Herrick v. Wardwell

58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 294
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedApril 19, 1898
StatusPublished

This text of 58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 294 (Herrick v. Wardwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Herrick v. Wardwell, 58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 294 (Ohio 1898).

Opinion

Burket, J.

The Cleveland Dairy and Transportation Company had many creditors, and the action below was brought for and in behalf of all of them, and the exceptions were taken and error prosecuted in the same manner. The defendants in error now claim that as only one creditor, Newton Herrick, has filed a petition in error in this court, all the other creditors are content with the judgments below, and that in case of a reversal, such reversal can correct only the injury which Newton Herrick has sustained, and that no relief can be extended by this court to the other creditors.

This claim is not tenable. Newton Herrick commenced the action in behalf of all the creditors, to [306]*306collect a fund for the common benefit of all, and the action taken by him in their behalf inures to their benefit, whether taken in the court of common pleas upon his pleadings in that court, or in the circuit court on appeal or error, or in this court. Throughout the whole proceedings in all the courts, the action is for the benefit of all the creditors, and in the absence of fraud or collusion they are all concluded by the final judgment as to the recovery of the fund. Wright v. McCormick, 17 Ohio St., 86; Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St., 113; section 3260, Revised Statutes.

The circuit court finds the amount due to each creditor from the company, but renders no judgment in favor of any creditor. The order of distribution of the fund is not a judgment in favor of creditors, but an order upon the receiver to distribute the fund in his hands, whatever the fund may be. The judgment against the stockholders for the amount due from each, is the judgment to be affirmed or reversed in this proceeding in error, and the action as to the amount, is between the plaintiff in his own' behalf, and in behalf of all the creditors, on the one side, and the several stockholders, each for himself, on the other. In this contest the amount of the fund for final distribution may be increased or diminished, but the finding of the court as to who are creditors, and the amount due to each, will not thereby be affected, and therefore the several creditors are neither necessary, or proper parties to such proceedings in error. Whatever the final fund for distribution may be, the order of the court for its distribution among the creditors pro rata, will stand unaffected by the result of the proceedings in error. If the plaintiff in error should succeed, and increase the [307]*307fund, the rate per cent, to each creditor would be increased, and in case of failure it might be diminished, or remain the same; but the order to distribute the fund, whether increased, diminished or remaining the same, would stand unreversed and unaffected by the result of this proceeding in error. The reversal here sought is only as to the amounts to be paid by the three stockholders, Wardwell, Whitacre and Kies, and to reverse or modify the judgment of the circuit court as to them, does not in the least affect any judgment rendered for or against creditors, and therefore the creditors should not be made parties to this petition in error.

In such cases against stockholders the names of the creditors and the amount due to each from the corporation, are usually ascertained by a reference to a master or referee, notice being published by order of the court for creditors to present their claims. In case of a contested claim, an issue should be ordered to be made up and tried to ascertain and fix the amount due to the creditor from the corporation. While the issue and trial as to such contested claim is a proceeding in the case, it is distinct from the proceedings against the stockholders, the one being to establish the validity of a creditor’s claim against the company, and the other to collect a fund from the stockholders for the common benefit of all the creditors.

In the next place it is claimed by defendants in error, that the milk contracts were not binding obligations, were so indefinite as to be void, and lack the element of mutuality.

The producer of milk agreed to sell to the corporation all the milk which he should produce, and the corporation agreed to pay him for all the milk [308]*308shipped from April 1, 1892, to May 1, 1893, at the prices named in the contract.

While the producer is not bound to produce any certain quantity of milk, unless it may be twenty gallons per day, the corporation is bound to pay for all the milk shipped, the prices named in the contract. After performance by the producer, the corporation cannot avoid its obligation by pleading that the producer was not bound to perform the contract. The option to produce milk and thereby perform his contract was for the benefit of the producer, and when milk was produced and shipped, the obligation of the corporation to pay for it was binding, and the contract between the parties was then both definite and mutual.

The production and shipment of milk continued until the corporation made an assignment, December 15, 1892, and thereafter for the first time an attempt was made to take advantage of the weakness of these milk contracts. It was then too late. Performance by the producers without objection by the corporation, or its officers or stockholders, had then cured whatever weakness there may have been in the contracts. Fishmonger's Company v. Robertson, 5 Man. & G., 131; Phelps v. Townsend, 8 Pick., 392; Commercial Bank v. Nolan, 7 How. (Miss.), 518; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 451; Stahl v. Van Vleck, 53 Ohio St., 136; Himrod Furnace Co. v. Cleveland & Mahoning R. R. Co., 22 Ohio St., 451.

Next it is urged by defendants in error that the debts for milk delivered under the contracts, accrued, not at the date of the execution of contracts but at the time of the delivery of the milk.

The language of the Constitution, Article XIII, section 3, is as follows: “Dues from the corpora[309]*309tion shall be secured by such individual liability of the stockholders, and other means, as may be prescribed by law; but in all cases each stockholder shall be liable over and above the stock by him or her owned, and any amount unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in amount to such stock.”

Section 3258 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio reads as follows: “The stockholders of a corporation which may be hereafter formed, and such stockholders as are now liable under former statutes, shall be deemed and held liable, in addition to their stock, in an amount equal to the stock by them subscribed, or otherwise acquired, to the creditors of the corporation, to secure the payment of the debts and liabilities of the corporation.”

Stockholders are liable to secure the payment of the “dues” from corporations, as well as the “debts and liabilities” thereof. The liabilities mentioned in the statute are to the “creditors” of the corporation, but in the constitution “creditors” are not named. The word ‘ ‘creditor” cannot have the effect to limit, or narrow the words “dues, debts and liabilities.” Whoever has a claim against a corporation which falls within the terms, “dues, debts or liabilities,” is a creditor of such corporation within the .meaning of the constitution and statute under consideration.

When the corporation executed these milk contracts, it thereby incurred a liability to pay for all the milk which should be shipped under said contracts.

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Bluebook (online)
58 Ohio St. (N.S.) 294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/herrick-v-wardwell-ohio-1898.