Higgins v. Elliott's Feed, Seed & Fertilizer Co.

451 S.W.2d 884, 248 Ark. 450, 1970 Ark. LEXIS 1239
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedApril 6, 1970
Docket5-5160
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 451 S.W.2d 884 (Higgins v. Elliott's Feed, Seed & Fertilizer Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Higgins v. Elliott's Feed, Seed & Fertilizer Co., 451 S.W.2d 884, 248 Ark. 450, 1970 Ark. LEXIS 1239 (Ark. 1970).

Opinion

J. Fred Jones, Justice.

A truck and trailer rig belonging to Elliott’s Feed, Seed & Fertilizer Co., Inc. was damaged in a collision with a vehicle belonging to Robert Mark Higgins. Elliott’s, Inc. sued Higgins in the St. Francis County Circuit Court for $2,686.43 in damages based upon the difference in the market value of the vehicle immediately prior to and immediately after the collision. Elliott’s, Inc. subsequently amended its complaint alleging and praying as follows:

“That as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff sustained damages in the amount of Three Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty and No/100 Dollars ($3,720.00) as a result of the lack of business earnings due to the out of service time for the tractor and trailer being out for repairs. That the Three Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Dollars ($3,720.00) is in addition to the Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-Six and 43/100 Dollars ($2,686.43), which represents actual property damage to the tractor and trailer.”

Higgins demurred to so much of the amended complaint as pertains to the loss of earnings as an element of damage and the demurrer was overruled by the trial court. Elliott’s, Inc. conceded in its brief that the trial court was correct in overruling the demurrer, so the question on demurrer is no longer involved in this case. At the close of the evidence offered by Elliott’s, Inc., Higgins filed a motion for directed verdict as to the elements of alleged damages because of loss of use of the truck, and this motion was also overruled by the trial court. The case was submitted to the jury on interrogatories and over the objection of Higgins the court gave to the jury instruction 18, as follows:

“If an interrogatory requires you to assess the damages of Elliott’s, Inc., you must then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate Elliott’s, Inc., for any of the following elements of damages sustained:
1. The difference in the fair market value of its 1964 International trac tor-trailer immediately before and after the occurrence. In determining this difference you may take into consideration the reasonable cost of repairs.
2. The value of any earnings or profits or working time lost. Whether any of these elements of damages have been proved by the evidence is for you to determine.”

On special interrogatories the jury found that Elliott’s, Inc. had suffered total damages in the amount of $4,936.43; that Higgins was guilty of 85% of the negligence causing the damage and that Elliott’s, Inc. contributed 15%. The trial court diminished the total amount of damages by 15% and entered judgment in favor of Elliott’s, Inc. against Higgins for $4,195.96 and costs. Higgins has appealed to this court and relies on the following point for reversal:

“The court erred in refusing to direct a verdict on that portion of the complaint pertaining to a loss of business earnings and in giving instruction numbered 18 (2) over appellant’s objection.”

Higgins argues in his brief that when the actual cost of repairs in the amount of $2,686.43 is subtracted from the total amount of damages found by the jury in the amount of $4,936.43, the resulting amount of $2,-250 was obviously awarded by the jury for lost business earnings; and, Higgins contends that this court on appeal, should reduce the judgment by that amount. In support of the error alleged in overruling his motion for a directed verdict, Higgins only argues that the testimony relating to loss of use is too speculative and conjectural to support a verdict including that element of damage. We agree with Higgins that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion for a directed verdict on the record of evidence presented here, and we are also of the opinion that the record requires a reduction in the amount of the judgment if it is to be affirmed.

Mr. Elliott testified that he owns and operates the corporation bearing his name and that the damage to the truck was repaired at a cost of $2,686.43. He testified that the corporation owned another truck besides the one that was damaged and that he had a verbal contract with Riviana Foods to use both trucks in hauling rice from Carlisle, Arkansas, to Memphis, Tennessee. He testified that because of the damage to the truck, half of his “fleet” was put out of business. He says that the damaged truck was grossing $100 per day; that it was out of operation for a period of 45 days while being repaired, and that his net loss in business profits during this period, including his loss in hauling his own rice, amounted to $3,720.

Mr. Brown, who was in charge of the repairs on the truck, testified that the repairs were delayed “possibly three weeks at least” because a part needed in repair of the truck was ordered from Michigan and the wrong part was sent. No one would seriously contend that Higgins should be liable for the negligence of whoever was responsible for the delay caused by the wrong part being sent from Detroit.

As we view the evidence, Mr. Elliott’s testimony as to loss of business, stated a conclusion not supported by competent substantial evidence. To permit such conclusion to stand as evidence substantial enough to support a judgment, would be giving the injured party an unfair advantage over a tort feasor amounting almost to blank check authority, which the law could not long tolerate nor industry long endure.

The insubstantial nature of Mr. Elliott’s testimony as to lost profits, is most evident from his answers on cross-examination, so we quote rather liberally therefrom. On cross-examination Mr. Elliott testified, in part, as follows:

“Q. Mr. Elliott, what was the terms of your contract with Riviana Foods?
A. I was to haul all their rough rice from Carlisle to Memphis that I could, and then if they needed any extra trucks, or I couldn’t get it there quick enough, or enough, they would hire a few extra trucks to help until we got caught up.
Q. Now, were you to do this every day of the year?
A. Well, anytime they wanted me to haul; usually that time of year we was real busy, because it was right after harvest, and they was needing to move rice into Memphis, into the mill.
Q. Do you have an accurate record of the number of days you hauled for Riviana in 1967?
A. Well, no; I do have it in my office, but I do know we are real busy hauling in December, January, and February.
Q. You are busy hauling, but have you consulted those records before coming in here today?
A. Yes, sir, I looked at them, but I can’t remember just what it was.
Q. Well, then, if you will, tell us how you arrived at this figure of $3,720?
A Well, my truck was grossing, one day we would haul one load, and next day we would get two, and my truck was averaging grossing $100.00 a day, and my truck was out 45 working days, besides the hauling that I missed for my own business.
Q.

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Bluebook (online)
451 S.W.2d 884, 248 Ark. 450, 1970 Ark. LEXIS 1239, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/higgins-v-elliotts-feed-seed-fertilizer-co-ark-1970.