[Cite as Higle v. Engle, 2026-Ohio-2123.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BROWN COUNTY
ABIGAIL HIGLE, : CASE NO. CA2025-08-012 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 6/8/2026 RALPH CURTIS ENGLE II, :
Appellant. :
:
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 20240500
Walker Law, LLC, and Jonathan D. Walker, for appellee.
Ralph Curtis Engle, II, pro se.
____________ OPINION
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Ralph Curtis Engle II, appeals a decision of the Brown County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion
for relief. Brown CA2025-08-012
{¶ 2} On August 5, 2024, appellee, Abigal Higle, filed a petition for a domestic
violence civil protection order ("DVCPO") against appellant on behalf of herself and the
parties' 11-year-old child. That same day, following an ex parte hearing during which Higle
testified, a magistrate issued an ex parte DVCPO and scheduled a full hearing on Higle's
petition for August 15, 2024. Subsequently, the parties jointly moved to continue the
hearing to retain counsel. The trial court granted the continuance and rescheduled the full
hearing for October 11, 2024.
{¶ 3} On October 11, 2024, both parties appeared at the hearing, represented by
counsel. Following negotiations, the parties entered into a consent agreement, listing
Higle and the parties' child as protected parties. The consent agreement stated that "the
parties agreed to enter into this consent agreement. There is no finding of domestic
violence," that Higle was granted exclusive possession of the residence, and that
appellant was permitted to stay in his property next door, provided there was no contact
with Higle or the child. The consent agreement and domestic violence civil protection
order was signed by the parties, their attorneys, and the trial judge. The consent
agreement was filed and adopted as an order of the trial court on October 17, 2024.
{¶ 4} On July 28, 2025, appellant, acting pro se, filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion,
seeking "relief from the judgment issued on or about August 5, 2024, pursuant to Civ.R.
60(B)(1), (3), and (5)." In other words, appellant sought relief from the magistrate's August
5, 2024 ex parte DVCPO and not from the trial court's adoption of the consent agreement.
Appellant asserted he was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (B)(3), and (B)(5)
because he was removed from his home without prior hearing or warning, Higle submitted
materially misleading claims to the court, and "the combination of attorney misconduct,
lack of notice, and resulting property and family loss justifies equitable relief." On July 29,
2025, the trial court denied the Civ.R. 60(B) motion as without merit.
-2- Brown CA2025-08-012
{¶ 5} Appellant now appeals, pro se, the denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion, raising
11 assignments of error. His first six assignments of error and his eighth assignment of
error assert that (1) the trial court erred in finding there was "immediate and present
danger," (2) the trial court improperly relied upon Higle's hearsay testimony, (3) the
magistrate made prejudicial remarks, prejudging appellant's future conduct, (4) the
residence exclusion was overbroad and vague, (5) the magistrate improperly assigned
custody of the child to Higle without due process by invoking R.C. 3109.042, (6) appellant
was deprived of parental, property, and financial rights without adequate notice or
adversarial hearing, and (7) the testimony of Higle's brother, a sheriff's office employee,
undermined impartiality. Appellant's last three assignments of error and his seventh
assignment of error ostensibly challenge collateral allegations and events that were not
adjudicated within the DVCPO proceedings, to wit, (1) Brown County Job and Family
Services unlawfully removed the child in retaliation for his report of child sexual abuse,
(2) the trial court failed to establish exigency in relation to the agency's removal of the
child, (3) the combined acts of sabotaging a land deal, evicting appellant without process,
and disregarding his property interests evidence abuse of process and collusion, and (4)
appellant suffered collateral financial harm through the unauthorized manipulation of his
financial accounts.
{¶ 6} Before addressing the merits of appellant's assignments of error, we first
determine whether this appeal is properly before us.
{¶ 7} Appellant appeals the trial court's denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion which
sought to vacate the magistrate's August 5, 2024 ex parte DVCPO. R.C. 3113.31(G)(1)
governs the appealability of orders granting or denying domestic violence civil protection
orders, and as pertinent here, provides that "[a]n order issued under this section, other
than an ex parte order, that . . . approves a consent agreement, . . . is a final, appealable
-3- Brown CA2025-08-012
order." Therefore, the August 5, 2024 ex parte order was not a final appealable order.
Daugherty v. Daugherty, 2012-Ohio-1520, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.); J.J. v. Kilgore, 2021-Ohio-928,
¶ 7 (10th Dist.); Hanna v. Keszei, 2009-Ohio-4136, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). Furthermore, the trial
court's filing and adoption of the parties' consent agreement on October 17, 2024,
superseded the ex parte order, rendering any possible or claimed error in the ex parte
order moot. Daugherty at ¶ 15; J.J. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} The October 17, 2024 consent agreement was a final appealable order
under R.C. 3113.31(G)(1). However, appellant did not appeal the consent agreement.
