Heyden v. Mineral County Detention Facility

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: December 11, 2024
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00452
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 THOMAS JOHN HEYDEN, Case No. 3:24-cv-00452-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 BILL FERGUSON, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Thomas John Heyden brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 13 to redress constitutional violations that she1 claims she suffered while incarcerated. (ECF 14 No. 1-1.) On October 7, 2024, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file a fully complete application 15 to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee on or before December 4, 16 2024. (ECF No. 3.) The Court warned Plaintiff that the action could be dismissed if she 17 failed to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis with all three 18 documents or pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil action by that deadline. (Id. at 2.) That 19 deadline expired and Plaintiff did not file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 20 pauperis, pay the full $405 filing fee, or otherwise respond. 21 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 22 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 23 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 24 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court 25 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 26 27 1In the Complaint, Plaintiff states she is a transgender woman. (ECF No. 1-1.) 1 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 2 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 3 Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 4 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 5 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 6 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 7 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 8 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 9 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 10 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 11 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 12 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 13 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 14 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 15 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 16 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 17 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 18 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 19 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 20 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 21 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 22 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 23 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 24 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 25 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 26 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 27 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 1 || F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and 2 || unless Plaintiff either files a fully complete application to proceed in forma pauperis or 3 || pays the $405 filing fee for a civil action, the only alternative is to enter a second order 4 || setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only 5 || delays the inevitable and squanders the Court’s finite resources. Additionally, Plaintiff's 6 || mail is being returned as undeliverable because she failed to file an updated address with 7 || the Court. (See ECF Nos. 4, 5.) Setting another deadline is not a meaningful alternative 8 || given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 10 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 11 || prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file a fully complete application to proceed in forma 12 || pauperis or pay the full $405 filing fee in compliance with this Court’s October 7, 2024, 13 || order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 14 || No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue her 15 || claims, she must file a complaint in a new case and satisfy the matter of the filing fee. 16 DATED THIS 11" Day of December 2024.

18 MIRANDA M. DU 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28