~~-,~ I tflf -! Z-L.j STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION STATE OF MAINE DOCKET NO: AP-11-044 cumberland,ss,Clerk's Office
MARK HIDER, MAR 1 5 2012 Plaintiff, RECEIVED V. ORDER CITY OF PORTLAND PLANNING BOARD
Defendants.
Before the court is Plaintiff Mark Hider's SOB appeal .of the City of Portland Planning
Board's decision. The City of Portland Planning Board opposes the appeal and asks the
court to dismiss the Plaintiff's action.
BACKGROUND Enterprise Rent-a-Car (Enterprise) filed an application with the City of Portland
Planning Board (the Board) to expand the paved area, include a maintenance building,
and add a new fueling facility at their ~ 128 Westbrook Street location. Enterprise
hosted a neighborhood meeting concerning the application and the Board held a
workshop about the expansion for abutting landowners and interested parties. Finally,
the Board held a public meeting on August 23, 2011, where they approved the
application.
Plaintiff Jviark Hider (Hider) is an abutting landowner 1 who opposes the
expansions proposed by Enterprise. While Hider did not attend Enterprise's
neighborhood meeting or the Board's workshop he did email the Board written
1The complaint noted that Hider resides at 70 Cobb Street, Portland, Maine, which abuts the property involved in the Enterprise app.Lica.tion. (Compl. 9I 1.) He does n t m,vn that property. (Def.'s Br. 4.) During the hearing Hider demonstrat.ed that he owns other abutting property at 76 Cobb Street. As a result, the Board conceded that Hider has standing to pursue this appeal.
1 comments prior to the Board's public meeting. Additionally, Hider attended the public
meeting and spoke for over seven minutes.
The Board is permitted to "adopt its own rules for the conduct of its business."
Portland, Me., Code§ 14-25(b). Pursuant to this permission, the Board has adopted a
"three minute rule."
Members of the public may offer evidence or statements relevant to the project under consideration. Each speaker shall be limited to three (3) minutes. The Chair may, at is discretion, extend this period for an additional three (3) minutes. The Board may grant an initial or any further extensions upon a majority vote of those present and voting. Rules of the Portland Planning Board Art. VI(B) §l(E).
Hider, through his attorney Mark Dion, filed a complaint for review of
govermnental action and declaratory judgment on September 28, 2011, and listed the
City of Portland Planning Board as the defendant. 2 Attorney Dion's motion to
withdraw was granted on January 27, 2012. Hider represented himself during the
March 7, 2012, hearing.
DISCUSSION
1. Due Process Violation as an Inde12endent Action
The Superior Court is granted the authority to review the Board's decision by
Sec. 14-29 of the Portland Code. 3 These appeals must be conducted in accordance with
2 The Board argues that it is not the appropriate party for this appeal since Portland's municipal
code does not give it authority to defend its decision on appeal. See Portland, Me., Code§ 14-30; Inhabitants of the Town of Boothbay Harbor v. Russell, 410 A.2d 554, 560 (Me. 1980) (" Absent a positive legislative grant of authority ... the board is not a proper party."). Here, the Board is being asked to defend its procedure against a claim that the Plaintiff's right to due process was violated by the Board's rules. The Board has sufficient interest in the outcome of this dispute, since it concerns the constitutionality of its own procedures, to remain as a party to the case. See Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779, 781 (Me. 1981) (allowing the Board of Overseers to remain as a party because it was "sufficiently lnterested in the outcome of the dispute"). · The Code addresses appeals as follows: An appeal from any final decision of the plann ing board as to any rn.atter over which it has final authority may be taken by any party or by any authorized officer or agent of the city to the superior court in accordance with Rule SOB of
2 Rule SOB of the :tviaine Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule SOB limits the Superior Court's
appellate review "of any action or failure or refusal to act by a governmental agency,
including any ... board" as allowed by statute or "as otherwise available by law." :tvI.R.