See App.R. 4(A). Rather, nine months later, appellant filed his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. It is
well established that "[a] Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment cannot be used as
a substitute for a timely appeal or as a means to extend the time for perfecting an appeal
from the original judgment." Key v. Mitchell, 1998-Ohio-643, ¶ 5. Civ.R. 60(B) "'does not
exist to allow a party to obtain relief from his or her own choice to forgo an appeal from
an adverse decision.'" Scrimizzi v. Scrimizzi, 2019-Ohio-2793, ¶ 53 (12th Dist.), quoting
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 15.
{¶ 9} Appellant is essentially attempting to gain review of the consent agreement
and civil protection order granted against him by appealing the trial court's denial of his
Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Or, as the Eighth District Court of Appeals described it, by appealing
the trial court's judgment entry denying his motion to vacate, appellant "is attempting to
bootstrap arguments that are time-barred. In other words, [he] is attempting to utilize the
instant appeal to improperly seek review of alleged errors that he failed to timely appeal."
In re A.P., 2026-Ohio-743, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); T.S. v. L.J.R., 2026-Ohio-1862, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.)
(respondent attempting to utilize the instant appeal of the denial of her Civ.R. 60[B] motion
to improperly seek review of alleged errors of the civil stalking protection order she failed
to timely appeal). However, "[s]uch procedural devices cannot be used in order to obtain
-4- Brown CA2025-08-012
review of a judgment where a timely appeal was not filed." State ex rel. Durkin v. Ungaro,
39 Ohio St.3d 191, 192 (1988).
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[Cite as Higle v. Engle, 2026-Ohio-2123.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BROWN COUNTY
ABIGAIL HIGLE, : CASE NO. CA2025-08-012 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 6/8/2026 RALPH CURTIS ENGLE II, :
Appellant. :
:
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 20240500
Walker Law, LLC, and Jonathan D. Walker, for appellee.
Ralph Curtis Engle, II, pro se.
____________ OPINION
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Ralph Curtis Engle II, appeals a decision of the Brown County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion
for relief. Brown CA2025-08-012
{¶ 2} On August 5, 2024, appellee, Abigal Higle, filed a petition for a domestic
violence civil protection order ("DVCPO") against appellant on behalf of herself and the
parties' 11-year-old child. That same day, following an ex parte hearing during which Higle
testified, a magistrate issued an ex parte DVCPO and scheduled a full hearing on Higle's
petition for August 15, 2024. Subsequently, the parties jointly moved to continue the
hearing to retain counsel. The trial court granted the continuance and rescheduled the full
hearing for October 11, 2024.
{¶ 3} On October 11, 2024, both parties appeared at the hearing, represented by
counsel. Following negotiations, the parties entered into a consent agreement, listing
Higle and the parties' child as protected parties. The consent agreement stated that "the
parties agreed to enter into this consent agreement. There is no finding of domestic
violence," that Higle was granted exclusive possession of the residence, and that
appellant was permitted to stay in his property next door, provided there was no contact
with Higle or the child. The consent agreement and domestic violence civil protection
order was signed by the parties, their attorneys, and the trial judge. The consent
agreement was filed and adopted as an order of the trial court on October 17, 2024.
{¶ 4} On July 28, 2025, appellant, acting pro se, filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion,
seeking "relief from the judgment issued on or about August 5, 2024, pursuant to Civ.R.
60(B)(1), (3), and (5)." In other words, appellant sought relief from the magistrate's August
5, 2024 ex parte DVCPO and not from the trial court's adoption of the consent agreement.
Appellant asserted he was entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (B)(3), and (B)(5)
because he was removed from his home without prior hearing or warning, Higle submitted
materially misleading claims to the court, and "the combination of attorney misconduct,
lack of notice, and resulting property and family loss justifies equitable relief." On July 29,
2025, the trial court denied the Civ.R. 60(B) motion as without merit.
