Higgins v. Maine Criminal Justice Academy

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: June 13, 2011
• Docket: KENap-10-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION Doc1

Bryan Higgins,

Petitioner

DECISION AND ORDER V.

Maine Criminal Justice Academy,

Respondent

This matter was heard on May 24,2011, on Petitioner's request, pursuant to M.R.

Civ. P. SOC, for judicial review of Respondent's decision to revoke Petitioner's

certification to work as a law enforcement officer in Maine. 1 Attorney William

McKinley represented the Petitioner. Assistant Attorney General Leanne Robbin

represented the Respondent.

Factual/Procedural Background

As of May 28, 2008, Petitioner had been employed as a Maine State Trooper for

approximately 18 years. At that time, Petitioner owned a 16-foot motorboat that he was

1 On May 12,2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Additional Evidence by which motion Petitioner requested that the Court include the April 4, 2011, decision of an arbitrator following a hearing at which Petitioner challenged his termination from his employment as the result of the incident that is the subject of this matter. The arbitrator concluded that there was no just cause for terminating and ordered Petitioner's reinstatement provided that he is certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Maine. Because the decision was not rendered until April 4, 2011, Petitioner could not have filed his request with 10 days of the filing of the record as required by M.R. Civ. P. 80C(e). Insofar as Petitioner filed the request within a reasonable time after the issuance of the decision, the Court considers the request to be filed timely. In addition, although the relevance of the decision might be marginal, the fact that Petitioner has employment available as a law enforcement officer is at least arguably relevant to the appropriateness of the sanction imposed in this case. The Court, therefore, grants Petitioner's motion and supplements the record as requested. offering for sale. On May 28, Robert Green expressed interest in the boat, and met with

Petitioner at Petitioner's home in Levant to inspect the boat.

After viewing the boat, Mr. Green agreed to purchase the boat for $1,740 in cash.

Before completing the purchase, Mr. Green wanted to take the boat to a local lake to test

the boat. Petitioner agreed with the understanding that he would hold Mr. Green's money

until Mr. Green returned with the boat. In the event Mr. Green decided not to purchase

the boat, he would return the boat, and Petitioner would return Mr. Green's money. Mr.

Green agreed that if he damaged the boat, he would be obligated to purchase it.

When Mr. Green returned to Petitioner's home, he informed Petitioner that he was

not interested in purchasing the boat. In the course of a brief inspection of the boat,

Petitioner noticed some damage to the propeller of the boat's motor. Petitioner,

therefore, withheld $100 of Mr. Green's money to compensate for the damage. He

returned the balance of the money to Mr. Green. As Mr. Green was leaving Petitioner's

property, Petitioner noticed more damage to the propeller. Although Petitioner called to

Mr. Green, Mr. Green proceeded to leave the premises.

Throughout his encounter with Mr. Green, Petitioner was off duty and was not

wearing his law enforcement uniform. When Mr. Green failed to stop despite

Petitioner's request, Petitioner retrieved his State Poiice vehicle from the garage in order

to pursue Mr. Green, to stop him, and to discuss the issues regarding the boat. At the

time, Petitioner's personal truck and his wife's vehicle were in the driveway.

As Petitioner pursued Mr. Green, using the radar with which his vehicle was

equipped, he determined that Mr. Green was traveling at a speed of 76 miles per hour in a

45 mile per hour zone. Petitioner then decided to stop Mr. Green for criminal speed. After the stop, Petitioner placed Mr. Green in handcuffs, took him into custody, and

advised him that he was going to jail. Petitioner acknowledged that he does not typically

arrest an individual for criminal speed, but that he was influenced by his personal

involvement in the case.

Thereafter, Petitioner transported Mr. Green back to Petitioner's home. While at

his home, Petitioner subjected Mr. Green to a "pat down." During the "pat down,"

Petitioner detected the cash that Mr. Green had originally tendered for the boat.

Although Petitioner understood that the purpose of a "pat down" was to search for

contraband or items that could pose safety concerns, Petitioner removed and retained the

cash because he believed that he was entitled to the cash given his agreement with Mr.

Green.

At some point after arriving at his home, Petitioner decided not to take Mr. Green

to jail. Instead, he issued a summons to Mr. Green. As Petitioner was preparing the

summons, Mr. Green said that he "would take the boat."

On March 6, 2009, the State charged Petitioner with Official Oppression, in

violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 608. After a two-day trial, the jury was unable to reach a

verdict. The State subsequently decided not to retry the case provided that Petitioner

performed 20 hours of public service and refrained from future criminal conduct.

During the pendency of the criminal matter, based on the incidents of May 28, the

Board of Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy (the Board) informed

Petitioner of its decision to revoke his certificate to act as a law enforcement officer.

Petitioner subsequently requested an adjudicatory hearing to be held after the conclusion

of the criminal matter. On May 20, 2010, Hearing Officer James Smith conducted an adjudicatory hearing after which he recommended the revocation of Petitioner's

certificate. The Board, on June 11, 2010, adopted the recommendation of the Hearing

Officer. Petitioner timely filed a request for judicial review pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. SOC

and 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3).

Discussion

In its review of agency action, the Court is "limited to the record upon which the

agency decision was based ... " 5 M.R.S. § 11006(1). The Court reviews "decisions

made by an administrative agency for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or findings of

fact not supported by the record." Save Our Sebasticook, Inc. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2007

ME 102, ~ 13, 928 A.2d 736, 740 (quotation marks omitted). In this review, the Court

"shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on questions of fact." 5 M.R.S. §

11007(3).

