HINES, Presiding Justice.
This is an appeal by the owners of residential rental properties in Lowndes County from a final order of the superior court declaring that OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1),
which excludes low-income housing income tax credits from consideration for the purpose of assessing ad valorem tax, is unconstitutional as violating the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par- HI (a) (“taxation uniformity provision”).
For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.
The following facts are not in dispute in this appeal. The prop
erties at issue are eligible to receive federal and state low-income
housing income tax credits (“tax credits”) pursuant to Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“Section 42”), and OCGA § 48-7-29.6.
In exchange for receiving a ten-year award of tax credits, the property owners agreed to lease their rental units to
eligible low-income tenants at below-market rents set by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs (“GDCA”) for a period of thirty years or more. Income tax credits are claimed in equal amounts for a ten-year period beginning with the taxable year in which a qualified building is placed in service or, if elected by the owner, the succeeding taxable year (the “credit period”). During the credit period, the owner may not sell, transfer, or exchange the property without first requesting GDCA’s approval of the proposed sale, transfer, or exchange. The GDCA will not recognize a new owner until all required documentation is submitted and the new owner agrees in writing to assume the requirements and restrictions set forth in covenants applicable for low-income housing tax credits, Section 42, and corresponding federal regulations. After being awarded state and federal income tax credits by the GDCA, the property owners in this case “sold” the tax credits to investors in that they allowed investors to purchase limited partnership interests. The tax credits would “flow through” the partnerships to the limited partners, who would then use the tax credits to reduce their individual income tax liabilities.
On March 25, 2015, the Lowndes County Board of TaxAssessors (the “Assessors”) filed in the Superior Court of Lowndes County a
petition for declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1), which precluded the Assessors from considering the tax credits in determining the fair market value of the real property at issue, as of January 1, 2015. As noted, the superior court declared OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) to be unconstitutional as running afoul of the taxation uniformity provision, and affected property owners have filed the present appeal from the adverse ruling.
Again, OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.l) prohibits the tax assessor from considering tax credits in determining the fair market value of real property.
Yet, OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vi),
as amended in 2014, provides, in determining the fair market value of real property, that the tax assessor is to apply rental limitations, operational requirements, and other restrictions imposed on a property in connection with the property being eligible for any income tax credits described in OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1). Consequently, as the superior court stated, the issue is whether, given OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vi), as amended in 2014, OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) violates the uniformity requirement of Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (a). The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, and this Court’s review of a trial court’s holding regarding the constitutionality of a statute is de novo.
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt,
286 Ga. 731, 732-733 (2) (691 SE2d 218) (2010).
By its express terms, the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution mandates that property of the same class be assessed and taxed uniformly Paragraph III (b) (1) of the taxation uniformity provision states that, with specified limited exceptions, the “classes of subjects for taxation of property shall consist of tangible property and one or more classes of intangible personal property . . See note 2 supra.
[T]he Constitution creates “tangible property” as a single class of property. See Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. Ill (b). “Tangible property” includes real and personal property, and the General Assembly has no authority to establish different, classes or subclasses of tangible property other than as fixed by the Constitution. The types of tangible property that may be separately classified and subclassifiedby the General Assembly under the [taxation uniformity provision] are listed in subsection (b) of Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III.
Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
288 Ga. 113, 114 (1) (702 SE2d 145) (2010) (Punctuation omitted.) Neither Section 42 real property nor tax credits are part of this limited list of express exceptions. However, the property owners urge that this is of no moment because the tax credits are intangible personal property and, therefore, can be assessed differently from real property without violating the uniformity requirement. Thus, the threshold inquiry is the relationship of the tax credits to the tangible property at issue, that is their appropriate classification, for the purpose of ad valorem taxation.
OCGA § 48-5-3 mandates:
All real property including, but not limited to, leaseholds, interests less than fee, and all personal property shall be liable to taxation and shall be taxed, except as otherwise provided by law.
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HINES, Presiding Justice.
This is an appeal by the owners of residential rental properties in Lowndes County from a final order of the superior court declaring that OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1),
which excludes low-income housing income tax credits from consideration for the purpose of assessing ad valorem tax, is unconstitutional as violating the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par- HI (a) (“taxation uniformity provision”).
For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.
The following facts are not in dispute in this appeal. The prop
erties at issue are eligible to receive federal and state low-income
housing income tax credits (“tax credits”) pursuant to Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“Section 42”), and OCGA § 48-7-29.6.
In exchange for receiving a ten-year award of tax credits, the property owners agreed to lease their rental units to
eligible low-income tenants at below-market rents set by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs (“GDCA”) for a period of thirty years or more. Income tax credits are claimed in equal amounts for a ten-year period beginning with the taxable year in which a qualified building is placed in service or, if elected by the owner, the succeeding taxable year (the “credit period”). During the credit period, the owner may not sell, transfer, or exchange the property without first requesting GDCA’s approval of the proposed sale, transfer, or exchange. The GDCA will not recognize a new owner until all required documentation is submitted and the new owner agrees in writing to assume the requirements and restrictions set forth in covenants applicable for low-income housing tax credits, Section 42, and corresponding federal regulations. After being awarded state and federal income tax credits by the GDCA, the property owners in this case “sold” the tax credits to investors in that they allowed investors to purchase limited partnership interests. The tax credits would “flow through” the partnerships to the limited partners, who would then use the tax credits to reduce their individual income tax liabilities.
