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SJC-13787
ANDRES HIDALGO vs. WATCH CITY CONSTRUCTION CORP. & another.1
Middlesex. December 5, 2025. – March 25, 2026.
Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ.
"Anti-SLAPP" Statute. Practice, Civil, Attorney's fees, Appeal, Motion to dismiss. Massachusetts Wage Act.
Civil action commenced in the Waltham Division of the District Court Department on March 17, 2021.
A special motion to dismiss was heard by Ellen M. Caulo, J., and a motion for reconsideration was also heard by her.
Following review by the Appeals Court, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 148 (2024), motions for appellate attorney's fees and for reconsideration were considered by a panel of that court, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.
David E. Belfort (Robert S. Mantell also present) for the plaintiff. Elliott M. Loew for the defendants. Ellen J. Messing, Raven Moeslinger, Lucas Newbill, Oren Sellstrom, & Mirian Albert, for Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
1 Mainor Ariel Zepeda. 2
KAFKER, J. This appeal concerns an award of appellate
attorney's fees under G. L. c. 231, § 59H, more commonly known
as the "anti-SLAPP" statute. The plaintiff, Andres Hidalgo,
sued his employer, Watch City Construction Corp., and its owner,
Mainor Ariel Zepeda (collectively, Watch City), for violations
of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148-150, and related counts
(Wage Act claims). Watch City brought counterclaims against
Hidalgo for, inter alia, abuse of process and malicious
prosecution. In response, Hidalgo filed and, after an
interlocutory appeal, ultimately prevailed on a special motion
to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.
Hidalgo thereafter sought appellate attorney's fees and costs
for the anti-SLAPP work, using the "lodestar" method as the
basis of his request -- that is, multiplying the number of hours
reasonably spent by reasonable hourly rates. He did not seek to
recover attorney's fees for any legal work regarding the Wage
Act claims, which have not yet been tried. In its order, the
Appeals Court panel assumed the hours and rates were reasonable
for the anti-SLAPP work but nevertheless halved the fee award
because it concluded the award was disproportionate to the
relatively low amount of damages at stake in Hidalgo's Wage Act 3
claims.2 We granted Hidalgo's application for further appellate
review, limited to the issue of appellate attorney's fees.
We conclude that the Appeals Court panel erred in reducing
the attorney's fee award for the anti-SLAPP work performed on
appeal. As we have previously emphasized, the lodestar method
for determining the amount of attorney's fees is a reasonable
number of hours multiplied by a reasonable rate for the work
performed. Here, having found that the number of hours spent
and the rates charged regarding the anti-SLAPP motion on appeal
were reasonable, particularly because the legal issues regarding
anti-SLAPP are notoriously difficult, it was an abuse of
discretion to use the monetary value of the Wage Act claims, for
which no legal fees were sought, as the basis for reducing the
attorney's fees to be awarded for the anti-SLAPP work.3
1. Background. Hidalgo worked for Watch City as an hourly
general laborer. On March 17, 2021, Hidalgo filed a six-count
civil action in the District Court against Watch City for
violations of the Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148-150, and
2 Specifically, the panel stated that the hours worked "appear to be reasonable" and that "the rates identified could be appropriate." The panel queried whether the junior lawyer's rate was high, but it noted that its award "should not be construed as challenging the 'market rates' claimed by plaintiff's counsel."
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association and Lawyers for Civil Rights. 4
related claims, alleging that Watch City failed to pay him for
four weeks of work. He sought $3,738.67 in lost wages, which
amounted to $11,216.01 when trebled under the Wage Act, see
G. L. c. 149, § 150. Watch City denied the allegations in its
answer and brought counterclaims against Hidalgo for, inter
alia, abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Hidalgo filed
a special motion to dismiss the counterclaims under the anti-
SLAPP statute, arguing that the counterclaims were based solely
on his petitioning activity (i.e., his filing of the lawsuit to
recover his wages). The motion judge denied Hidalgo's anti-
SLAPP motion,4 and Hidalgo filed an interlocutory appeal with the
Appeals Court. See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521-522
(2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) (doctrine of present execution
permits interlocutory appellate review of denial of special
motion to dismiss).
The Appeals Court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the
counterclaims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. Hidalgo v.
Watch City Constr. Corp., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 148, 155 (2024).
