Hightower v. Vose

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Hightower v. Vose. Read the opinion of the Court — 95 F.3d 1146
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided September 12, 1996·No. 95-2296·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



September 12, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 95-2296

CHRISTOPHER J. HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

GEORGE A. VOSE, JR., ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________

____________________

Christopher J. Hightower on brief pro se. ________________________
Michael B. Grant, Senior Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department _________________
of Corrections, on Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Disposition Under Rule 27.1 for appellees.

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. Christopher Hightower appeals pro se the __________ ___ __

dismissal of his civil rights complaint pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we affirm in

part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.1 1

On March 28, 1994, Hightower filed a complaint under 42

U.S.C. 1983 against various Rhode Island prison officials

based on events which allegedly occurred while Hightower was

a pretrial detainee. Stripped to its essentials, the

complaint alleges that correctional officers Gilbert and

Berry conspired to falsely charge Hightower with swearing and

threatening; Officer Gilbert later admitted at a disciplinary

hearing that Hightower did not swear and that the alleged

threat was a statement by Hightower that he intended to file

____________________

1Although appellees have not raised the issue of waiver, 1
we note that the instant case was originally referred to a
magistrate judge for a recommended disposition pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate's report recommended
dismissal, Hightower filed no objection to the magistrate's
report, and the district judge adopted the recommended
decision on the ground that "no objection has been timely
filed and the time for objecting has expired." As a general
rule, a litigant in this circuit waives the right to
appellate review of a district court order adopting a
magistrate's recommendation if the litigant fails to object
to the proposed decision before the district court. See, ___
e.g., Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 & ____ ____________________ _____
n.19 (1st Cir. 1994); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor ______________________ ___________
Co., 616 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1980). However, we decline ___
to apply the waiver rule to a pro se litigant's failure to ___ __
object where, as here, appellees have not argued waiver and
the magistrate's report does not warn the litigant "that
failure to file within the time allowed waives the right to
appeal the district court's order." United States v. ______________
Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) _______________
(mandating such notice in a magistrate's report where the
litigant is pro se). ___ __

-2-

a grievance; the disciplinary board found Hightower to be

guilty of threatening and imposed a term of segregation; and

the guilty finding was affirmed on administrative appeal.

The "false" charges were made and the discipline was imposed,

the complaint alleges, in retaliation for Hightower's filing

a grievance against Gilbert. The complaint also alleges that

the disciplinary board excluded evidence regarding the nature

of the "threat" in its written report, and that the evidence

in the disciplinary record does not support a guilty finding.

Finally, the complaint alleges that Hightower suffered

various indignities during segregation--including the denial

of a shower for eight days and having unknown correctional

officers soil his court clothing--and that prison officials

did not immediately return him to the general population at

the completion of his disciplinary term.

Based on these facts, Hightower alleged the denial of

his right under the First Amendment to petition the

government for the redress of grievances. He also alleged a

denial of both substantive and procedural due process.

Finally, Hightower invoked the supplemental jurisdiction of

the district court and alleged various violations of state

law.

To the extent that Hightower complains that he was

punished for expressing an intent to file a grievance--or in

the alternative, that he was subjected to "false charges" and

-3-

discipline in retaliation for doing so--he states a claim

under the First Amendment.2 See, e.g., Sprouse v. Babcock, 2 ___ ____ _______ _______

870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the First

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