Hevener v. Berry

17 W. Va. 474, 1880 W. Va. LEXIS 17
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 18, 1880
StatusPublished

This text of 17 W. Va. 474 (Hevener v. Berry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hevener v. Berry, 17 W. Va. 474, 1880 W. Va. LEXIS 17 (W. Va. 1880).

Opinion

Moore, Judge:

So far as the record presents the questions in this case, I think the principles governing them have been fully elucidated in Warren et al. v. Branch et al., 15 W. Va. 21, wherein Judge Green collated the authorities bearing upon the questions vital, to this case, and the court enunciated these principles:

“ 2d. When with the knowledge and assent of the creditor there is a misrepresentation with regard to material facts, and had the real facts been known and not misstated, they might reasonably have prevented the security from entering into his contract of suretyship, such contract will not be binding on the surety, though such misrepresentation was not made with a fraudulent purpose.
“3d. Unless enquired of by a surety, a creditor is under no obligation to disclose facts in no manner connected with the business which is the subject of the surety-[490]*490ship, though such facts would probably have a decided 'influence on the surety in determining whether he would enter into the contract.
“ 4th. If a material fact connected with the contract of suretyship, which might influence the surety in entering into the contract, is fraudulently concealed with a view to benefit the creditor, such concealment, though no en-quiry is made by the surety, would discharge him.
5th. But though the simple failure of a creditor to communicate to a surety a fact material for the surety to know, and though this fact be connected with the contract of suretyship, will not generally vitiate the contract, unless the concealment by the creditor was fraudulent, even though the principal in procuring the surety to enter into the contract acted fraudulently; yet if the dealings are such as fairly to lead the creditor, if a reasonable man, to believe that the principal must have used fraud by suppressing facts or otherwise, in procuring the surety to enter into the contract, and such fraud has been used, it will vitiate the contract as to the surety, though ■no actual fraud be traced to the creditor.
“ 6th. If a contract is made for the sale of land, and nothing be said in the contract about the vendor’s lien being reserved, and bond and personal security be taken for the purchase-money, this alone will not amount to a waiver of the vendor’s lien; but if it be shown by direct evidence, or by the circumstances of the case, that the vendor relied only on the bond and personal security, the vendor’s lien is waived, and he would be required to execute a deed without reserving the vendor’s’lien. Before the passage of our statute requiring an express reservation of this lien on the face of the deed, the execution of a deed and the taking of personal security would amount to a waiver of the vendor’s lien.”

The bill and amended bills seek, on the part of Hevener, to avoid the judgment enjoined: First. Because of the release of the vendor’s lien, by Berry, on the house and lot, which Hevener claims, was co-sure[491]*491ty with him in securing to Berry the payment of the $3,000.00 note, and that it was released without his knowledge or consent, and in fact that he first learned of its being released after the judgment was obtained; Second. Because there was collusion between the defendants, Berry and Hounshell, to defraud Hevener out of the $3,000.00 with its interest. The plaintiff, had a clear right, not only under the statute, Code, ch. 126, §§ 5 and 6, but also under the general principles of equity, to waive his. defence at law and seek relief by injunction against the judgment in a court of equity, and to show the fraud if it existed, for as said in Hil-liard on Injunction, page 196, § 36, Fraud is another ground of injunction, and this, although the party might find a remedy in a court of law, or though he had notice of the judgment in time to appeal, and made an abortive attempt to do so.” See also Kerr on Fraud and Mistake pp. 43, 44 and 47, also Smith v. McLain, 9 W. Va. 654.

Whilst it is true the allegations of the bill are not as specific, as might be inferred from Smith v. McLain they should be, to enjoin the judgment, yet they sufficiently show that class of ignorance, unmixed with negligence, which under the peculiar circumstances of the case would permit.equity to relieve him, if the facts of the case are true as he presents them by his bills. As said in Bige-low on Fraud, page 46, He is guilty of a fraud who secretly changes a state of affairs, and then, without revealing this fact, procures another to do an act into which the true state of affairs enters as a motive,” as for example, where “ a creditor knowing that his debtor is in failing circumstances, obtains from him for part of his claim a mortgage, substantially covering all of his property, and gets the debtor to obtain the endorsement of another person, for another part, without revealing the fact of the mortgage, this is a fraud upon the endorser, and discharges him from liability.” Hevener, by his allegations of Berry’s release of the vendor’s lien on the [492]*492property purchased by Hounshell, and the procuring of 'his (Hevener’s) signature to the $3,000.00 note to secure the purchase-money on the property thus relieved from the vendor’s-lien, without the knowledge and consent of Hevener, attempts to bring the case within the principle as laid down by Bigelow.

Whilst it is true, as before' stated, that the bill and amended bills aré not as specific and direct in the charge of fraud, or the allegations of the circumstances showing fraud,-or collusion with intent to defraud, as the principles of good pleading require, yet they sliow upon their face sufficient to induce a court of equity to take cognizance of the case, and enter upon an enquiry into the merits; and therefore it was proper to overrule the demurrers to the bill and amended bills; and certainly so as to the second amended bill, because the pleadings had already shown that the insurance company had been connected with the transaction to such an .extent as to make it a question whether the note of $3,000.00 it held was not in fact for the same money as that of the note upon which Berry had obtained judgment against Hevener. If so, then it is manifest, that it would be inequitable to permit Berry to have the benefit of both notes, and to collect both ; but if both notes were intended to secure the same money to Berry, and the note held by the company was secured by the mortgage, and the judgment on the note against Hevener was intended to pay off the mortgaged note, certainly equity would come to the relief of Hevener and subrogate him to the rights and equities of the company and of Berry, upon his payment to the company of the amount of the mortgage-note. It was therefore right to make the company a party defendant so as to ascertain its interest in the subject-matter, and what were the true state of facts, that justice should be done in the premises to all parties.

Having thus disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we-must now.enter upon the merits of the case, and see to what extent, they are governed by the principles of [493]*493law and equity we have cited, and bearing in mind that “ no facts are properly in issue, unless charged in the bill; and of course no proofs can be generally offered of facts not in the bill; nor can relief be granted for matters not charged, although they may be apparent from other parts of the pleadings and evidence'; for the court pronounces its decree

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Related

Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v. Patton
9 W. Va. 648 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1876)
Warren v. Branch
15 W. Va. 21 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1879)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
17 W. Va. 474, 1880 W. Va. LEXIS 17, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hevener-v-berry-wva-1880.