F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
DEC 2 1997 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 96-1525 v. (D.C. 94-K-686) MR. MICHAUD, Chief of Denver Police; (D. Colo.) MR. OLIVA, Chief of County Jail; E. L. ROY; R. J. ROMERO; P. A. MANZANAREZ; F. S. VESSA; T. D. FULLER; J. SEWELL; L. C. DOMINQUES; L. L. STEVENSON; F. J. SPINHARNEY; D. M. DELMONICO; J. A. HART; P. BEAULIEU; N. WASHER; JOHN SIMONET, Director of Corrections; T. A. SASIM, Captain of Operations; SGT. YAMAMOTO, Sgt. of Operations; P. R. RODRIGUEZ, Deputy; P. H. SANCHEZ, Sgt. of Operations; SGT. FRANK, Sgt. of Receiving; WELLINGTON WEBB, Mayor of Denver; MANAGER OF SAFETY FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; DENVER COUNTY JAIL, hospital personnel, and any other person(s) who by act, omission, of knowledge of the events, without stopping or reporting same, Defendants - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BALDOCK, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff brought an action naming twenty-two individuals and Denver County Jail
officials as defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the use of unreasonable force
during and after his arrest. Plaintiff also alleged that he was denied access to the jail law
library prior to his state criminal trial and during appellate review of his criminal
conviction. Plaintiff was represented by counsel until one week before his criminal trial
when his counsel was granted leave to withdraw. Plaintiff represented himself during his
criminal trial, but had counsel appointed for his criminal appeal. Appointed counsel also
represented Plaintiff at trial in the section 1983 action at issue here.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
2 The record before us indicates that prior to, or at the beginning of, trial, counsel for
both parties submitted a stipulated set of jury instructions and verdict forms naming the
two arresting officers, Officers Romero and Stevenson, as the sole Defendants. The
record also reflects that Plaintiff’s claim regarding access to the jail law library was not
pursued at trial. Plaintiff only argued the unreasonable force claim against the two
arresting officers to the jury.
After a jury verdict in favor of the arresting officers, Plaintiff’s counsel was
granted leave to withdraw from his representation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff, proceeding pro
se, filed a notice of appeal naming “Mr. Michaud, et al.,” as Appellees. That notice was
rejected by this court on the grounds that the judgment from which the appeal was taken
did not appear to resolve all claims against all defendants and therefore was not final.1
After mesne and sundry proceedings, the district court entered an order nunc pro tunc
confirming that, before trial, Plaintiff had waived his claims against all Defendants except
the two officers he proceeded against at trial, and formally dismissing the action against
all other Defendants. Hernandez v. Officers Romero & Stevenson, No. 94-K-686 (D.
Colo. Sept. 11, 1997) (nunc pro tunc order amending prior judgment). Because the nunc
1 No formal motion to dismiss the other Defendants was submitted to the trial court. Additionally, the caption on the final stipulated pretrial order identified the defendants as “Mr. Michaud, et al.,” and referred only to “Defendants,” even though Plaintiff proceeded against only Officers Romero and Stevenson at trial.
3 pro tunc order stated that the judgment entered resolved all issues against all Defendants,
we exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The district court permitted Plaintiff leave to bring this appeal pro se, after paying
an initial partial filing fee. However, because the court would not certify that the issues
on appeal were not frivolous and presented a substantial question for adjudication, it held
that Plaintiff was not entitled to a trial transcript at the government’s expense pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 753(f). R., Vol. I, Exh. 94.
In this appeal, Plaintiff contends that the dismissal of the action against all
Defendants except Officers Romero and Stevenson was improper, and that the dismissal
of his claim of denied access to the law library was erroneous. Plaintiff also argues that
he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims to the trial court, and
therefore the verdict in favor of the arresting officers is invalid. Based on the record
before us, we conclude that Plaintiff’s arguments have no merit.
