Hertel v. City of Pontiac

470 F. Supp. 603, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12587
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMay 4, 1979
DocketCiv. 78-71357
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 470 F. Supp. 603 (Hertel v. City of Pontiac) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hertel v. City of Pontiac, 470 F. Supp. 603, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12587 (E.D. Mich. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHURCHILL, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in this action, two Michigan residents who reside in the metropolitan Detroit area, challenge the constitutionality of defendant National Football League’s (NFL) “home” blackout rule. This rule prohibits television broadcasts of “home” football games in areas within 75 miles of the “home” stadium. Defendant Detroit Lions, Inc. is a franchise member of the NFL. The plaintiffs assert that the “home” blackout rule violates their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under Art. I, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution (1963), in that individuals without the 75-mile blackout radius can view the games on home television, while the plaintiffs and others within the blackout radius cannot so view the games.

All the defendants filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. At the close of oral argument, the Court took the motions under advisement.

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees do not reach purely private conduct. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). It is only action taken by the state or attributable to it that is subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. The conclusion that purportedly private conduct should actually be attributed to the state can only be reached after “sifting facts and weighing circumstances . . ” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).

In Burton the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc. leased space for operation of a restaurant from Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of Delaware. The space was located in a public parking structure. In the lease the Authority covenanted to make the premises, including the decorative finishes, suitable for Eagle. The Authority further agreed to furnish heat and provide necessary repairs. Eagle refused to serve black patrons.

After reviewing the nature of the relationship between the State and the purported private actor, the Court in Burton held that

[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so “purely private” as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.

365 U.S. at 725, 81 S.Ct. at 862, 6 L.Ed.2d at 52. Where the state merely leases land to a private actor, there may be a requirement of a sufficient nexus between the state action and the private discrimination. See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976). The Court’s initial inquiry, then, is to determine whether the relationship between the State and the private parties in this case is one of interdependence.

I. STATE ACTION

The City of Pontiac Stadium Authority (“Authority”) leases the Silverdome to the City of Pontiac, which in turn subleases to the Detroit Lions. The Lions pay as annual rent the greater of $504,000 or 7% *605 of ticket sales. The City collects a “head charge” of $1.50 per ticket and has complete control of revenue from parking and the food, beverage, and souvenir concessions. In return, the City is responsible for maintenance, repair, and police supervision. Further, the State of Michigan annually appropriates $800,000 to the Authority. It is obvious that the financial success of this arrangement for the City depends upon the size of the crowd the home games draw. While the City’s responsibilities remain relatively constant in cost, the City’s revenues are directly keyed into home game attendance.

The relationship between the State and the private parties here is more interdependent than that which existed in Burton. Thus, the nature of the relationship shown here compels the conclusion that the conduct of the purported private actors should be treated as that of the State. Furthermore, since the 75-mile blackout rule has as its sole purpose and intent the increase of home game attendance, the Court would find state action here even if a nexus between the specific challenged conduct and the State were required to be shown. As Professor Tribe has stated, “the more government gains (and the more it appears to gain) by the way in which a [private] choice is made, the clearer is the case for treating the choice as one for which government bears responsibility.” Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 18-7 at 1171-72 (1st ed. 1978).

II. NATURE OF REVIEW

Once it is determined that conduct is subject to Fourteenth Amendment review, the crucial issue becomes the nature of that review. The traditional equal protection test of “rational relationship” is utilized in the sphere of economic and social legislation. This test only requires the state to show (1) a legitimate governmental interest and (2) that the classifications drawn are reasonably suited to achieve the government interest. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959).

In Alan v. Wayne County, 388 Mich. 210, 356, 200 N.W.2d 628, 699, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “[t]he acquisition, operation and subleasing of a stadium for the use of professional sports organizations may be a legitimate public purpose.” The operation of a profitable stadium, or at least one which does not drain the public fisc, must necessarily also be a proper public purpose. In this case the classification drawn — geographic area — is one of the so-called “natural” classifications. There is not involved here either a suspect criterion or a fundamental interest so as to trigger “strict scrutiny.” See Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). Nor do we have any of the semi-suspect criteria (sex, age, legitimacy) which would trigger a possible middle tier of review, the so-called “rationality with a bite.” Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). Therefore, it is clear that the proper nature of Fourteenth Amendment review here is the rational relationship test.

The plaintiffs have attempted to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution (1963), Art. I, § 2.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
470 F. Supp. 603, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hertel-v-city-of-pontiac-mied-1979.