Hess v. Centurion Health

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREG HESS, No. 24-5765 D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01864-SPL-MTM Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* CENTURION HEALTH, Named as Centurion Healthcare Vender ADOCRR; SIJI THOMAS, Agent of Centurion; BRITTANY WHISLER, Nurse, Agent of Centurion; BREA LAWSEN, Nurse, Agent of Centurion; STEPHANIE OPLINGER, Nurse; ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS REHABILITATION AND REENTRY; STACEY FIFE, Nurse; STATE OF ARIZONA; RYAN THORNELL, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation; NAPHCARE, INC.; GRACE KARANJA- ADAMS; MICHELLE McCRAY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted July 29, 2026**

Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.

Greg Hess appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

and other claims in connection with the denial of requested medical equipment in

prison. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hess’s Eighth

Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claims because Hess

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant was

deliberately indifferent to Hess’s serious medical needs. See Hamby v. Hammond,

821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a difference of opinion

between a physician and a prisoner—or between medical professionals—

concerning appropriate medical care does not amount to deliberate indifference);

Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a defendant is

deliberately indifferent only if the defendant knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety, and that to prevail on a claim involving alternative

choices of treatment, the plaintiff must show that the chosen treatment was

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 24-5765 medically unacceptable under the circumstances); see also Lockett v. County of Los

Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a claim for municipal

liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),

requires a plaintiff to show an underlying constitutional violation); Duvall v.

County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth deliberate

indifference standard for damages claims under Title II of the ADA).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hess’s equal

protection claim because Hess failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as

to whether he was treated differently from other inmates who were similarly

situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See

United States v. Juv. Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that,

where no protected class is implicated, an equal protection claim requires showing

that the government action was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hess’s motions to

compel discovery because Hess has not shown prejudice resulting from the denials.

See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of

review and explaining that the district court’s discovery rulings “will not be

disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in

actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

3 24-5765 The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on Hess’s discovery

motions and defendants’ motion for summary judgment without oral argument. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (stating that “the court may provide for submitting and

determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings”); D. Ariz. R. 7.2(f) (stating

that the district court may decide motions without oral argument); Mahon v. Credit

Bureau of Placer County Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth

the standard of review).

Hess’s challenge to the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief

is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.

1992) (explaining that, when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of

a denial of preliminary injunctive relief would have no practical consequences, and

the issue is therefore moot).

We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See United

States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

4 24-5765