We reiterate that Plaintiff was represented by counsel in this civil action. The trial
minutes reflect that Plaintiff proceeded at trial against only Officers Romero and
Stevenson. This necessarily indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel would no longer pursue
claims against the other Defendants, including those who allegedly denied Plaintiff access
to the law library. R., Vol. I, Exh. 77. The actions of Plaintiff’s counsel are binding on
Plaintiff because a party authorizes counsel to act as its agent. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
4 (1978); Committee on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.
1971). The record also indicates that some of the Defendants were entitled to dismissal as
a matter of law, based upon their right to qualified immunity. See Workman v. Jordan,
958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e reiterate that qualified immunity is not only a
defense to liability but also entitlement to immunity from suit and other demands of
litigation.”); see also Hernandez, No. 94-K-686, at 3. Additionally, there is some
evidence in the record to support the abandonment of Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied
access to the prison law library. Defense counsel acquired prison documents that show
Plaintiff did visit the law library during the period in question.2 These documents also
indicate that Plaintiff failed to appear for other scheduled visits to the law library. See R.,
Vol. I, Exh. 70 at 7-8. We hold that the district court’s nunc pro tunc order formally
dismissing all Defendants except Officers Romero and Stevenson was not erroneous.
Because the judgment in the suit against the two officers “resolved all issues against all
Defendants,” Plaintiff has no defendant against whom he may proceed. Therefore, the
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
DEC 2 1997 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 96-1525 v. (D.C. 94-K-686) MR. MICHAUD, Chief of Denver Police; (D. Colo.) MR. OLIVA, Chief of County Jail; E. L. ROY; R. J. ROMERO; P. A. MANZANAREZ; F. S. VESSA; T. D. FULLER; J. SEWELL; L. C. DOMINQUES; L. L. STEVENSON; F. J. SPINHARNEY; D. M. DELMONICO; J. A. HART; P. BEAULIEU; N. WASHER; JOHN SIMONET, Director of Corrections; T. A. SASIM, Captain of Operations; SGT. YAMAMOTO, Sgt. of Operations; P. R. RODRIGUEZ, Deputy; P. H. SANCHEZ, Sgt. of Operations; SGT. FRANK, Sgt. of Receiving; WELLINGTON WEBB, Mayor of Denver; MANAGER OF SAFETY FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; DENVER COUNTY JAIL, hospital personnel, and any other person(s) who by act, omission, of knowledge of the events, without stopping or reporting same, Defendants - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BALDOCK, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff brought an action naming twenty-two individuals and Denver County Jail
officials as defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the use of unreasonable force
during and after his arrest. Plaintiff also alleged that he was denied access to the jail law
library prior to his state criminal trial and during appellate review of his criminal
conviction. Plaintiff was represented by counsel until one week before his criminal trial
when his counsel was granted leave to withdraw. Plaintiff represented himself during his
criminal trial, but had counsel appointed for his criminal appeal. Appointed counsel also
represented Plaintiff at trial in the section 1983 action at issue here.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
2 The record before us indicates that prior to, or at the beginning of, trial, counsel for
both parties submitted a stipulated set of jury instructions and verdict forms naming the
two arresting officers, Officers Romero and Stevenson, as the sole Defendants. The
record also reflects that Plaintiff’s claim regarding access to the jail law library was not
pursued at trial. Plaintiff only argued the unreasonable force claim against the two
arresting officers to the jury.
After a jury verdict in favor of the arresting officers, Plaintiff’s counsel was
granted leave to withdraw from his representation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff, proceeding pro
se, filed a notice of appeal naming “Mr. Michaud, et al.,” as Appellees. That notice was
rejected by this court on the grounds that the judgment from which the appeal was taken
did not appear to resolve all claims against all defendants and therefore was not final.1
After mesne and sundry proceedings, the district court entered an order nunc pro tunc
confirming that, before trial, Plaintiff had waived his claims against all Defendants except
the two officers he proceeded against at trial, and formally dismissing the action against
all other Defendants. Hernandez v. Officers Romero & Stevenson, No. 94-K-686 (D.
