Herrmann v. Bd. of Com'rs of City of Aberdeen

285 N.W.2d 855, 1979 S.D. LEXIS 304
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 12, 1979
Docket12642
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 285 N.W.2d 855 (Herrmann v. Bd. of Com'rs of City of Aberdeen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Herrmann v. Bd. of Com'rs of City of Aberdeen, 285 N.W.2d 855, 1979 S.D. LEXIS 304 (S.D. 1979).

Opinion

FOSHEIM, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court which denied the application of appellants for a writ of mandamus to open a dedicated public alley. We reverse.

In 1959, the owners of the land in question recorded an approved plat for an addition to the City of Aberdeen, wherein this alley was dedicated. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Jacob Grismer and Frederick Herrm-ann Associates, Inc. acquired title to abutting lots in Block 2 of this addition. One of the alleys dedicated to the public use runs between the lots of the Grismers and Frederick Herrmann Associates, Inc. That part of the alley extending approximately 124 feet north between the properties of Herrmann and Grismer has never been opened. The remainder of the alley is open and is used by the abutting landowners for garbage removal and for access to their garages which face on the alley. Mr. Gris-mer has taken possession of that portion of the unopened alley from approximately its center line westward and has erected or maintained thereon a fence, a utility building, a standing mailbox and a garbage rack. Mr. Herrmann, on the other hand, relying on access to the alley as platted and dedicated, has erected a combination garage and utility building at the rear of his home. If the alley is opened, he will have access to his garage. Appellants’ petition to have the alley opened was resisted by Jacob Grismer and denied by the Aberdeen City Commission.

The basic question on appeal is whether the city commission has a duty to compel the removal of obstructions upon a dedicated public alley placed there by an abutting landowner and to open the alley for the benefit of the public when requested to do so by other abutting landowners.

Appellants contend the city commission has an unqualified duty to open the alley. It is the position of the city commission that this matter is within their discretion.

SDCL 11-3-6 provides that the governing body of a municipality shall, by resolution, approve any plat to an addition to the *857 municipality before it can be recorded. 1 SDCL 11-3-12 then provides that once the plat is recorded, the land intended for alleys can be used for no other purpose. 2 SDCL 9-45-1 grants to municipalities the authority to lay out, establish, open, and improve streets and alleys. 3 This, we have held, is an exclusive power. Town of Andover v. Cooper, 37 S.D. 258, 157 N.W. 1053 (1916); Board of Commissioners of Spink County v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 28 S.D. 44, 132 N.W. 675 (1911). Once dedicated, no alley shall be vacated by the governing body of a municipality except upon the petition and consent of adjoining property owners. SDCL 9-45 — 7. 4

A statute must be construed according to its manifest intent; such intent must be derived from the statute as a whole, as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. Concrete Materials Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 70 S.D. 535, 19 N.W.2d 523 (1945). Reading these statutes together, as we must, we find that once the governing body of a municipality has exercised its statutory authority to approve or disapprove the plat to an addition to the municipality, its legislative function ends. The land then contained in the recorded plat and dedicated as an alley can be used for no other purpose. Only the municipality can open, establish and improve the dedicated alley. When the plat is recorded, the statutory duty of the governing body becomes inflexible.

In Bryant v. Gustafson, 230 Minn. 1, 40 N.W.2d 427 (1950), the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that each purchaser of a lot is entitled to the benefit of the plat as it *858 appears when he purchased it and that it is not simply the street or alley upon which the purchased lot may abut that the purchaser has the privilege of using and enjoying, but all easements, rights, privileges and advantages which the plat represents. The court went on to state that all purchasers, “when the conveyance is made with reference to a plat, are deemed, in the absence of fraud, to have full knowledge and notice of all that appears upon the plat, and with knowledge of the legal effect thereof, whether the rights thereby conferred upon the lot owners generally be to the advantage or disadvantage of any particular purchaser.” 230 Minn, at 10, 40 N.W.2d at 433.

This brings us to the question of whether mandamus lies as the proper remedy to enforce the opening of the alley. We have held that when the relief sought is the enforcement of a ministerial, as distinguished from a discretionary, duty within the intention of the statute, mandamus is an appropriate remedy. Danforth v. City of Yankton, 71 S.D. 406, 25 N.W.2d 50 (1946). In Danforth v. City of Yankton, supra, wé held that any elector, citizen or taxpayer, regardless of any special or peculiar interest apart from that of the public, may apply for and obtain a writ of mandamus to enforce the performance of such a duty. In Van Gerpen v. Gemmill, 72 S.D. 265, 33 N.W.2d 278 (1948), we did not reach the question of whether the performance of an independent duty of a township board regarding a township road may be compelled by mandamus. Generally, however, the writ lies to compel the performance of a statutory duty (by officers upon whom it is imposed) to open a public way. State v. Freese, 147 Neb. 147, 22 N.W.2d 556 (1946). See: Board of Commissioners of Fremont County v. State, 369 P.2d 537 (Wyo.1962); 52 Am.Jur.2d Mandamus § 221 (1970); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus §§ 176b, 177a (1948).

Respondents argue that mandamus is not an available remedy in this case because a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists. 5 They contend that appellants can initiate proceedings to abate a nuisance pursuant to SDCL 21-10-5 against any abutting owners who are obstructing the alley. 6 We are not persuaded by this argument.

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Bluebook (online)
285 N.W.2d 855, 1979 S.D. LEXIS 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/herrmann-v-bd-of-comrs-of-city-of-aberdeen-sd-1979.