Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company v. National Labor Relations Board

645 F.2d 506, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2402, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13032
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMay 21, 1981
Docket80-3205
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 645 F.2d 506 (Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hickory Springs Manufacturing Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 645 F.2d 506, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2402, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13032 (5th Cir. 1981).

Opinion

GEE, Circuit Judge:

Campaign tactics preceding a representation election held among twenty over-the-road truck drivers at the petitioning em *507 ployer’s Fort Smith, Arkansas, facility draw before us two interesting questions of labor law. The first concerns the effect of “sincere-money” payments exacted by the union as a precondition to its organizing effort — a sort of Savair -in-reverse condition. 1 The second involves the effect on the election’s validity of pre-election threats of picket line violence, arguably made or adopted by the union, and of threats and misconduct by union supporters in and about the polls. The Regional Director agreed with the employer that the last of these required a hearing for resolution but overruled all its other objections. In a split decision, with two of five members dissenting, the Board overruled all of the employer’s objections, rejected the Regional Director’s recommendation of a hearing on the violence issue, and certified the union as bargaining representative without more ado. The employer’s refusal to bargain, the Board’s consequent certification and bargaining order, and the employer’s petition to us constitute the procedural vehicles by which the validity of that certification and the election on which it depends are brought forward. Since, for the reasons that follow, we partly disagree with the Board’s disposition, we deny enforcement, vacate the Board’s order, and remand for a hearing.

The “Sincere-Money” Payments

The union’s campaign opened in the fall of 1977 with a meeting of fifteen or sixteen of the twenty drivers, held in a rest area near Fort Smith. Present and taking the lead there were a union business agent, Cecil Douthitt, and one of the drivers, B. J. Bramlett. After an exhortation by Mr. Bramlett and the consequent signing of union authorization cards, Mr. Douthitt took the floor and advised the assembly that before the union would go further it would be necessary for a majority of the drivers to pay a total of forty dollars each, representing one month’s dues and an initiation fee.

He explained that the union set this condition because of an unsuccessful organizing campaign held three years earlier, when a large percentage of the drivers signed cards but most voted against the union. Douthitt observed that there had been a lot of laughter at the union then but that this time the union would do the laughing — all the way to the bank and regardless of the election’s outcome. Seven of the drivers paid directly, and Bramlett paid for seven more who were caught short on condition that he be reimbursed next payday. The employer contends that Douthitt’s action in requiring these payments interfered with the employees’ freedom of choice in the election and rendered it invalid.

In support of its contention the employer advances essentially two arguments, one deriving from authority and one from logic. The authority relied on is National Labor Relations Board v. Savair Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 270, 94 S.Ct. 495, 38 L.Ed.2d 495 (1973). In that case the Court invalidated an election because of a campaign maneuver of a somewhat similar type to that employed here: waiver by the union of a ten dollar initiation fee for those employees who signed union representation slips before the election but not for those who signed them thereafter. 2

As we read its opinion, the Savair Court discerned one basic vice in the tactic used there and other, subsidiary faults of a lesser nature. The major vice was characterized as buying of endorsements, and the Court concluded that “the statutory policy of fair elections ... [does not permit] endorsements, whether for or against the union, to be bought and sold in this fashion.” 414 U.S. at 277, 94 S.Ct. at 498. To do so, the Court observed, permits the union to paint a false pre-election picture of employee support and subjects rank and file opponents of unionization to the fear of facing a wrathful union regime should the union carry. We are unable to grasp fully the force of the Court’s final observation, since it ap *508 pears to us that the danger noted will always be present for any opponent who makes his opposition known; but except for it, we see no application of the Savair rationale to this case.

Here there was no vote buying, rather the contrary. Here we view not a special concession to those who endorsed the union in the course of the election campaign but rather an unusual, union-imposed obstacle to employee support of the organizing effort. Nor is any false depiction of employee support presented by the tactic, since support with cash as well as words is true support indeed. In short, whatever the merits or demerits of the tactic employed here, Savair does not condemn it.

The argument from logic is not so readily rejected. It is patently true and must be conceded straight away that the preliminary cash investment in union victory exacted by Mr. Douthitt tended to advance the moment of decision for or against unionism by the drivers who paid. This being so, the opportunities of the employer to change their views in the course of the campaign were plainly diminished and their freedom of choice at the moment of casting their ballots somewhat pre-empted.

The matter is one of degree, however, and for several reasons we do not think the interference was of the type or of the degree of severity that we need condemn. As for its type, it was entirely legitimate: no duress was involved, and the choice to put up the “sincere money” or not was a free one. Indeed, it was a lesser step than another that would also have been entirely legitimate: affiliation with the union in advance of the election by drivers who wished to join it. What Douthitt required was no more than an early voucher of commitment to the union cause, and we know of no rule or doctrine disqualifying persons from participation in organizing campaigns or elections on the basis of their degree or timing of commitment, whether for or against the union cause. 3

We therefore concur with the Board and the Regional Director that the sincere-money tactic, while perhaps inelegant or unwise, was not improper. The matter is otherwise, however, as to the objections based on the threats of picket-line and strike violence and on misconduct at the polls, subjects to which we now turn.

The Threats of Violence

In our circuit, it is settled that when an objector such as Hickory Springs makes out a prima facie case by its affidavits the Board must grant a hearing and may not conclude that one is unwarranted by “considering matter turned up by the regional director, . . . weighing the relative factual data and ... making credibility determinations.” NLRB v. Claxton Manufacturing Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir. 1980).

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645 F.2d 506, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2402, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13032, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hickory-springs-manufacturing-company-v-national-labor-relations-board-ca5-1981.