Colo. Sept. 11, 1997) (nunc pro tunc order amending prior judgment). Because the nunc
1 No formal motion to dismiss the other Defendants was submitted to the trial court. Additionally, the caption on the final stipulated pretrial order identified the defendants as “Mr. Michaud, et al.,” and referred only to “Defendants,” even though Plaintiff proceeded against only Officers Romero and Stevenson at trial.
3 pro tunc order stated that the judgment entered resolved all issues against all Defendants,
we exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The district court permitted Plaintiff leave to bring this appeal pro se, after paying
an initial partial filing fee. However, because the court would not certify that the issues
on appeal were not frivolous and presented a substantial question for adjudication, it held
that Plaintiff was not entitled to a trial transcript at the government’s expense pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 753(f). R., Vol. I, Exh. 94.
In this appeal, Plaintiff contends that the dismissal of the action against all
Defendants except Officers Romero and Stevenson was improper, and that the dismissal
of his claim of denied access to the law library was erroneous. Plaintiff also argues that
he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims to the trial court, and
therefore the verdict in favor of the arresting officers is invalid. Based on the record
before us, we conclude that Plaintiff’s arguments have no merit.
We reiterate that Plaintiff was represented by counsel in this civil action. The trial
minutes reflect that Plaintiff proceeded at trial against only Officers Romero and
Stevenson. This necessarily indicates that Plaintiff’s counsel would no longer pursue
claims against the other Defendants, including those who allegedly denied Plaintiff access
to the law library. R., Vol. I, Exh. 77. The actions of Plaintiff’s counsel are binding on
Plaintiff because a party authorizes counsel to act as its agent. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955
4 (1978); Committee on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.
1971). The record also indicates that some of the Defendants were entitled to dismissal as
a matter of law, based upon their right to qualified immunity. See Workman v. Jordan,
958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e reiterate that qualified immunity is not only a
defense to liability but also entitlement to immunity from suit and other demands of
litigation.”); see also Hernandez, No. 94-K-686, at 3. Additionally, there is some
evidence in the record to support the abandonment of Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied
access to the prison law library. Defense counsel acquired prison documents that show
Plaintiff did visit the law library during the period in question.2 These documents also
indicate that Plaintiff failed to appear for other scheduled visits to the law library. See R.,
Vol. I, Exh. 70 at 7-8. We hold that the district court’s nunc pro tunc order formally
dismissing all Defendants except Officers Romero and Stevenson was not erroneous.
Because the judgment in the suit against the two officers “resolved all issues against all
Defendants,” Plaintiff has no defendant against whom he may proceed. Therefore, the
implied dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied law library access was not
erroneous.
Plaintiff further contends that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to present
his case to a jury. He alleges that the trial court improperly denied his offer of proof and
2 An exhibit provided by Defendants included a set of documents showing Plaintiff’s library visits in January, February, and March of 1994. Plaintiff’s criminal trial was held on February 7, 1994, and his notice of appeal was filed in April 1994.
5 erroneously excluded the testimony of witnesses who previously had brought claims of
excessive force against the same defendants, Officers Romero and Stevenson. We review
a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Faulkner v. Super Valu
Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1433 (10th Cir. 1993). While the proffered evidence could be
viewed as bolstering Plaintiff’s claims, it was unfavorable to Plaintiff’s case in other
respects. See R., Vol. I, Exh. 77. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiff’s offer of proof. We also believe that the prior bad act
testimony of Plaintiff’s witnesses was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence
404. We therefore hold that Plaintiff was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present
his claims at trial.
The absence of a trial transcript prevents a more detailed review of the issues
raised than we have given. The sparse record available to us leads us to conclude that
Plaintiff’s claims have no merit and the district court did not err by finding that a trial
transcript at government expense was not justified. To the extent that Plaintiff raises an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we dismiss that claim without prejudice. Such
claims should be brought in a collateral proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See
United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
6 The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge