Hicks v. State of Washington

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHEN KEITH HICKS, No. 25-2742 D.C. No. 3:24-cv-05607-JNW Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

STATE OF WASHINGTON; ANGIE NELSON, in either her personal or professional capacity; THURSTON COUNTY FAMILY COURT,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Jamal N. Whitehead, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 29, 2026**

Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.

Stephen Keith Hicks appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). from state family court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Miroth v.

County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2025). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hick’s action as barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine because the claims are a “de facto appeal” of a state court

decision or are “inextricably intertwined” with that decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d

1148, 1163-66 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012)

(explaining that claims are “inextricably intertwined” with state court decisions

where federal adjudication “would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the

same issues” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Hick’s complaint

without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting

forth standard of review and stating that dismissal without leave to amend is proper

where amendment would be futile).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

2 25-2742