Civ. P. SOB(a). The Board asserts that this claim is an independent action, not a SOB
appeal, and the Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements set out in Rule SOB(i)
regarding independent actions. The court agrees.
The Plaintiff has not asked the court to review the Board's actions; instead he
asked the court to declare the Board's procedures unconstitutional. Such a request does
not fall ·within the scope of M.R. Civ. P. SOB. Rule SOB(i) controls independent actions
and requires the Plaintiff to file a motion "requesting the court to specify the fuh1re
course of proceedings." M.R. Civ. P. SOB(i). The Plaintiff failed to file this motion;
therefore this claim is not properly before the court.
Additionally, the Board's imposition of the three-minute rule does not violate
Hider's due process rights. 4 With regards to agency hearings and property rights, a
party's right to procedural due process is protected if he is "given notice of and an
opportunity to be heard at proceedings in which his property rights are at stake."
Niutton Hill Estates, Inc. v. Oakland, 468 A.2d 989, 992 (Me. 1983)_. In order to ensure that
the public was given an adequate opportunity to be heard the Board needed to "strike a
fair and reasonable balance between its interest in efficiency and the public's right to
speak." Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 ME 112, CJ[ 20, 736 A.2d 241 (noting that the
the Maine Rul s of Civil Procedlrre. No appeal shall lie concerning any ma lt er as to which the p wer of the board is lhTtited to the making 0£ a reconunendation. Section 14-29 1 The Board asserts that the th.ree-m.im1 te rule was not eveJ1 applied to Hider during the public me ting because he spoke for over seven minutes. The rul includes allowing the Chairperson Lo allow for additional time. Even though he spoke £or more than three minutes the rule was applied t him. His comments ended with the Chairperson 0£ the Board telling him his time was up. (MeeLing Tr. 25:11-12.) As a result, he was poterttially restricted by the rule .
3 right to address the T_o wn Council is not unlimited). Here, it is undisputed that Hider
was given notice. He was also given several opportunities to be heard both orally and
in writing.
In Crispin v. Town of Scarborough the Law Court determined that a similar three
minute rule provided the public with an adequate opportunity to be heard. Id. at 91: 21.
The Town Council allowed members of the public "three minutes to make initial
comments, and [individuals were] allowed a second chance to speak after everyone
present had been given an opportunity to speak once." Id. at 91: 19. The Law Court
found that "[i]n light of the number of people who wished to address the Town
Council, both for and against the project, the Council's decision to limit initial
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~~-,~ I tflf -! Z-L.j STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION STATE OF MAINE DOCKET NO: AP-11-044 cumberland,ss,Clerk's Office
MARK HIDER, MAR 1 5 2012 Plaintiff, RECEIVED V. ORDER CITY OF PORTLAND PLANNING BOARD
Defendants.
Before the court is Plaintiff Mark Hider's SOB appeal .of the City of Portland Planning
Board's decision. The City of Portland Planning Board opposes the appeal and asks the
court to dismiss the Plaintiff's action.
BACKGROUND Enterprise Rent-a-Car (Enterprise) filed an application with the City of Portland
Planning Board (the Board) to expand the paved area, include a maintenance building,
and add a new fueling facility at their ~ 128 Westbrook Street location. Enterprise
hosted a neighborhood meeting concerning the application and the Board held a
workshop about the expansion for abutting landowners and interested parties. Finally,
the Board held a public meeting on August 23, 2011, where they approved the
application.
Plaintiff Jviark Hider (Hider) is an abutting landowner 1 who opposes the
expansions proposed by Enterprise. While Hider did not attend Enterprise's
neighborhood meeting or the Board's workshop he did email the Board written
1The complaint noted that Hider resides at 70 Cobb Street, Portland, Maine, which abuts the property involved in the Enterprise app.Lica.tion. (Compl. 9I 1.) He does n t m,vn that property. (Def.'s Br. 4.) During the hearing Hider demonstrat.ed that he owns other abutting property at 76 Cobb Street. As a result, the Board conceded that Hider has standing to pursue this appeal.
1 comments prior to the Board's public meeting. Additionally, Hider attended the public
meeting and spoke for over seven minutes.
The Board is permitted to "adopt its own rules for the conduct of its business."
Portland, Me., Code§ 14-25(b). Pursuant to this permission, the Board has adopted a
"three minute rule."
Members of the public may offer evidence or statements relevant to the project under consideration. Each speaker shall be limited to three (3) minutes. The Chair may, at is discretion, extend this period for an additional three (3) minutes. The Board may grant an initial or any further extensions upon a majority vote of those present and voting. Rules of the Portland Planning Board Art. VI(B) §l(E).
Hider, through his attorney Mark Dion, filed a complaint for review of
govermnental action and declaratory judgment on September 28, 2011, and listed the
City of Portland Planning Board as the defendant. 2 Attorney Dion's motion to
withdraw was granted on January 27, 2012. Hider represented himself during the
March 7, 2012, hearing.
DISCUSSION
1. Due Process Violation as an Inde12endent Action
The Superior Court is granted the authority to review the Board's decision by
Sec. 14-29 of the Portland Code. 3 These appeals must be conducted in accordance with
2 The Board argues that it is not the appropriate party for this appeal since Portland's municipal
code does not give it authority to defend its decision on appeal. See Portland, Me., Code§ 14-30; Inhabitants of the Town of Boothbay Harbor v. Russell, 410 A.2d 554, 560 (Me. 1980) (" Absent a positive legislative grant of authority ... the board is not a proper party."). Here, the Board is being asked to defend its procedure against a claim that the Plaintiff's right to due process was violated by the Board's rules. The Board has sufficient interest in the outcome of this dispute, since it concerns the constitutionality of its own procedures, to remain as a party to the case. See Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779, 781 (Me. 1981) (allowing the Board of Overseers to remain as a party because it was "sufficiently lnterested in the outcome of the dispute"). · The Code addresses appeals as follows: An appeal from any final decision of the plann ing board as to any rn.atter over which it has final authority may be taken by any party or by any authorized officer or agent of the city to the superior court in accordance with Rule SOB of
2 Rule SOB of the :tviaine Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule SOB limits the Superior Court's
appellate review "of any action or failure or refusal to act by a governmental agency,
including any ... board" as allowed by statute or "as otherwise available by law." :tvI.R.
Civ. P. SOB(a). The Board asserts that this claim is an independent action, not a SOB
appeal, and the Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements set out in Rule SOB(i)
regarding independent actions. The court agrees.
The Plaintiff has not asked the court to review the Board's actions; instead he
asked the court to declare the Board's procedures unconstitutional. Such a request does
not fall ·within the scope of M.R. Civ. P. SOB. Rule SOB(i) controls independent actions
and requires the Plaintiff to file a motion "requesting the court to specify the fuh1re
course of proceedings." M.R. Civ. P. SOB(i). The Plaintiff failed to file this motion;
therefore this claim is not properly before the court.
Additionally, the Board's imposition of the three-minute rule does not violate
Hider's due process rights. 4 With regards to agency hearings and property rights, a
party's right to procedural due process is protected if he is "given notice of and an
opportunity to be heard at proceedings in which his property rights are at stake."
Niutton Hill Estates, Inc. v. Oakland, 468 A.2d 989, 992 (Me. 1983)_. In order to ensure that
the public was given an adequate opportunity to be heard the Board needed to "strike a
fair and reasonable balance between its interest in efficiency and the public's right to
speak." Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 ME 112, CJ[ 20, 736 A.2d 241 (noting that the
the Maine Rul s of Civil Procedlrre. No appeal shall lie concerning any ma lt er as to which the p wer of the board is lhTtited to the making 0£ a reconunendation. Section 14-29 1 The Board asserts that the th.ree-m.im1 te rule was not eveJ1 applied to Hider during the public me ting because he spoke for over seven minutes. The rul includes allowing the Chairperson Lo allow for additional time. Even though he spoke £or more than three minutes the rule was applied t him. His comments ended with the Chairperson 0£ the Board telling him his time was up. (MeeLing Tr. 25:11-12.) As a result, he was poterttially restricted by the rule .
3 right to address the T_o wn Council is not unlimited). Here, it is undisputed that Hider
was given notice. He was also given several opportunities to be heard both orally and
in writing.
In Crispin v. Town of Scarborough the Law Court determined that a similar three
minute rule provided the public with an adequate opportunity to be heard. Id. at 91: 21.
The Town Council allowed members of the public "three minutes to make initial
comments, and [individuals were] allowed a second chance to speak after everyone
present had been given an opportunity to speak once." Id. at 91: 19. The Law Court
found that "[i]n light of the number of people who wished to address the Town
Council, both for and against the project, the Council's decision to limit initial
comments to three minutes represented a reasonable balancing of the interest of the
public." Id. at <]I 21. Similarly, the court finds that the Board's three-minute rule
provides the public an opportunity to be heard and therefore Hider's due process rights
were not violated.
2. Merits of the Enterprise Ap12licati n
During the March 7, 2012, hearing Hider presented several arguments that were
not included in the complaint. These arguments addressed the merits of the Enterprise
application and the overall review process used by the Board. Additionally, Hider
requested a trial of the facts. While these arguments are appropriate for an SOB appeal
the court cannot consider them at this time.
Rule SOB incorporates the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and provides
additional guidelines for the Superior Court's review of government actions. M.R. Civ.
P. SOB(a). Pursuant to :tvI.R. Civ. P. SOB(d) a party may move for a limited trial of the
facts. "The purpose of such a trial is not to retry the facts but rather to permit the court
to obtain facts that are not present in the record." Silsby v. Belch, 2008 ME 104, 91: 6, 952 )
4 A.2d 218 (citing Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7,
motion for a trial of the facts must be filed "within 30 days after the complaint is filed."
:tvI.R. Civ. P. 80B(d). In addition to the motion the party must also file "a detailed
statement, in the nature of an offer of proof, of the evidence that the party intends to
introduce at trial." Id. If the party does not file the motion within 30 days then the
party has waived any right to a trial on the facts. Id. When such a trial is waived the
Superior Court's review is limited to the record. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(f). Here, Hider did
not file a motion for a trial of the facts and the 30-day window has passed. As a result,
the court's review of the case is restricted to the record. 5
Hider disagrees with how his former counsel handled this appeal and the
arguments :tvir. Dion set forth in the complaint. Despite this disagreement, Hider is
unable to present arguments during the hearing that are based on causes of action not
set forth in the complaint. "[T]he purpose of the complaint is to provide defendants
with fair notice of the claim against them." Bowen v. Eastman, 645 .A.2d 5, 7 (Me. 1994).
If the defendant does not have notice then it cannot properly defend the claim as
required in M.R. Civ. P. 12. Rule SOB states, "[t]he complaint shall include a concise
statement of the grounds upon which the plaintiff contends the plaintiff is entitled to
relief, and shall demand the relief sought." M.R. Civ. P. SOB(a). 6 Since the merits of the
Board's review of the Enterprise application are not plead in the complaint, nor are they
5 The record in this case is insufficient for appellate review. Rule 80B(e)(2) sets forth the contents and procedure requirements for the record. Here, counsel for the Board noted that the parties did not meet in advance to determine the contents of the record. Adclitionally1 the record did not incl ude "the application or other doct1ments that inil":i.ated the agency proceedings" as required by the rule. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)(2). The ourl is entitled to "djsrniss the action for want of prosecution" for failing to con1ply with the record requirements. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(h). 6 At this point in the litigation, a party may only amend the complaint "by leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party." M.R. Civ. P. lS(a). However, even with an amended complaint, Hider is not entitled to a trial of the facts because the 30-day deadline has passed.
5 discussed in the brief in support of the complaint, the court is unable to address the
merits of the application in this appeal.
The entry is:
The SOB Appeal of the City of Portland Planning Board
is DIS:tvIISSED.