Hersh v. State Bar

496 P.2d 1201, 7 Cal. 3d 241, 101 Cal. Rptr. 833, 1972 Cal. LEXIS 190
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedMay 22, 1972
DocketS.F. 22861
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 496 P.2d 1201 (Hersh v. State Bar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hersh v. State Bar, 496 P.2d 1201, 7 Cal. 3d 241, 101 Cal. Rptr. 833, 1972 Cal. LEXIS 190 (Cal. 1972).

Opinion

Opinion

THE COURT.

This is a proceeding brought by petitioner LeRoy Hersh, a member of the State Bar, pursuant to rule 59(b), California Rules, of Court, 1 to review decisions by the Board of Governors of respondent State *243 Bar fixing fees of its active members for the full calendar, year 1972 in accordance with recent legislation effective March 4, 1972. 2 Petitioner contends that regular annual fees have been improperly levied because authorization for increased membership fees can be applied only to calendar years commencing with 1973, and because a new $10 Client Security Fund fee was prematurely assessed. We agree with both contentions although we determine for other reasons that the State Bar may retain sums collected for the Client Security Fund.

The State Bar is a public corporation governed, in the first instance, by the State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6000 et seq.). 3 Section 6140 of that act contains the statutory authorization for the Board of Governors to collect fees from its members in order toi carry on its functions. On November 17, 1971, the Board of Governors fixed the 1972 membership fees, increasing the charges over those of the previous year relying upon newly adopted legislation. 4 Such legislation would normally not be effective until March 4, 1972, the sixty-first day after the end of the legislative session (see Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8). At the time the board fixed the membership fees section 6140 provided for lesser fees than those adopted by the resolution. 5 The resolution purported to adopt a fee schedule which *244 is $5 to $10 in excess of that authorized by section 6140 as it provided prior to the effective date of the new enactment, depending on the number of years a member had been admitted to practice and also' purported to impose an additional fee of $10 on all members, said sum to be applied for the purpose of creating a Client Security Fund.

The new legislation revised section 6140 and added section 6140.5. The legislation authorizes increased annual membership fees well in excess of those adopted by the board’s resolution (§ 6140), and authorizes the board to establish the Client Security Fund “toi relieve or mitigate pecuniary losses caused by the dishonest conduct” of active members of the State Bar. (§ 6140.5.) Section 6140.5, subdivision (b), provides: “Commencing January 1, 1972, the board may increase the annual membership fees fixed by it pursuant to section 6140- by an additional amount per active member not to exceed ten dollars ($10) in any year, the additional amount to be applied only for purposes of the fund.” 6

*245 It is apparent that the Board of Governors could not legally fix the annual membership fee in accordance with the revised statute until it became effective on March 4, 1972, empowering the board to so act. “It has been uniformly held in this state that a statute has no force whatever until it goes into effect pursuant to the law relating to legislative enactment. It speaks from the date it takes effect and not before. Until that time it is not a law and has no force for any purpose. [Citations.] So where the Legislature passes an act to amend a statute then existing, the latter remains in full force during the time between the passage of the amendatory act and the time when it becomes effective. [Citation.]” (People v. Righthouse (1937) 10 Cal.2d 86 [72 P.2d 867].) Thus at the time the Board of Governors fixed the 1972 membership fee schedule, it was authorized to do so only by the statutory direction of section 6140 as it then read. To the extent that fees exceed the amounts authorized on November 17, 1971, they were invalidly assessed.

Respondent argues that even if the board was not authorized in the normal course to fix fees at higher rates before March 4th, the legislation when effective expressly gave it such authority. For purposes of resolving this contention we must consider the $10 additional fee for the Client Security Fund apart from the increased basic annual membership fees. As to the charge for the fund, the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent that it could be assessed for the 1972 calendar year. New section 6140.5, subdivision (b), specifically states: “Commencing January 1, 1972, the board may increase the annual membership fees . . . not to exceed ten dollars ($10) . . . to be applied only for purposes of the fund.” (Italics added.) Thus, clearly after the March 4th effective date, the board could properly fix and collect the $10 Client Security Fund fee for the calendar year 1972.

The parties agree that most, if not all, of respondent’s active members have paid their 1972 fees as fixed by respondent’s board. 7 Since we are advised that the board has adopted a resolution reassessing the 1972 Client Security Fund fee after the March 4th effective date of chapter 1338, it would be a useless act to require respondent to refund the $10 and then bill its members again. To avoid such needless loss of time and expense, respondent may retain the fees thus collected pursuant to section 6140.5.

As for the increased basic annual membership fees, however, there is no such indication of legislative intent as to which calendar year the amount *246 can, first be collected. 8 There is no statement “Commencing January 1, 1972,” as in the case of the Client Security Fund additional fee authorized by section 6140.5. Such an omission is the more noticeable, and hence deemed to be intentional, in view of the further legislative direction in section 6140 itself for the effective date upon which to commence further increased fees for a State Bar building program. (§ 6140, subd. (b).) If the Legislature had a clear intent that the increased basic membership fees be collected as of the 1972 calendar year, we must presume it would have utilized the same mechanism which it used in parallel circumstances to express that intent. In the absence of such a declaration, and with no other facts it is presumed that the Legislature intended the increased basic yearly fees to be prospective. (Krause v. Rarity (1930) 210 Cal. 644, 655 [293 P. 62, 77 A.L.R. 1327]; DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 172-173 [18 Cal.Rptr. 369, 367 P.2d 865]; Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 388, 396 [182 P.2d 159]; Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349, 371 [55 Cal.Rptr.

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Bluebook (online)
496 P.2d 1201, 7 Cal. 3d 241, 101 Cal. Rptr. 833, 1972 Cal. LEXIS 190, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hersh-v-state-bar-cal-1972.