On March 25, 2015, the Lowndes County Board of TaxAssessors (the “Assessors”) filed in the Superior Court of Lowndes County a
petition for declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1), which precluded the Assessors from considering the tax credits in determining the fair market value of the real property at issue, as of January 1, 2015. As noted, the superior court declared OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) to be unconstitutional as running afoul of the taxation uniformity provision, and affected property owners have filed the present appeal from the adverse ruling.
Again, OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.l) prohibits the tax assessor from considering tax credits in determining the fair market value of real property.
Yet, OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vi),
as amended in 2014, provides, in determining the fair market value of real property, that the tax assessor is to apply rental limitations, operational requirements, and other restrictions imposed on a property in connection with the property being eligible for any income tax credits described in OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1). Consequently, as the superior court stated, the issue is whether, given OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vi), as amended in 2014, OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) violates the uniformity requirement of Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (a). The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, and this Court’s review of a trial court’s holding regarding the constitutionality of a statute is de novo.
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt,
286 Ga. 731, 732-733 (2) (691 SE2d 218) (2010).
By its express terms, the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution mandates that property of the same class be assessed and taxed uniformly Paragraph III (b) (1) of the taxation uniformity provision states that, with specified limited exceptions, the “classes of subjects for taxation of property shall consist of tangible property and one or more classes of intangible personal property . . See note 2 supra.
[T]he Constitution creates “tangible property” as a single class of property. See Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. Ill (b). “Tangible property” includes real and personal property, and the General Assembly has no authority to establish different, classes or subclasses of tangible property other than as fixed by the Constitution. The types of tangible property that may be separately classified and subclassifiedby the General Assembly under the [taxation uniformity provision] are listed in subsection (b) of Article VII, Section I, Paragraph III.
Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
288 Ga. 113, 114 (1) (702 SE2d 145) (2010) (Punctuation omitted.) Neither Section 42 real property nor tax credits are part of this limited list of express exceptions. However, the property owners urge that this is of no moment because the tax credits are intangible personal property and, therefore, can be assessed differently from real property without violating the uniformity requirement. Thus, the threshold inquiry is the relationship of the tax credits to the tangible property at issue, that is their appropriate classification, for the purpose of ad valorem taxation.
OCGA § 48-5-3 mandates:
All real property including, but not limited to, leaseholds, interests less than fee, and all personal property shall be liable to taxation and shall be taxed, except as otherwise provided by law. Liability of property for taxation shall not be affected by the individual or corporate character of the property owner or by the resident or nonresident status of the property owner.
The appraisal of real property for tax purposes is subject to regulation. Indeed, the Georgia Department of Revenue has adopted regulations, which have been compiled in an “Appraisal Procedures Manual” (“APM”), to guide county tax officials in appraising real
property. See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.01.
“The APM defines ‘real property’ as ‘the bundle of rights, interest and benefits connected with the ownership of real estate.’ ”
Morton v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
294 Ga. App. 901, 904 (1) (670 SE2d 528) (2008); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.02 (1) (x). “ ‘Real estate’ means the physical parcel of land, improvements to the land, improvements attached to the land, real fixtures and appurtenances such as easements.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.02 (1) (v). Also, OCGA § 44-1-2 (a) defines “real estate” to be:
(1) All lands and the buildings thereon;
(2) All things permanently attached to land or to the buildings thereon; and
(3) Any interest existing in, issuing out of, or dependent upon land or the buildings thereon.
As is evident, the very existence of tax credits is inextricably bound with the ownership of real estate. As the Court of Appeals concluded in
Pine Pointe Housing, L.P. v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
254 Ga. App. 197 (561 SE2d 860) (2002), “Section 42 tax
credits provide a ... stream of value tied solely to the property.” Id. at 200 (1) (b). Although the Court of Appeals determined that it was inappropriate to retroactively apply OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) to the underlying controversy in
Pine Pointe Housing,
much of the analysis in the case in regard to ad valorem tax valuation is apposite here.
In 1996, Pine Pointe Housing, a limited partnership, constructed a 71-unit rental housing project in Valdosta, and the property received an allocation of tax credits. As in the present case, the limited partnership permitted the tax credits to “flow through” to the tax benefit of its limited partners. Pine Pointe appealed the 1997 ad valorem tax assessment of the property to the Lowndes County Board of Equalization, and the Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors then appealed the ruling of the board of equalization to the superior court, which held a de novo hearing in the matter in November 2000. The issue was the fair market value of the property as of January 1, 1997, and, specifically how to value the property for ad valorem tax purposes given the applicable rental restrictions and federal income tax benefits. On November 30, 2000, the superior court issued its order establishing the fair market value of the property; in doing so, the superior court concluded that the mortgage equity or debt equity income approach to valuation was valid and applicable to the property and that in determining fair market value, it had to consider, inter alia, restrictive covenants of record and the associated tax credits. Pine Pointe appealed, contending, among other things, that the superior court erred in considering the tax credits in determining fair market value. The Court of Appeals disagreed, rejecting Pine Pointe’s arguments that the tax credits had, in economic effect, been sold, and thus had no value to Pine Pointe; that consideration of the tax credits was inconsistent with the APM; that the tax credits could not be considered income for accounting purposes; that the superior court’s ruling was inconsistent with principles established by case law; and that OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.l), which was effective as of July 1, 2001, prohibited consideration of the tax credits.