The Court "must affirm findings of fact if they are supported by substantial

evidence in the record, even if the record contains inconsistent evidence or evidence

contrary to the result reached by the agency." Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Board of

Environmental Protection, 2010 ME 18, ~ 13, 989 A.2d 1128 (citations omitted). "The

'substantial evidence' standard does not involve any weighing of the merits of evidence.

Instead it requires us to determine whether there is any competent evidence in the record

to support a finding. Administrative agency findings of fact will be vacated only if there

is no competent evidence in the record to support a decision." Friends of Lincoln Lakes,

2010 ME 18, ~ 14 (citing, Lakeside at Pleasant Mountain Condo. Ass'n v. Town of

Bridgton, 2009 ME 64, ~ 11, 974 A.2d 893, 896; Fitanides v. City of Saco, 2004 ME 32,

~ 23, 843 A.2d 8, 15). In this case, the Board determined that Petitioner's conduct constituted Official

Oppression, which is prohibited by 17 M.R.S. § 608, and, as a sanction, revoked

Petitioner's law enforcement certificate. Petitioner challenges both the finding of Official

Oppression and the sanction imposed.

Pursuant to 25 M.R.S. §2806(1)(B)(2), the Board "[m]ay suspend or revoke" an

officer's law enforcement certificate if the officer "[h]as engaged in conduct that is

prohibited ... by any provision of the Maine Criminal Code, chapter 15, 19, 25, or 45."

The offense of Official Oppression is included within chapter 25. According to Maine

law, "[aJ person is guilty of official oppression if, being a public servant and acting with

the intention to benefit himself or to harm another, he knowingly commits an

unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office." 17-A M.R.S. § 608(1)

(2010).

The record establishes that Petitioner used his police vehicle to pursue an

individual (Robert Green) for the purpose of resolving a private dispute. Although Mr.

Green might have subsequently engaged in conduct for which Petitioner could

legitimately stop Mr. Green's vehicle, the fact remains that Petitioner intentionally used

the vehicle under circumstances that he knew to be inappropriate and unauthorized.

Even if the individuai 'slater conduct is such that Petitioner's use of the vehicle to

pursue Mr. Green for a private purpose cannot serve as the basis of a finding of Official

Oppression, Petitioner's actions after stopping the vehicle independently support the

Board's conclusion. After placing Mr. Green in handcuffs, a practice that Petitioner did

not routinely employ when he stopped an person for criminal speed, Petitioner

transported Mr. Green back to Petitioner's house to view the damage to the boat. At Petitioner's home, Petitioner searched Mr. Green, and confiscated and retained the money

that Petitioner had previously tendered for the boat. Although Petitioner's search of Mr.

Green is arguably appropriate under the circumstances for safety reasons, his confiscation

and retention of the money is clearly not justified as part of his arrest of Mr. Green for

criminal speed. The record, therefore, contains substantial evidence to support the

Board's finding that Petitioner "knowingly commit[ted] an unauthorized act that

purport[ed] to be an act of his office."

Petitioner also contends that Respondent's decision to revoke Petitioner's

certificate was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In support of his

argument, Petitioner cites a number of other matters in which Respondent imposed lesser

sanctions for what Petitioner characterizes as more serious conduct.

Although a comparative analysis of other sanctions might have some relevance to

the Board's determination of the appropriate sanction in Petitioner's case, such an

analysis is not controlling. The Board must assess each case on its own merits. Here, the

Board determined that revocation was warranted. In this case, the Board concluded that

Petitioner used his status as a law enforcement officer to obtain money from an individual

with whom he was involved in a private dispute. Given that the conduct was directly

related to his role as a iaw enforcement officer, and involved the misuse of the authority

afforded him as a law enforcement officer, the Court cannot conclude that the Board's

decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court affirms the June 11, 2010, decision of

the Board of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Order into the docket by reference.

Dated: ~Pf 3/11 ..v--- uperior Court 1- Date Filed 7 I 2 /1 0 Kennebec Docket No. AP-10-22 County ~USTICE ASSIGNED: ROBERT MURRAY Action Petition For Review 80C

Bryan Higgins vs. Maine Criminal Justice Academy

Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney

William K. McKinley, Esq. Leanne Robbin, AAG PO Box 9711 Portland, ME 04104-5011

Date of Entry

7/9/10 Petition For Review Of Final Agency Action, filed 7/2/10. s/McKinley, Esq.

7/14/10 Return mail receipt served on Janet Mills, AAG on 7/7/10. Return mail receipt served on John Rogers, on 7/7/10. 8/2/10 Certification of Record, filed. s/Robbin,.AAG (record in vault) Index to Record, filed. NOTICE AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE ISSUED Copies to attys. of record.

9/13/10 Petitioner's Brief on 80C Appeal and Final Agency Action filed by Atty McKinley.

9/27/10 Respondent's memorandum of law filed by Leanne Robbins, AAG.

10/6/10 Petitioner's Reply Brief, filed. s/McKinley, Esq.

NotJc'/3 of sottmg tor. t~y J, 4/ J;£ I L. ..U_) I~ liD (}· N/ v' /~ oll sent to attorneys of record.

5/12/11 Petitioner's Motion for Additional Evidence and Incorporated Memorandum, filed. s/McKinley, Esq. 5/23/11 Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Additonal Evidence, filed. s/Robbin, AAG 6/15/11 DECISION AND ORDER, Nivison, J. (6/13/11) Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court affirms the June 11, 2010, decision of the Board of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy. Pursuant 'toM.R.Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Order into the docket by reference. Copies to attys. of record.