Hicks v. Borgen

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 1, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00533
StatusUnknown

This text of Hicks v. Borgen (Hicks v. Borgen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hicks v. Borgen, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DESMOND HICKS,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 22-CV-533-JPS

JAMES BORGEN, TYLER BRODERICK, KELLY SCHOEBEL, ORDER LANCE PENN, CASEY GIGSTEAD, DR. KAREN RONQUILLO HORTON, MICHELLE ROBBINS, and MARIE BRENNER,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Desmond Hicks, an inmate confined at Redgranite Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, ECF No. 2. On July 8, 2022, however, Plaintiff paid the filing fee in full; the Court will therefore deny as moot the motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. The remainder of this Order screens Plaintiff’s complaint. 1. FEDERAL SCREENING STANDARD Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from chronic pain following his surgery on May 22, 2022 at Froedtert Hospital Orthopedic Department in Milwaukee for a quadriceps tendon rupture in his left leg. ECF No. 1 at 2. After his surgery, Plaintiff returned to Fond Du Lac County Jail (“FDLJ”) where he alleges he failed to get proper medical care. Plaintiff names three FDLJ healthcare providers, Defendant Ronquillo-Horton (“Ronquillo- Horton”), Defendant Robbins (“Robbins”), and Defendant Brenner (“Brenner”). Id. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that these three defendants delayed him effective medical care and failed to properly address his complaint of chronic pain following his surgery. Id. Plaintiff claims these defendants forced him to suffer needless pain from May 2019 until he was released from FDLJ in February 2020; Plaintiff now walks with a permanent limp. Id. Following his denial of proper medical treatment, Plaintiff filed grievances against those defendants. Plaintiff alleges that various FDLJ security employees then retaliated against him for the filing of his complaints. As to his retaliation claim, Plaintiff names Defendant Borgen (“Borgen”), Defendant Broderick (“Broderick”), Defendant Schoebel (“Schoebel”), Defendant Penn (“Penn”), and Defendant Gigstead (“Gigstead”). Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that these defendants retaliated against him by placing him in isolation status, filing a false disciplinary report against him, limiting his canteen ordering, limiting his dayroom (phone, television and interaction with other inmates), searching his cell on an almost weekly basis, and denying him medical care assistive devices in the dayroom. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff additionally alleges that these defendants blocked the phone number for Dr. William Raasch, the surgeon at Froedtert Hospital. Id. at 4. 3. ANALYSIS First, Plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate- indifference claim against Ronquillo-Horton, Robbins, and Brenner for their indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. The Eighth Amendment secures an inmate’s right to medical care. Prison officials violate this right when they “display deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Deliberate indifference claims contain both an objective and a subjective component: the inmate “must first establish that his medical condition is objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’; and second, that prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ i.e., that they both knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health.” Lewis v. McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 562–63 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citations omitted)). “A delay in treating non-life-threatening but painful conditions may constitute deliberate indifference if the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010)). The length of delay that is tolerable “‘depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.’” Id. (quoting McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640). Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered chronic pain following a surgical procedure and that Ronquillo-Horton, Robbins, and Brenner denied him care to address his pain.

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Bluebook (online)
Hicks v. Borgen, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hicks-v-borgen-wied-2022.