As the Court of Appeals explained, generally real property is taxed according to its fair market value, and the General Assembly has defined fair market value as “the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property and a willing seller would accept for the property at an arm’s length, bona fide sale.” OCGA § 48-5-2 (3), supra at n. 4. The Court explained that OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B) set forth the factors which had to be considered in determining fair market value, which factors include any restrictions or limitations on the use of the property resulting from state or federal law, rules or regulations, and
any other factors pertinent to the fair market value; in such determination, the taxing authorities are required to apply external factors, such as zoning, deed restrictions, and other pertinent factors, which would by their very nature, include tax credits. The Court of Appeals elaborated:
The credits have value to a taxpayer with federal income tax liability and can be “passed through” a partnership structure to those taxpayers. Because Section 42 tax credits are generated by a designated property, a third party would pay for the value as part of that property’s sale price in a bona fide, arm’s length transaction. Furthermore, the tax credits go hand in hand with restrictive covenants that require the property to charge below-market rent. By statute, these restrictions are required to be considered by the assessor. If viewed in isolation, the rental restrictions would artificially depress the value of the property for tax valuation purposes.
Pine Pointe Housing,
supra at 198 (1).
The tax credits are a benefit connected to the real estate itself, rather than to any individual or entity Indeed, “if a property eligible for Section 42 tax credits is sold, then the subsequent owner of the property is entitled to the future tax credits associated with the property”
Pine Pointe Housing,
supra at 199 (1) (a); 26 USCA § 42 (d) (7) (A) (ii).
And,
a future owner could choose to act in a way that would eliminate the [Section 42] credit, but it does not change the law that any tax credit generated is associated with the property nor the evidence that an available tax credit has value to a third-party purchaser. Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code has provisions which encourage a buyer and seller of property generating Section 42 tax credits to ensure the property continues to be operated as a low-income rental project.
Pine Pointe Housing,
supra at 199-200 (1) (a); 26 USCA § 42 (d) (7).
Furthermore, the fact that the tax credits are by statute expressly linked to a “qualified low-income building” and not the underlying land itself does not alter this tie. See 26 USCA § 42 (a).
Indeed, a building by statutory definition is “real estate.” See OCGA § 44-1-2 (a), supra.
As for the argument that consideration of the tax credits for the purpose of property valuation and assessment would run afoul of the provision in the APM that real property excludes intangible benefits associated with the ownership of real estate, such as business goodwill, it is without merit.
The fact that tax credits can be transferred independently from the ownership of the associated real property does not render them “intangible personal property” for the purpose of valuation for taxation. Again, the APM expressly includes in the definition of real property the “bundle of rights, interests, and benefits connected with the ownership of real estate.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 560-11-10-.02 (1) (x). Furthermore,
Section 42 tax credits are not the type of benefit associated with owning real estate, such as goodwill, that cannot be taken into account in determining the value of a property to a third party. Goodwill is a favor which the management of a business wins from the public, and as such is more associated with a business operation than the property on which the business is located.
Pine Pointe Housing,
supra at 200 (1) (b) (Punctuation omitted.). Even if tax credits, considered artificially in isolation, are intangible in nature, they, in fact, do not exist in isolation — they are wholly dependant upon and are not viable apart from the real estate giving rise to them. As noted, the tax credits are an item of value “tied solely to the property.” Id. Thus, they are part and parcel of the tangible real estate and “may properly contribute to an assessment of fair market
value.”
Morton,
supra at 906 (1). Indeed, to conclude otherwise would bar from consideration a property right which plainly affects the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept in a sale, thus, effectively nullifying the statutory definition of fair market value. See OCGA § 48-5-2 (3), supra at n. 4.
Decided September 12, 2016.
Coleman Talley, Edward F. Preston,
for appellants.
Elliott, Blackburn & Gooding, Walter G. Elliott,
for appellee.
Arnall Golden Gregory, Henry R. Chalmers, Jeffrey C. Adams, Jennifer L. Shelfer; Hall Booth Smith, Anthony A. Rowell, Jennifer D. Herzog; Gardner, Willis, Sweat & Goldsmith, Kimberly A. Reid,
amici curiae.
Simply, inasmuch as OCGA § 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) exempts these income tax credits from consideration in determining the fair market value of the properties at issue, the statute grants preferential treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes and creates a subclass of tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution. See Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III (b), supra at n. 2. This runs afoul of the taxation uniformity provision.
Blevins,
supra at 114 (1). Consequently, the judgment of the superior court stands.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.