Highland Oil Corp. v. City of Lathrup Village

Michigan Supreme Court

Highland Oil Corp. v. City of Lathrup Village

85 N.W.2d 185, 349 Mich. 650

CourtMichigan Supreme Court

DecidedOctober 7, 1957

DocketCalendar 46,742

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 85 N.W.2d 185 (Highland Oil Corp. v. City of Lathrup Village) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Highland Oil Corp. v. City of Lathrup Village, 85 N.W.2d 185, 349 Mich. 650 (Mich. 1957).

Pincite

Opinion

Edwards, J.

This case in its most important aspect involves an attack upon the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance in the new city of Lathrup Village in Oakland county. The ordinance under fire first restricted certain lots along Southfield road to a residential classification and then by amendment permitted professional buildings (in the nature of doctors’ offices) to be built there.

The plaintiff oil company claims a constitutional right to build a gasoline station on its lots. It points to long-time business restrictions and 20 x 100-foot platting of its 7 lots, along with heavy traffic on Southfield road as rendering the restrictive zoning unreasonable. Lathrup Village, as defendant, points to an immediate neighborhood, of fine homes, the long-time (if by chance interrupted) residential zoning of the particular lots, and the claimed detrimental effect of a gasoline station on nearby, though not adjacent, homes.

The history of Lathrup Village is laid out in this record. It dates back to 1924 when the 9 subdivisions now comprising the new city were originally acquired, carefully planned and platted by Louise Lathrup Kelley and her mother. After many vicissitudes through depression and war (see Craig v. Kelley, 311 Mich 167), the subdivisions developed over the years until they were incorporated in a home-rule city by charter adopted in 1953. As we deal with one of its problems now, the city of Lath-rup Village is a small residential community of about 1,000 homes, most of them valued between $25,000 and $50,000 and located midway between the *653 northern Detroit city limits and the city of Birmingham. The streets of Lathrup Village are winding and shaded. There are only a few commercial buildings in the entire city. There is no manufacturing, and as of now there are no gasoline stations.

The original plan of Lathrup Village included provision for a considerable amount of commercial frontage. In addition to the platting of 20-foot lots .along Eleven and Twelve Mile roads, all of the Southfield road frontage within what is now the village was laid out in 20 x 100-foot lots with an alley to the rear, and with restrictions which permitted business usage. The record seems to indicate that at least for many years the lots thus platted for business proved to number far in excess of demand.

In 1937 the township of Southfield first adopted a zoning ordinance 'which was applicable to the Lath-rup subdivisions, and it is undisputed that that ordinance zoned the property currently in dispute as residential. Such zoning continued at least until the adoption of the charter of the new city in 1953. Section 3.16 of that charter continued its effectiveness as follows:

“The zoning ordinance and the building code of the township of Southfield, under the conditions of section 7.1 hereof, shall continue in full force and effect in the territory incorporated within the city and be administered therein by the city until amended or repealed or found invalid.”

Section 7.1 of the charter thus referred to concerns interim legislation. Section 18.11 of the charter is entitled “Interim Legislation,” and reads as follows:

“Within 30 days after the effective date hereof, the clerk under direction of the council, shall procure, and enter and maintain in a record called ‘Interim Legislation,’ a copy of each existing township *654 bylaw, ordinance, resolution, rule and regulation disclosed by tbe public records of tbe township; and the council shall, within 60 days after such entry, determine the provisions thereof which apply to said territory under authority of this section. The application of such provisions to this home-rule city shall terminate not later than June 7, 1954.”

The new city council did not meet the time schedule contemplated by this last provision and no zoning ordinance had been adopted by the new city as of the fall of 1954. At that time plaintiff Highland Oil was seeking for gasoline station locations and through a real-estate broker entered negotiations with Louise Lathrup Kelley, the original developer of the city who held title to the 7 lots running north from the northeast corner of Southfield and Glen-wood. Obviously relying upon the June 7, 1954, termination date, Mrs. Kelley represented to Highland Oil’s representative that this property was available for construction of a gasoline station since no zoning ordinance was in effect. The record discloses that at the time Mrs. Kelley’s husband was a member of a city board charged with drafting the new zoning ordinance.

After checking the charter provisions and satisfying itself, Highland Oil bought the 7 lots for $31,-000. Mrs. Kelley retained the right to approve or disapprove the plans for the proposed gasoline station, her interest therein amongst others being ownership of most of the adjacent property. The subsequent developments of consequence to our case took place in the following chronology:

April 5, 1955, Highland Oil filed an application for a building permit for a gasoline station on the property it had purchased, with the duly designated building inspector of the new city.

April 8, 1955, this application was referred to the city council with a letter informing the council that *655 the application for this “high-grade” gasoline station did not conform to “the proposed zoning ordinance.”

April 11, 1955, Highland Oil’s representative appeared before the city council and requested issuance of the building permit, but the council instead adopted a resolution referring the application to its zoning committee for recommendation.

On April 15th, Highland Oil filed the presently-considered petition for writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of building permit. This writ was finally granted by the circuit judge after an extended hearing, by an order signed October 26, 1955. But long before that a number of other developments had intervened.

April 22, 1955, a week after the petition for the writ had been filed, the city council adopted ordinance 18 which zoned the property in dispute for residential purposes only and established such front, rear and side yard restrictions as to have the effect of forbidding the use of any 20-foot lot for any purpose unless 4 of them -were accumulated in 1 ownership, or unless there was an exception granted by the board of zoning appeals.

May 5, 1955, the city council passed a resolution acting upon the building permit application for the first time and denying it, citing the newly-adopted zoning ordinance and certain building code deviations which apparently were mentioned at this point for the first time.

July 12, 1955, the city council adopted ordinance 22 which provided in 4 blocks of Southfield frontage, including the property currently discussed, for the establishment of a TP-1 district, * as follows:

“In the TP-1 district, no building structure or premises, except as otherwise provided in this ordi *656 nance, shall he erected or used except for 1 of the following uses:

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