-2- Brown CA2025-08-012
{¶ 5} Appellant now appeals, pro se, the denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion, raising
11 assignments of error. His first six assignments of error and his eighth assignment of
error assert that (1) the trial court erred in finding there was "immediate and present
danger," (2) the trial court improperly relied upon Higle's hearsay testimony, (3) the
magistrate made prejudicial remarks, prejudging appellant's future conduct, (4) the
residence exclusion was overbroad and vague, (5) the magistrate improperly assigned
custody of the child to Higle without due process by invoking R.C. 3109.042, (6) appellant
was deprived of parental, property, and financial rights without adequate notice or
adversarial hearing, and (7) the testimony of Higle's brother, a sheriff's office employee,
undermined impartiality. Appellant's last three assignments of error and his seventh
assignment of error ostensibly challenge collateral allegations and events that were not
adjudicated within the DVCPO proceedings, to wit, (1) Brown County Job and Family
Services unlawfully removed the child in retaliation for his report of child sexual abuse,
(2) the trial court failed to establish exigency in relation to the agency's removal of the
child, (3) the combined acts of sabotaging a land deal, evicting appellant without process,
and disregarding his property interests evidence abuse of process and collusion, and (4)
appellant suffered collateral financial harm through the unauthorized manipulation of his
financial accounts.
{¶ 6} Before addressing the merits of appellant's assignments of error, we first
determine whether this appeal is properly before us.
{¶ 7} Appellant appeals the trial court's denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion which
sought to vacate the magistrate's August 5, 2024 ex parte DVCPO. R.C. 3113.31(G)(1)
governs the appealability of orders granting or denying domestic violence civil protection
orders, and as pertinent here, provides that "[a]n order issued under this section, other
than an ex parte order, that . . . approves a consent agreement, . . . is a final, appealable
-3- Brown CA2025-08-012
order." Therefore, the August 5, 2024 ex parte order was not a final appealable order.
Daugherty v. Daugherty, 2012-Ohio-1520, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.); J.J. v. Kilgore, 2021-Ohio-928,
¶ 7 (10th Dist.); Hanna v. Keszei, 2009-Ohio-4136, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.). Furthermore, the trial
court's filing and adoption of the parties' consent agreement on October 17, 2024,
superseded the ex parte order, rendering any possible or claimed error in the ex parte
order moot. Daugherty at ¶ 15; J.J. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 8} The October 17, 2024 consent agreement was a final appealable order
under R.C. 3113.31(G)(1). However, appellant did not appeal the consent agreement.
See App.R. 4(A). Rather, nine months later, appellant filed his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. It is
well established that "[a] Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment cannot be used as
a substitute for a timely appeal or as a means to extend the time for perfecting an appeal
from the original judgment." Key v. Mitchell, 1998-Ohio-643, ¶ 5. Civ.R. 60(B) "'does not
exist to allow a party to obtain relief from his or her own choice to forgo an appeal from
an adverse decision.'" Scrimizzi v. Scrimizzi, 2019-Ohio-2793, ¶ 53 (12th Dist.), quoting
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 15.
{¶ 9} Appellant is essentially attempting to gain review of the consent agreement
and civil protection order granted against him by appealing the trial court's denial of his
Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Or, as the Eighth District Court of Appeals described it, by appealing
the trial court's judgment entry denying his motion to vacate, appellant "is attempting to
bootstrap arguments that are time-barred. In other words, [he] is attempting to utilize the
instant appeal to improperly seek review of alleged errors that he failed to timely appeal."
In re A.P., 2026-Ohio-743, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); T.S. v. L.J.R., 2026-Ohio-1862, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.)
(respondent attempting to utilize the instant appeal of the denial of her Civ.R. 60[B] motion
to improperly seek review of alleged errors of the civil stalking protection order she failed
to timely appeal). However, "[s]uch procedural devices cannot be used in order to obtain
-4- Brown CA2025-08-012
review of a judgment where a timely appeal was not filed." State ex rel. Durkin v. Ungaro,
39 Ohio St.3d 191, 192 (1988). "If we were to hold differently, judgments would never be
final because a party could indirectly gain review of a judgment from which no timely
appeal was taken by filing . . . a [Civ.R. 60(B)] motion to vacate judgment." Id.
{¶ 10} Accordingly, we dismiss appellant's appeal. Key, 1998-Ohio-643, at ¶ 5-7;
T.S. at ¶ 14-15; Pike v. Piatt, 2016-Ohio-5041 (7th Dist.).
{¶ 11} Appeal dismissed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER , J., concur.
-5- Brown CA2025-08-012
JUDGMENT ENTRY
Upon consideration of the appeal and briefs before this court, it is the order of this court that this appeal should be and hereby is dismissed because this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the present matter for lack of a timely filed notice of appeal of the October 17, 2024 consent agreement and domestic violence civil protection order pursuant to App.R. 4(A).
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Brown County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed to appellant.
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robin N. Piper, Judge
/s/ Mike Powell, Judge
-6-