision of counsel is the interest in economy. While it is certainly • true that appointment of counsel for indigent parents will require additional expenditures by the state, we simply cannot agree with the state’s contention that its interest in saving public money outweighs the parents’ interest in not being unfairly deprived of the custody of a child. “For the State to in[382]*382trude permanently or only temporarily in a manner designed to disassemble the nuclear family, society’s most basic human and psychological unit without affording counsel and guidance to a class of society’s least equipped adversaries” constitutes a denial of fundamental due process.7
Imposition of the obligation to provide counsel finds support in the decisions of the Supreme Court involving right to counsel. Development of the constitutional right to assistance of state-provided counsel began with the Court’s decision in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) that an indigent defendant who is unable to make his own defense in a capital case must have appointed counsel. Id. at 71, 53 S.Ct. at 65. It is now settled law that an indigent criminal defendant threatened with imprisonment is entitled to appointed counsel in both federal and state prosecutions. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. Although delinquency proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal, the serious consequences of a finding of delinquency were held to mandate the assistance of counsel. Id. at 36, 87 S.Ct. at 1448. While it is obvious that the constitutional mandate for procedural protections increases as a proceeding approaches the nature of a criminal prosecution, the Court has rejected a rigid civil-criminal distinction in determining what process is due an individual. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), Justice Blackmun emphasized that the label affixed to an action would not be controlling: “Little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court proceeding either ‘civil’ or ‘criminal.’ The Court carefully has avoided this wooden approach.” Id. at 541, 91 S.Ct. at 1984.
We cannot accept the state’s argument that the right to appointed counsel should be limited solely to cases designated “criminal.” The Supreme Court has rejected this technical approach in favor of a test which looks to the nature and impact of the proceeding. Although a dependency proceeding is denominated a civil proceeding, we find that the possible deprivation of liberty rights inherent in a dependency proceeding closely resembles the loss of liberty which attends a criminal proceeding. We therefore hold that an indigent parent in a dependency proceeding is entitled to appointment of counsel, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.8
[383]*383We also note that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment supports a rule requiring the provision of counsel to indigent parents in dependency proceedings. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause requires the state to furnish free transcripts to indigent criminal defendants who appeal their convictions. Id. at 19, 76 S.Ct. at 590. Subsequently, the Court expanded this ruling to hold that a state must furnish counsel to incarcerated indigent criminal defendants in appeals provided of right. “There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefits of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, . . is forced to shift for himself.” Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58, 83 S.Ct. 814, 817, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). In Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971), the Court extended the Griffin rationale to criminal appeals involving only a fine. The Court rejected the city’s argument that Griffin should be limited to cases in which a defendant is sentenced to confinement. The Court felt that this argument misconceived the principle set forth in Griffin —that invidious diserimination exists when an effective appeal is made available only to those who can afford the appeal. Id. at 196-97, 92 S.Ct. at 415-16. The Court also emphasized the practical effects and serious collateral consequences that may attend imposition of a fine in a criminal proceeding. Id. We have already discussed that the child dependency proceeding “by its very nature resembles a criminal prosecution,” Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959, 91 S.Ct. 1624, 1626, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971) (Black, J. dissenting). Given the nature of the proceeding and the severe consequences of an adjudication of dependency, we find these cases supportive of the requirement that an indigent defendant be provided the same tools that a more prosperous parent would have to defend against the threatened deprivation by the state.9 See Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge, 396 Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55, 61 (1976).
III.
The state urges that, if this Court finds a right to counsel in dependency proceedings, it should adopt the case-by-case method of Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974) for determining whether counsel should be appointed. Because we believe that the case-by-case method is unworkable, we hold instead that an indigent parent in a [384]*384dependency proceeding has an absolute right to counsel absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.
In holding that the right to counsel should be determined upon the facts of each case, the court in Cleaver adopted the same approach which was rejected in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) as inappropriate for use in criminal cases. Rejecting the rule established in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942) that the right to counsel was to be tested “by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case,” id. at 462, 62 S.Ct. at 1256, the Gideon Court held that criminal defendants have an absolute right to the assistance of counsel. 372 U.S. at 344, 83 S.Ct. at 796. The Court has also followed the principle of Gideon in finding that there is an absolute right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1451, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), and sex offender proceedings, Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 611, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967).
Despite this compelling precedent, the state urges that we follow the Supreme Court’s approach in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), which held that the right to counsel in probation or parole revocation hearings should be determined on a case-by-case basis. This argument overlooks, however, the basis upon which the Gagnon court distinguished the rule requiring an absolute right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Recognizing that the case-by-case method had been rejected for use in criminal trials, the Court held that Gideon was not controlling because of the following “critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings:”
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole. The need for counsel at revocation hearings derives, not from the invariable attributes of those hearings, but rather from the peculiarities of particular cases.
Id. at 789, 93 S.Ct. at 1763. The court agreed that, under the case-by-case approach, there would be cases in which a lawyer would have been helpful but would not be appointed, but felt that this possibility was permissible since the interest at stake in revocations hearings was the “more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime.” Id. We could find no more persuasive support for imposition of an absolute right to counsel than the reasoning of the court in Gagnon. The exact factors that the Court notes as requiring an absolute right of counsel in criminal cases are also present in dependency proceedings — in opposing counsel, formal rules of evidence, procedural rights, and an adversarial format. Furthermore, in Gagnon, use of the case-by-case method was justified partially because of the limited due process rights of prisoners; the due process rights of parents in child dependency proceedings, however, are among the most fundamental and basic of those guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In arguing for adoption of the case-by-case method, the state relies heavily on the fact that, in some dependency proceedings, parents may not wish to contest a dependency proceeding. The Florida statute defines “dependent'child” to include a child who:
(a) Has been abandoned by his parents or other custodians.
(b) For any reason, is destitute or homeless.
[385]*385(c) Has not proper parental support, maintenance, care, or guardianship.
(d) Because of the neglect of his parents or other custodians, is deprived of education as required by law, or of medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other care necessary for his well-being.
(e) Is living in a condition or environment such as to injure him or endanger his welfare.
(f) Is living in a home which, by reason of the neglect, cruelty, depravity, or other adverse condition of a parent or other person in whose care the child may be, is an unfit place for him.
(g) Is surrendered to the division of family services or a licensed child-placing agency for purpose of adoption.
Fla.Stat.Ann. § 39.01(10) (West 1974). Dependency proceedings may also be instituted by the state to determine the disposition of a “child in need of supervision,” which includes a child who: “(a) Being subject to compulsory school attendance, is truant from school, (b) Persistently disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents or other custodians and is beyond their control, (c) Has run away from his parent or custodian.” Id. The State contends that counsel is unnecessary when parents voluntarily consent to surrender a child either temporarily or for adoption, or when parents consent to the state’s supervision over an uncontrollable child. It is true that, in some of these instances, parents will be fully aware of the effect and significance of the dependency proceeding, and in full agreement with the proceedings. Obviously, an attorney is not necessary in such cases. Hilary Davis’ case is an excellent example, however, of the desirability of a rule which would impose an absolute right to counsel which parents may waive if counsel is not desired. The state has termed Hilary Davis’ actions a “voluntary relinquishment” of the custody of her child. According to the state, she consented to the state’s custody of the child and therefore, under the proposed “case-by-case” method, did not need an attorney. Yet Ms. Davis, in “voluntarily” relinquishing her child, suffered a grievous loss because of her lack of understanding of the consequences of the proceeding.- The trial court found that she was under the impression that her child would be taken for a short period of weeks, until she was able to support herself and the child. She little suspected that her child was to be taken until he reached the age of 18, or until she proved, in a hearing at which the burden was on her, that she should regain custody. The advice of an attorney would have prevented this regrettable result. It is clear that counsel is often needed, even in the state’s “non-adversarial,” “voluntary,” dependency proceedings. Of course, it is likely that parents in some dependency proceedings will not require counsel. When that situation arises, a parent may make a knowing, intelligent, waiver of the right to counsel, and the state will be spared the expense. In view of the potential loss and the complex nature of dependency proceedings, a knowing waiver of counsel in cases where counsel is unnecessary is a far better rule than to adopt a case-by-case approach which, as illustrated by the instant case, may often be ineffective.
We must not lose sight of the fact that the real issue in this case is the extent to which poverty can be allowed to interfere with this nation’s commitment to equal justice for all. We realize that it cannot be said there is meaningful access to the judicial process until all serious litigants are represented by counsel. The ' Supreme Court has recognized ever since Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) that a vision of equal justice demands that the poor have an opportunity to receive the same treatment in the courts as the wealthy. As discussed previously, we come to the realization that there is an obligation in the courts “to lift the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances,” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34, 76 S.Ct. 585, 598, 100 L.Ed. 891 [386]*386(1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) when litigants appear before us.10
Thus, we are only recognizing here the principle laid down by the Court in Edwards almost forty years ago. A judicial system is not fair which has a built in opportunity for the rich to receive a different treatment than the poor. A judicial system is not equitable or consistent when counsel is provided in criminal cases but not in child custody proceedings.
We agree with the holding of the district court that, upon the filing of a petition for an adjudication of dependency, a parent must be informed that he has a right to counsel immediately following service of the petition or seizure of the child. The right to counsel may be relinquished by a “knowing and intelligent” waiver following notice of the right to counsel. As a final point of appeal, the state contends that the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against a state court judge. The Supreme Court has recently heard argument in a case involving this precise issue, see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumer’s Union, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 226, 62 L.Ed.2d 168, (1980), and therefore we do not reach this issue. The Court’s decision in that case will instruct the district court, which will consider the issue on remand.
The judgment is AFFIRMED in all respects except as to the award of attorney’s fees. On that issue the Court will act in conformity with the decision of the Court in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumer’s Union, supra.