Hesse v. Ashurst

468 P.2d 343, 86 Nev. 326, 1970 Nev. LEXIS 514
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedApril 23, 1970
Docket6006
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 468 P.2d 343 (Hesse v. Ashurst) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hesse v. Ashurst, 468 P.2d 343, 86 Nev. 326, 1970 Nev. LEXIS 514 (Neb. 1970).

Opinion

OPINION

By the Court,

Mowbray, J.:

Henry Hesse and his wife, Thelma Hesse, have appealed to this court from an order of the district court granting respondent Marvin Kent Ashurst’s habeas petition, in which he sought and was awarded the custody of his two minor sons, Michael *328 Kent, aged 5, and Neal Scott, aged 4. The children and their mother, Judy, who had been severely injured in an auto accident, had been living for many months with the Hesses, Judy’s parents. Judy became a paraplegic, and she died on March 31, 1969. On April 2, 1969, the First Judicial District Court issued temporary letters of guardianship to the Hesses, and the court awarded them the care, custody, and control of the minor children. 1 Thereafter, their natural father, Marvin Kent Ashurst, filed this habeas proceeding in district court, and the district judge ordered that the custody of the children be removed from the Hesses and placed with Ashurst. Hence, this appeal. We reverse, and we order that the custody of the children be returned to the Hesses pursuant to their letters of guardianship.

1. Factual Background.

Marvin Kent Ashurst and Judy Hesse were married on February 1, 1963. They had two sons, Michael and Neal. They had several residences in and about Carson City. In February 1967 they moved into a two-story home at 412 Thompson Street. Their marriage was not a happy one, and there were periods of separation. In May 1967 Judy met with a tragic accident and became a paraplegic. During Judy’s initial hospitalization, lasting until August 1967, the Hesses cared for the children in their home in Carson City, with no financial support from respondent Ashurst. In August the family returned to their home at 412 Thompson Street and lived together until October, when Ashurst abandoned the home. Because of her condition, Judy was unable to care for the children in the two-story house; so she and the boys moved in October into the Hesses’ home. They were together until December 1968, when Judy returned to the hospital, where she remained until her death. The children have lived with the Hesses until this present habeas writ was issued. Although Ashurst visited the boys on occasion after he left Judy in October 1967, his visits became *329 less frequent and had finally ceased some time prior to Judy’s death. The Hesses provided for the children and cared for them as their own. 2 Ashurst did not visit the children at Christmas time nor when Michael had an eye operation and was hospitalized. 3 Nor did Ashurst ever request custody of the children until he filed his habeas petition. 4 In July 1968, after repeated demands by Ashurst, Judy consented to a divorce. Ashurst remarried 7 days later. In the divorce proceedings Judy received custody of the children, and Ashurst agreed to pay her $50 a month for the support of each child, and no more. 5

*330 2. Parental Preference.

We laid down the guide line in McGlone v. McGlone, 86 Nev. 14, 464 P.2d 27 (1970), that a fit parent is to be preferred over nonparents in child custody cases and that custody may not be given to a nonparent unless the parent is found to be unfit. We have concluded, based on the record that was received in the habeas hearing and is now before us, that the presumption of parental preference as a matter of law has been overcome in this case. Ashurst abandoned Judy and his two sons when he left her alone to care for them, which she was physically unable to do, in their two-story residence. And he did not even advise anyone that he had left her. 6 Ashurst’s attitude and conduct toward his children thereafter was one of callous indifference and abandonment. Until after Judy’s death, he was perfectly content that his sons’ care and custody remain with the Hesses. He excuses his indifference on the ground that he did not feel welcome in the presence of the Hesses. Yet the record fails to support his explanation. 7 Rather, the record indicates that Ashurst was content to go it alone, as far as his family was concerned. He went out with other women. 8 He *331 infected Judy with gonorrhea. 9 He cashed bad checks. 10 Placed alongside these qualifications of parental fitness, we have the candid statement of counsel for respondent that the Hesses are well able to care for the two young boys:

Mr. Diehl: “We would suggest to the court at this time that at no time during the course of these proceedings did we question the fitness of the maternal grandparents as far as caring for these children. I think they proved themselves to be devoted as far as parents to their own children were concerned and of course indeed devoted as far as their grandchildren are concerned.”

The record supports counsel’s forthright admission regarding the fitness qualifications of the Hesses. They are comparatively young grandparents, in their late 40’s, and they are well qualified to provide for the care and custody of the two children.

We conclude that the presumption of parental preference in this case has been overcome. The record presents conclusive *332 evidence of respondent’s unfitness. In the final consideration, the best interests of the children remain paramount. NRS 125.140; Cooley v. Cooley, 86 Nev. 220, 467 P.2d 103 (1970); Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969); Timney v. Timney, 76 Nev. 230, 351 P.2d 611 (1960). We believe that those interests will best be served in this case by placing the care and custody of the two children with the Hesses. We therefore reverse the order of the district court granting habeas, and we remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter an appropriate order directing the respondent to deliver the children to the appellants, pursuant to their letters of guardianship.

Collins, C. J., Zenoff, Batjer, and Thompson, JJ., concur.
1

n her will, Judy had nominated the Hesses as guardians of her sons. The will provided in part:

“I hereby nominate as the guardians of the person and estate of my sons during their minority, my father and mother, Mr. and Mrs.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
468 P.2d 343, 86 Nev. 326, 1970 Nev. LEXIS 514, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hesse-v-ashurst-nev-1970.