High Desert Wildlife v. Deschutes County Assessor

CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedAugust 12, 2016
DocketTC-MD 150429C
StatusUnpublished

This text of High Desert Wildlife v. Deschutes County Assessor (High Desert Wildlife v. Deschutes County Assessor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
High Desert Wildlife v. Deschutes County Assessor, (Or. Super. Ct. 2016).

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Property Tax

HIGH DESERT WILDLIFE RESCUE & ) REHABILITATION, INC. dba HIGH ) DESERT WILDLIFE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 150429C ) v. ) ) DESCHUTES COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Defendant. ) FINAL DECISION1

Plaintiff appeals Defendant’s August 26, 2015, denial of its application for property tax

exemption under ORS 307.130. The subject property is identified as Account 109387 (subject

property) for the 2015-16 tax year. The matter was submitted to the court on the written briefs of

the parties, the last of which was received April 18, 2016. Karon V. Johnson represented

Plaintiff. Tana West represented Defendant. No exhibits were received from either party.

Defendant attached three exhibits – A, B, and C – to its brief filed April 18, 2016.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties agree to the following facts, which the court will largely quote from

Plaintiff’s memorandum signed April 5, 2016 and received by the court April 8, 2016.

“On April 16, 2013, Thomas Aspel executed a deed transferring title to his property at

62410 Erickson Road, Bend, Oregon 97702, to three individuals: Jeff Cooney, DVM; Jeannette

Bonomo; and Skyleah Kellogg.” (Ptf’s Memo at 1; see also Def’s Memo at 1, Def’s Ex A.)

“The purpose of the transfer was to establish a wildlife rehabilitation station on Mr. Aspel’s

1 This Final Decision incorporates without change the court’s Decision, entered July 25, 2016. The court did not receive a statement of costs and disbursements within 14 days after its Decision was entered. See Tax Court Rule–Magistrate Division (TCR–MD) 16 C(1).

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 150429C 1 property.” (Ptf’s Memo at 1.) “Although High Desert Wildlife Rescue & Rehabilitation, Inc.,

([hereinafter] HDW), a 501(c)(3) charitable corporation, had been incorporated by then, Skyleah

Kellogg, who owned the nursing home where Mr. Aspel resided, persuaded the parties to put the

title to the property in the individual names of Dr. Cooney and Ms. Bonomo, and to add her

name to the title as well. No consideration was paid for the property.” (Id.)

“When it became apparent to Dr. Cooney and Ms. Bonomo that the property should have

been titled in the name of the charitable corporation, they executed deeds transferring their

undivided 1/3 interests in the property to HDW on September 24, 2014.” (Ptf’s Memo at 2; see

also Def’s Memo at 1, Def’s Ex B.) “Ms. Kellogg refused, however, to transfer her interest,

declaring that she intended to keep it in her family. Dr. Cooney lodged a complaint with the

Oregon Attorney General. Kellogg was initially indicted for two counts of criminal mistreatment

of a dependent person and two counts of tax evasion, Deschutes County Criminal Case No. 15

FE 0537.” (Ptf’s Memo at 2.)

“HDW made a timely application for a property tax exemption for the tax year 2015-16.”

(Ptf’s Memo at 2; Def’s Memo at 1.) According to Defendant’s written denial of Plaintiff’s

application for property tax exemption, HDW applied for exemption under ORS 307.130. (Ptf’s

Compl at 2.) Defendant’s denial letter indicates that one or more of its employees visited the

subject property and “determined that the use and organization would qualify for the exemption

[but HDW] only owns 66.67% [of the property and] a taxable party owns the other 33.33%.”

(Id.) Plaintiff’s memorandum indicates that the application was denied because “HDW did not

meet the requirements of ORS 307.162(4)(c), in that at the time of its application HDW did not

hold both full legal and equitable title to the property.” (Ptf’s Memo at 2.) Defendant’s

///

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 150429C 2 exemption application denial letter cites that statute, stating that under ORS 307.162(4)(c)

“ ‘[o]wnership’ means legal and equitable title.” (Ptf’s Compl at 2.)

“On March 29, 2016, Ms. Kellogg pled guilty to [two criminal counts] * * * [and] [a]s

part of th[e] plea agreement, she executed a deed transferring her undivided 1/3 interest in the

subject property to HDW. The deed was recorded with the Deschutes County Clerk’s office the

same day.” (Ptf’s Memo at 2.) Defendant’s memorandum confirms that a deed was executed on

that date “transferring Skyleah Kellogg’s 1/3 interest to HDW for [the subject] property.”

(Def’s Memo at 1.)

II. ANALYSIS

The issue is whether, for the 2015-16 tax year, Plaintiff qualified for property tax

exemption under ORS 307.130(2).2 That statute provides in relevant part: [u]pon compliance

with ORS 307.162, * * * property owned or being purchased by * * * incorporated literary,

benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions shall be exempt from taxation.” ORS

307.130(2) (emphasis added). ORS 307.162 governs the exemption application process and

includes certain relevant definitions. Subsection (4)(c) of ORS 307.162 is the focus of this

appeal. It provides that “ ‘[o]wnership’ means legal and equitable title.” ORS 307.162(4)(c)

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff notes in its memorandum that Skyleah Kellogg (Kellogg) “fraudulently obtained

and wrongfully held” her undivided one third interest in the subject property. (Ptf’s Memo at 3.)

Plaintiff discusses the equitable remedy of a constructive trust, a creation of common law

designed to prevent unjust enrichment. (Id. at 3-4; Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust

Enrichment § 55 (2011).) Plaintiff cites several cases where a court ordered the conveyance of

2 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2013.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 150429C 3 property by the wrongdoer to the wronged party where the wrongdoer obtained legal title by

fraud or “any other unconscientious manner.” Springer v. Young, 14 Or 280, 283 (1886),

quoting 1 Pomeroy Eq Jur, Sec 155.

However, Plaintiff then notes that “there is no doubt that the doctrine of constructive

trusts makes a distinction between legal and equitable title [and that] [t]he same distinction is

made by ORS 307.162(4)(c), which clearly requires both legal and equitable title for the property

owner to qualify for a tax exemption.” (Ptf’s Memo at 4.) Plaintiff admits in its memorandum

that it did not have legal ownership of the property when it applied for exemption. (Ptf’s Memo

at 5.) At the time of the transfer, Kellogg held legal title to an undivided one-third interest in the

subject property. She continued to hold legal title until well after the deadline for applying for

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Related

Springer v. Young
12 P. 400 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1886)

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High Desert Wildlife v. Deschutes County Assessor, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/high-desert-wildlife-v-deschutes-county-assessor-ortc-2016.