Higginson v. Dall

13 Mass. 96
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court·Decided March 15, 1816·Published·Cited by 27 cases

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was now delivered by

Parker, C. J.

The question proper to be first settled by us is, whether the written memorandum, which was received in evidence, ought to have been admitted, and also the facts relating to it, which might have been proved by the testimony of the broker. Indeed, there seems to be no reason why the latter should have been rejected, if the former was admitted ; both being parol evidence, and neither of them making a part of the contract which was finally agreed to by the parties. (4) And we are all of opinion, that it ought not to have been admitted, for the purpose for which it was offered ; which was, to show that the policy was void in consequence of the insurance made by the plaintiff abroad. Although policies of insurance are not technically specialties, not being under seal, they have nevertheless ever been deemed instruments of a solemn nature, and subject to most of the rules of evidence which govern in the case of specialties. The policy itself is considered to be the contract between the parties ; and whatever proposals are made, or conversa lions had, between the parties, prior to the subscription, they are to be considered as waived, if not inserted in the policy, or contained n a memorandum annexed to it.

[85] * Representations, however, of the state of the vessel, and giving a description of the voyage, may be proved by oral or written testimony, when the object is to falsify those representations ; for many things material to the risk are stated in the application for insurance, which are not usually made a part of the policy; and it is a part of the law of insurance, that such representations may be so proved. Warranties, however, must always be inserted in the policy, as also any agreements as to the policy being vacated on the happening of any event agreed on by the parties.

The paper admitted in evidence was in some respects a repre sentation ; but it was not intended at the trial to falsify it in that respect. The sole object for which it was introduced was, to avoid the policy on account of an event specified in the paper. It was, in fact, to make the policy conditional, when by its terms it was absolute ; which would, in effect, be annulling and destroying the contract by extrinsic matter proved by parol, and thus defeating the intention of the parties, as expressed in the instrument made to carry that intention into effect. However probable it may be, in the present case, that the written memorandum was looked to by insurer and insured as the grounds of their contract, it would tend to great uncertainty and inconvenience to depart from the known rules, in cases of such universal influence.

Whether the construction given to the memorandum by the judge at the trial was correct or not is not a question of importance. But it may not be amiss to say, that he himself thinks it was not correct, and that, had the words used made a part of the policy, he is- W'ell satisfied that the fact of insurance having been made abroad by the plaintiff would, within the meaning of the parties, have rendered this policy inoperative ; the object of the agent having manifestly been to secure something for his friend abroad, upon the supposition of bis being unable to procure insurance there ; but not intending to bind him, if he had exercised his judgment on the subject himself.

* We must, then, consider the case as depending altogether upon the terms of the policy, independent of any stipulation of the parties not contained in it.

The first objection to the plaintiff’s recovering was, that he had not an insurable interest, in consequence of the conveyance of the ship by way of mortgage. But this objection was not much insisted on, because of the uncertainty of some of the evidence, whether the mortgage was subsisting or not at the time of making the policy We are satisfied, however, that, if it were subsisting, it left an insurable interest in the plaintiff; even if the ship were mortgaged to her full value ; for it has been settled by many decisions, that different par [86] ties, having different interests in the same subject matter, may severally cause insurance upon it. (5)

Whether, in such case, the insured ought to insure his interest only in the ship, or may insure the ship itself, does not appear to have been definitively settled. But, if the interest need not be stated in the policy, it would seem, nevertheless, that the assured could never proceed against the underwriter for a total loss, in cases where abandonment would be necessary to constitute such loss ; because, by his own act, transferring the title and the possession of the ship, no abandonment could be effectually made of the subject matter of the insurance.

Passing over, therefore, this question, as unnecessary to be settled in this action, no objection on this ground having been suggested at the trial; we come to the main question in the cause, namely, What effect the policy on the ship made at Calcutta, subsequent in date to the one under consideration, together with the abandonment made to the underwriters there, and the payment of a total loss, before the offer to abandon here, had upon this contract.

The policy, upon which the abandonment took place, was valued ; and the estimated value of the ship was much less than the evidence used at the trial proved her to be worth. The policy, upon which this action is brought, is * an open policy ; so that .the estimate of value, made on the foreign policy, is not binding upon either of the parties to this. If the capture had continued, so that an absolute total loss had taken place, or if an offer to abandon had been made here during the capture, or after the recapture because the voyage had been broken up, the insured having it in his power to abandon, the underwriter here would have been liable for a proportion, according to his subscription, of the value of the vessel as proved here, without regard to the valuation abroad, any further than as it might be considered as evidence, not conclusive, of the actual value of the ship.

But, in order to make the underwriters here liable for a total loss, which can be constructive only, the ship being entire and under the control of the assured after the recapture, subject only to the legal salvage claimed by the recaptors, an offer to abandon was necessary; and that offer should be made under circumstances which would give the insurer a legal title, with the right of possession of the ship ; otherwise the offer would be merely formal, and give no advantage whatever to the insurer.

Now the effect of the valuation of the ship abroad was, to fix the price at which the underwriters should become her legal owners, in. case of a claim for a total loss upon abandonment; and thus to de[87] prive the insured of all power to convey any interest in the ship to the underwriter here ; so that the offer to abandon was merely formal and nugatory, and cannot entitle him to recover for a total loss. In truth it is the same as if. the plaintiff, after the capture and recapture of his ship, had thought fit, not from necessity, to sell her ; in which case he could claim nothing of underwriters, but an indemnity for her diminished value in consequence of the peril insured against.

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Higginson v. Dall, 13 Mass. 96 (Mass. 1816).

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