The Appeals Court thereafter invited Hidalgo to file a petition
for appellate attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the fee-
shifting provision of the anti-SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231,
4 The motion judge initially dismissed the counterclaims but changed course after granting Watch City's motion for reconsideration. 5
§ 59H, fifth par. Id. at 155 n.8. Hidalgo filed a petition
seeking $67,361.25 in fees, a sum he reached through use of the
lodestar method. See Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309,
324 (1993). In support of his petition, Hidalgo submitted
affidavits from his attorneys, their time records, and
affidavits from two other Massachusetts labor and employment
lawyers affirming that the hourly rates used in the lodestar
calculation were "market rates." Watch City did not oppose the
fee request.
In an order dated February 20, 2025, a panel of the Appeals
Court awarded Hidalgo $33,680.65 -- one-half of his requested
fee -- and held that Hidalgo's requested fee was not reasonable,
even though it concluded that the hours and rates used in
Hidalgo's lodestar calculation appeared to be reasonable. See
note 2, supra. As the panel further explained, "The anti-SLAPP
statute issues raised by the appeal were fairly complex, and
involved the application of a new standard authored by the
Supreme Judicial Court while the appeal was pending."
Nevertheless, the panel reasoned that although the lodestar
method is an "important touchstone" when evaluating fee
requests, Hidalgo's award ought to also reflect the monetary
value of his Wage Act claims. "In our discretion," the panel
wrote, "we do not find it 'reasonable' to award legal fees of
$67,000 in prosecuting . . . two counterclaims raised in 6
response to an $11,000 claim." Hidalgo moved for
reconsideration, the panel denied the motion, and we allowed
Hidalgo's application for further appellate review, limited to
the issue of appellate attorney's fees.
2. Discussion. a. Statutory background. The anti-SLAPP
statute "establishes a procedure for obtaining the early
dismissal of a claim that seeks to impose liability on
individuals for exercising their constitutional right of
petition." Bristol Asphalt Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods.,
Inc., 493 Mass. 539, 540 (2024). This "procedural vehicle[,]
known as the special motion to dismiss," also allows the movant
to secure attorney's fees related to a meritless SLAPP claim
"before significant discovery has occurred." Id. at 548. See
G. L. c. 231, § 59H, fifth par. ("If the court grants such
special motion to dismiss, the court shall award the moving
party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those
incurred for the special motion and any related discovery
matters"). "The purpose of the statute is to reimburse persons
for costs and attorney's fees if a judge determines that the
statute is applicable and allows their motion to dismiss."
Fabre, 436 Mass. at 525, quoting McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass.
343, 350 (2000). Indeed, the fee-shifting provision of the
anti-SLAPP statute "furthers the statute's underlying purposes
of broadly protecting petitioning activity and promoting 7
resolution of SLAPP litigation quickly with minimum cost"
(quotations and citation omitted). Polay v. McMahon, 468 Mass.
379, 389 (2014). Here, Hidalgo was entitled to an award of
appellate attorney's fees pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H,
because he prevailed on his special motion to dismiss Watch
City's counterclaims after his interlocutory appeal.
b. Lodestar multiplier. We review an award of attorney's
fees for an abuse of discretion. Sutton v. Jordan's Furniture,
Inc., 493 Mass. 728, 742 (2024). "We find abuse of discretion
when we determine that a decision resulted from a clear error of
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision . . .
such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable
alternatives" (citation omitted). Id.
"The lodestar method is generally used for calculating
attorney's fees under fee-shifting statutes," such as the anti-
SLAPP statute. Sutton, 493 Mass. at 742. See McLarnon, 431
Mass. at 349-350. Determining reasonable attorney's fees should
"begin with the lodestar calculation, based on the number of
hours that are reasonably expended and adequately documented,
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." LaChance v.
Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 757, 772 (2016). See
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
In identifying the reasonable hours and rates to be used in
a lodestar calculation, the court 8
"should consider the nature of the case and the issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in similar cases."
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-389 (1979). "No
one factor is determinative, and a factor-by-factor analysis,
although helpful, is not required." Berman v. Linnane, 434
Mass. 301, 303 (2001). With respect to reasonable hours, the
court should generally look at "the amount of time documented by
the [prevailing party's] attorney," and then consider "whether
this amount of time was reasonably expended." Stowe v. Bologna,
417 Mass. 199, 203 (1994). In making this determination, the
court should consider not only the prevailing party's "financial
interests at stake but also the [prevailing party's] other
interests sought to be protected by the statute in question and
the public interest in having persons with valid claims under
the statute represented by competent legal counsel." Id.
