Hickman v. Hickman

1 Del. Ch. 133
Court of Chancery of Delaware·Decided March 15, 1821·Published

Opinion

Ridcely, Chancellor.

There are two kinds of bills to preserve testimony; one, is to perpetuate the testimony, or to examine witnesses in perpetuam rel memoriam; the other, is to examine witnesses de bene esse. The former lies where the party is in actual, undisturbed possession ; or where lands are devised by will from the heir at law; or where no action has been brought,but the party intends to commence a suit. In these, and in similar. cases, this bill will lie, because no suit being brought, the party has no opportunity to examine his witnesses, and is exposed to a future attack or to a future loss, in case such testimony cannot be preserved until a judicial investigation.

The bill to examine witnesses de bene esse is different [137] from the bill to perpetuate testimony, and is directly the reverse of it. It is brought by a person out of possession, whose witnesses are aged or infirm, or where the knowledge of the matter rests with a single witness, or with two only, and is in aid of a trial at law or in equity, where the testimony is in danger of being lost before the matter to which it relates can be examined into by the proper tribunal. It is commonly brought after the commencement of a suit at law or in equity; or it is made part óf a bill in equity brought in a cáse in which such testimony has a direct bearing and reference.

If a party could not perpetuate his testimony by a bill in this court before suit brought, he might lose the opportunity of establishing his right; for his adversary need only delay a suit until his witnesses are dead, or the testimony be otherwise lost, and then the party would be without remedy or protection, however legal and honest his defence might be.

The books of practice are extremely confused on this subject, and generally blend the two kinds of bills together, and do not plainly distinguish the rules applicable to one from those applicable to the other. And, indeed, in the adjudged cases,the language of the reporters seldom makes any distinction, though by attention to the cases, the difference may be plainly observed. Cooper’s Treatise on Equity throws more light upon this subject, and arranges and methodises it more clearly than any other practical work that I have seen. See Gilberts Equity 119, 120 ; 6 Vesey Jr. 251.

Bills to perpetuate testimony are substantial, original bills, which have no other design but to secure the evidence of some right or interest which may be endangered or lost, if the testimony upon which it depends be not preserved. Upon the same principle the Court will lend its aid in bills quia timet, to secure a party against the neglect, inadvertence, or culpability of another. And so, [138] in bills of discovery, for discovering facts resting in the knowledge of the defendant, or deeds or other writings or things in his power or custody,—in these instances the Court acts to secure a right, or to prevent a loss or injury, and not to redress a wrong.

In bills to perpetuate testimony, no relief is prayed. 3 Atk. 439, 2 Vent. 114, Prec. in Ch. 532: and so, in bills of discovery, 3 Vesey Jr. 4, 343 : 2 Ves. Jr. 459 : 2 Bro. Ch. Rep. 319: 4 Bro. Ch. Rep. 480. This is because the object of such bills is attained as soon as the testimony is taken, or the discovery made.

We find many instances of bills to perpetuate testimony or to examine witnesses in perpetuam rel memoria,m. In Dorset vs. Girdler, Prec. in Chanc. 531, there was a bill brought by one in possession of a fishery, to examine his witnesses in perpetuam rel memoriam, to establish his sole right of fishery. It was suggested in the bill, that the defendant pretended a sole right, and threatened to bring an action and to disturb the plaintiff when his witnesses should be dead. The defendant demurred, for that the plaintiff had not verified his title at law, and had no right to bring his bill in the first instance. The demurrer was over-ruled, because one in possession and not disturbed cannot sue, and the facts to which the testimony relates cannot be immediately investigated in a court of law. If the defendant had actually disturbed the plaintiff, the defendant ought to have pleaded this, and that the plaintiff should seek his remedy at law; or, if the plaintiff had shown in his bill that the defendant had actually disturbed him by fishing, then the demurrer would have been proper, but not for barely threatening. There, the defendant had by Ms answer insisted on his right of fishery and hoped to prove it, and yet by his demurrer would debar the plaintiff from proving anything at all. See 1 Atk. 284.

Here, the defendant, Hickman, admits by his answer, that the complainant is in possession, but he denies that [139] he ever intended to convey to the complainant- an. estate in fee simple, and says that he cannot read writing, that the deed was not read to him, and that if he ever executed such a deed as the complainant hath set out in his bill, it was by imposition. This answer admits everything necessary to give this Court jurisdiction; and the bill makes out precisely a case fitted for the examination of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony.

Lord Nottingham, it is said by Cooper in his Treatise on Equity, p. 51, decided the first and leading case upon this sort of bill; and he held that it might be exhibited for leave to bring a deed into Court, and to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to it; and that the plaintiff should set forth a title and pray to examine to it. The case is cited, Rep. Temp. Finch 391.

In Parry vs. Rogers 1 Vern. 441, a demurrer to a bill to perpetuate testimony . touching the title of lands was allowed, because there was no impediment that hindered the plaintiff from trying his right at law. See 1 Vern. 308 : 1 Atk. 571.

Suffolk vs. Green, et. al., 1 Atk. 450, was a bill to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to a bond charged to be usurious, alleging that the defendant, Green, whom the plaintiff wanted to examine, was very aged and infirm. Green, who was a nominee only in the bond, demurred, as the bill sought to subject him to a penalty, and also as the plaintiff did not offer to pay what was really due. If the demurrer had stopped at the first part of the bill, which sought to subject the defendant to a penalty, it would have been good ; but, as to perpetuating the testimony, it was bad ; for the plaintiff was entitled to perpetuate the testimony, notwithstanding his not offering to pay. And Lord Hardwieke says, a man may bring a bill to perpetuate his testimony in many eases where he cannot bring a bill for relief without waiving the penalty, as in waste—or in the case of a forged deed—or in the case [140] of insurances, after a commission to examine witnesses beyond sea as to fraudulent losses; and yet, in many cases fraudulent losses are subject to a penalty, even sometimes felonious. The bill is to perpetuate testimony to a plain fact. What may be the consequence of that fact is of another consideration. This case of Suffolk vs. Green is full and clear ; for it appear» that though the party may be subjected to a penalty, or even to felony, the testimony may.be perpetuated.

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Hickman v. Hickman, 1 Del. Ch. 133 (Del. Ct. App. 1821).

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