Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Corp.

214 S.W.2d 315, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1491
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 16, 1948
DocketNo. 4449.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 214 S.W.2d 315 (Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Development Corp., 214 S.W.2d 315, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1491 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).

Opinions

WALKER, Justice.

Appellants, referred to hereinafter as Plaintiffs, brought this action in Trespass to Try Title against Appellees, referred to hereinafter as Defendants, to recover the title to and the possession of .the Adolpho Sterne League, Abstract No. 32, in Tyler County, and 'to recover substantial damages as well. Defendants disclaimed surface ownership of some 400 acres of the League, and on trial, Plaintiffs disclaimed the same interests which Defendants had disclaimed. At the close of Plaintiffs’ proof, -the trial court instructed a verdict in behalf of Defendants, and Plaintiffs have appealed.

Plaintiffs claim only a limitation title to the Sterne League, and the title claimed by them is founded upon the possession of a few acres of the League by one Thomas Collier, who died in January, 1900. Plaintiffs say that such actual. possession as their proof shows Thomas Collier to have had was referable to a tax deed dated December 15, 1864, made to him by the District Collector of the Confederate War Tax. This deed, they say, purported to convey the Sterne League and they say further that Thomas Collier’s actual possession, being referable to this deed, effected a disseizin of the entire League.

Plaintiffs claim the title of Thomas Collier under and by virtue of the statutes of descent and distribution.

Plaintiffs’ proof did not fix either the location or the boundaries of Thomas Collier’s actual possession with the certainty required to support a judgment for the land held in such possession, and under Plaintiffs’ pleading, the trial court properly instructed a verdict in Defendants’ behalf unless this proof exhibited a prima facie title to the entire League, vested -in Thomas Collier. The arguments of the parties raise the following issues:

(1) The effect of the assignment for the benefit of Thoma-s Collier’s creditors: — On September 9,' 1890, Thomas Collier, who was a merchant, having places of business in the communities of Town Bluff and Spurger, in Tyler County, executed an assignment for the benefit of his creditors. R. K. Bower, who is identified by some of the proof as an employee of Mr. Collier’s, was named as Assignee. This instrument was filed for record on the day it was made, and we will assume that the Assignee accepted his trust. We will also assume that the instrument was a valid statutory assignment for the benefit of those creditors of Mr. Collier’s who would accept it, good against the criticisms made of it in Plaintiffs’ brief, and that having accepted his trust the Assignee became vested with title to all of Thomas Collier’s property, excepting only property exempt to him. Thomas Collier’s claim to land upon the Sterne. League was not exempt.

Whether the Assignee filed a bond or made a report to the District Court were matters not touched on in the evidence. The proof leaves it uncertain whether the Assignee acted under the assignment or not, but there is proof that Thomas Collier’s actual possession of the acreage upon the Sterne League continued to exist for some time, perhaps 3 or 4 years, beyond the date of the assignment, and there is no evidence that the Assignee ever asserted a claim to, or exercised dominion over, or assumed to sell, any part of the Sterne League.

Defendants say that the assignment to Bower constitutes proof of an outstanding title to the Thomas Collier claim, vested in the Assignee.

This argument is overruled. Plaintiffs filed this action on February 25, 1942, over 50 years after the assignment was made, and whether the proof is to be construed as showing that the Assignee did or did not attempt to perform his trust, *317 we must presume from t'he information before us that the administration- of the trust (short of a redelivery or formal re-conveyance to the Assignor) has been wound up or has terminated in some manner in which the interested parties acquiesced. See: 5 C.J. 1195 (#283); 6 C. J.S., Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, § 164, p. 1322 ; 4 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, § 999, Notes 98-1; 32 Tex.Jur. 704 (#38). To some extent the trust expressed in Mr. Collier’s assignment for the benefit of his creditors was regulated by statute, but the actual administration of the trust was left in the Assignee’s hands, and after so great a period of time as that elapsing between the making of this assignment and the filing of this action we see nothing in the governing statutes which is inconsistent with the presumption we have made. See Acts 1879, Ch. 53, Acts 1883, Ch. 56, Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. art. 261 et seq.

The presumption made by us leaves the Assignee (if alive) vested, perhaps, with the naked legal title >to any land owned under Plaintiffs’ claim, but it leaves Plaintiffs vested with the equitable title to their respective shares of said land; and this equitable title would support this action. See: (1) 5 Tex.Jur. 90 (Secs. 32 & 33); 5 C.J. 1305 (Sec. 520); 6 C. J.S., Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, § 397, p. 1428. (2) Stafford v. Stafford, 96 Tex. 106, 70 S.W. 75; Newman v. Dotson, 57 Tex. 117; Montgomery v. Trueheart, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W. 284. (3) Lanius v. Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, at page 555, 101 S.W. 1076; Moore v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S.W. 61. (4) 11 Tex.jur. 500 (Sec. 57); 41 Tex.Jur. 472 (Sec. 17); Padgett v. Guilmartin, 106 Tex. 551, 172 S.W. 1101.

(2) Incidents of the tax deed to which Plaintiffs say the possession .of Thomas Collier was referable: Recitations in this tax deed show that the deed was made in furtherance of the war efforts of the Confederacy, and for this reason, Defendants say, in effect, that the deed must be regarded as being nothing at all and that claim of the entire League under the instrument, based upon actual possession of only a -part of the League, did not effect a disseizin of the entire League, that Thomas Collier was, in law, a trespasser without benefit of memorandum of title and his disseizin was limited to his actual possession.

Accepting Plaintiffs’ construction of their proof, the actual possession of Thomas Collier- antedated the Code of 1879, existing as early as 1868 or 1869 or 1870 and perhaps as lafe as 1893 or 1894. There is no proof respecting payment -of taxes by Thomas Collier and -consequently, if possession prior to the enactment of the Code is to be of any significance w.e assume that it must have complied with Sections 14 and 17 of the Act of February 5, 1841, P.D. Arts 4621 & 4624 and -that possession since the enactment of -the Code must have complied with Arts. 3194 and 3195, R.S. 1879. Of these statutes, Art. 3195, R.S. 1879, provided, as does Art. 5510, R.S. 1925, that possession under a “written, memorandum of title, other -than a -deed,” which was duly recorded, should be -construed as -extending to the boundaries specified-in the instrument. Sections 14 & 17 of the Act of February 5, 1841, did not refer to possession under muniments of title, but possession and -claim under “color of title” was given the same effect. Charle v. Saffold, 13 Tex. 94; Wofford v. McKenna, 23 Tex. 36, 76 Am.Dec. 53.

We have had some inclination to disagree with this argument of Defendants because -of the particular statutes under which Plaintiffs claim. See: Davis v. Howe, Tex.Com.App., 213 S.W. 609, and decision cited therein; Houston Oil Co. v. Jones, 109 Tex. 89, 198 S.W. 290; Moses v. Dibrell, 2 Tex.Civ.App. 457, 21 S.W. 414; Sanders v. Word, 50 Tex. Civ.App. 294, 110 S.W. 205.

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214 S.W.2d 315, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1491, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hicks-v-southwestern-settlement-development-corp-texapp-1948.