"[C]ompensable hours may be reduced if the time spent was wholly
disproportionate to the interests at stake." Stratos v.
Department of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 323 (1982). With
respect to reasonable rates, the proper starting point is
typically "the average rate in the community for similar work by
attorneys with the same years' experience." Stowe, supra at
203-204. Judges are afforded considerable discretion in 9
weighing these and the other Linthicum factors, as they are "in
the best position to determine how much time was reasonably
spent on a case, and the fair value of the attorney's services."
Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324. See Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan
Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 429-430 (2005) ("the
amount of a reasonable attorney's fee is largely
discretionary").
After multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a
reasonable rate, the court "may then adjust the [resulting]
lodestar calculation upward or downward" to account for
circumstances not otherwise adequately captured. Sutton, 493
Mass. at 742, quoting LaChance, 475 Mass. at 772. See, e.g.,
Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324 ("In limited circumstances, statutory
fee awards may be enhanced to compensate for the risk of
nonpayment"). However, as we have previously emphasized,
consistency is important; "[a] fair market rate for time
reasonably spent preparing and litigating a case is the basic
measure of a reasonable attorney's fee under State law as well
as Federal law," Fontaine, supra at 326, "and should govern
unless there are special reasons to depart from [it]," Stratos,
387 Mass. at 322.
Here, Hidalgo sought attorney's fees only for the anti-
SLAPP work performed, necessitated by Watch City's abuse of
process and malicious prosecution counterclaims. Hidalgo also 10
fully prevailed on the anti-SLAPP issues -- which are complex
and required application of a revised analytic framework
announced during the appeal in this case. See Bristol Asphalt
Co., 493 Mass. at 541-542. Watch City did not object to the fee
request. And the Appeals Court panel determined the hours
expended and the rates charged for the anti-SLAPP work were
reasonable. See note 2, supra. Nevertheless, the panel awarded
Hidalgo only one-half of his requested fee award based on the
"amount of damages involved" in the Wage Act claims. Linthicum,
379 Mass. at 389. This was an error for the reasons explained
infra.
Hidalgo did not seek recovery of attorney's fees for any
legal work related to the Wage Act claims. Indeed, those claims
have yet to be litigated. We have previously declined to
consider the "amount of damages involved" for claims for which
fees are neither sought nor awarded. Linthicum, 379 Mass. at
389. See, e.g., Twin Fires Inv., LLC, 445 Mass. at 430-431
(rejecting argument that judge erroneously based his attorney's
fee award on case as whole and not G. L. c. 93A claim on which
plaintiff prevailed); Berman, 434 Mass. at 302 & n.4 (rejecting
argument that fee award was disproportionate to amount at stake
in "count IV," where attorney's fees related to "count I"). The
proper question for the court, therefore, was whether the anti- 11
SLAPP work on appeal, not the monetary value of the Wage Act
claims, warranted $67,361.25 in fees.
To be sure, the amount of damages involved is a factor that
a court may use in connection with determining the
reasonableness of the rate and time spent. See Linthicum, 379
Mass. at 388-389. And, in connection with his counsel's
unopposed fee application, Hidalgo did not provide the court
with such a value for the counterclaims. Nonetheless, the
panel's use of the value of the Wage Act claims, in the absence
of any other valuation of the anti-SLAPP counterclaims, was
error. As the panel recognized, the anti-SLAPP issues were
complex; furthermore, the complexity of the anti-SLAPP issues on
appeal did not depend in any way on the value of the underlying
Wage Act claims. In these circumstances, using the modest sum
at stake in the Wage Act claims as a basis for reducing the fee
award related to the anti-SLAPP counterclaims was error.
We reiterate that generally, if a court determines that a
prevailing party's adequately documented hours and rates are
reasonable, as informed by the Linthicum factors, including the 12
value of the relevant claim, the resulting lodestar award is
also, absent special circumstances, reasonable.5,6
Moreover, to the extent the Wage Act claims were relevant
in resolving the anti-SLAPP motion -- as they were the original
petitioning activities that prompted the SLAPP counterclaims and
the successful anti-SLAPP motion -- the small amount of lost
wages at stake alone does not provide a basis for reducing the
appellate attorney's fees sought.
As this court has recognized, "[t]he right[] . . . to
petition for a redress of grievances [is] among the most
5 As noted supra, there may sometimes be "special reasons" to adjust the lodestar calculation upward or downward. Stratos, 387 Mass. at 322. See Sutton, 493 Mass. at 742, first quoting LaChance, 475 Mass. at 772, and then quoting Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324. The appellate anti-SLAPP work in this case, however, did not present such circumstances.
6 In a docket entry explaining its denial of Hidalgo's motion for reconsideration, the Appeals Court panel stated that "the value of the [SLAPP] counterclaims -- if there were information provided or available regarding the same -- would be a relevant consideration." However, the panel questioned Hidalgo's estimated value of the SLAPP counterclaims ($145,000), particularly because "the $3,000 in lost wages was the only objective evidence of record as to what is at stake in this case." The panel further stated that this argument was waived because Hidalgo did not present it in his motion for attorney's fees. But again, the focus should be on the reasonableness of the rates and the hours spent on the anti-SLAPP work on appeal, and the panel did not challenge the reasonableness of the hours and rates used in Hidalgo's lodestar calculation, see note 2, supra. Moreover, as explained further infra, the modest sum at stake in Hidalgo's Wage Act claims cannot alone be the basis for reducing his fee award. 13
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights" and
"has been a fundamental aspect of liberty for the better part of
1,000 years" (citation omitted). Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v.
Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 487 (2017). Indeed, the anti-SLAPP
statute was especially concerned with protecting the petitioning
rights of "individual citizens of modest means" against
retaliatory actions by those with greater resources. Duracraft
Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 161 (1998).
The Legislature and this court have also emphasized the
importance generally of Wage Act claims, as the nonpayment of
wages is a major concern. See, e.g., Ferman v. Sturgis
Cleaners, Inc., 481 Mass. 488, 495 (2019), quoting Lipsitt v.
Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 245 (2013) (purpose of Wage Act "was 'to
prevent the unreasonable detention of wages' by 'unscrupulous
employers'"). Although individual nonpayments may not provide
significant monetary recovery, such amounts are often, if not
always, critical to the wage earners involved. See Reuter v.
Methuen, 489 Mass. 465, 468 (2022) (Wage Act was intended "for
the protection of employees, who are often dependent for their
daily support upon the prompt payment of their wages" [citation
omitted]). It is also difficult, as the Appeals Court panel
recognized, to incentivize lawyers to take such cases given the
modest amounts at stake. See Ferman, supra, citing Lipsitt,
supra. To address all of these important concerns, the 14
Legislature provided for treble damages and attorney's fees
under the Wage Act. See Ferman, supra ("The Legislature
specifically included fee-shifting provisions in the Wage Act to
ensure its rigorous enforcement by private parties" and to
"provide both a necessary incentive for attorneys to take such
cases and a powerful disincentive for employers to withhold the
wages in the first place" [quotation and citation omitted]);
Lipsitt, supra at 246 (Legislature "dramatically increased"
remedies available under Wage Act by making treble damages
mandatory [quotation and citation omitted]). See also Stratos,
387 Mass. at 323 (purpose of fee-shifting provisions "is to
encourage suits that are not likely to pay for themselves, but
are nevertheless desirable because they vindicate important
rights"); School Comm. of Norton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 839, 854 (2005) (fee-shifting
provisions "aim[] to attract competent legal counsel for those
with meritorious claims yet limited means" [quotation and
citation omitted]). Reducing an anti-SLAPP fee award based on
the amount of damages sought for lost wages in the underlying
Wage Act claims impermissibly minimizes the importance of such
claims and risks disincentivizing lawyers from taking Wage Act
cases.
3. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse so
much of the order on attorney's fees that halves the fee award 15
based on the value of the Wage Act claims, and as so modified,
with a fee award of $67,361.25, the order is affirmed.7
So ordered.
7 Hidalgo also requests reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal, to which he is statutorily entitled, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H. Accordingly, Hidalgo may, within fourteen days of the date of the rescript, file with the clerk of the court for the Commonwealth an application for fees and costs, together with any supporting material. See Fabre, 441 Mass. at 10-11.