Hernandez v. Golden Gate Regional Center

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedNovember 18, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-04668
StatusUnknown

This text of Hernandez v. Golden Gate Regional Center (Hernandez v. Golden Gate Regional Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hernandez v. Golden Gate Regional Center, (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 JUANA LORENA HERNANDEZ, Case No. 24-cv-04668-MMC

7 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 8 v. MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND; 9 GOLDEN GATE REGIONAL CENTER, VACATING HEARING et al., 10 Defendants.

11 12 Before the Court are two motions: (1) defendant Aveanna Healthcare, LLC's 13 ("Aveanna") "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6)," filed September 16, 14 2024, and amended September 30, 2024; and (2) defendant Golden Gate Regional 15 Center's ("GGRC") "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of 16 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)," filed September 27, 2024. Plaintiff Juana Lorena Hernandez 17 ("Hernandez"), who proceeds pro se, has filed opposition to each motion; Aveanna and 18 GGRC have filed separate replies. Having read and considered the papers filed in 19 support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court deems the matters appropriate for 20 determination on the parties' respective written submissions, hereby VACATES the 21 hearing scheduled for November 22, 2024, and rules as follows: 22 1. Hernandez's Title VII claim is hereby DISMISSED: 23 a. To the extent the claim is asserted against GGRC, the claim is subject to 24 dismissal, as Hernandez fails to plead any facts to support her conclusory allegation that 25 GGRC was her employer. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Global 26 Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding "Title VII imposes liability for 27 discrimination on employers") (internal quotation, alteration, and citation omitted); 1 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice"). 2 b. To the extent the claim is based on a theory that Hernandez was 3 terminated on account of her sex (see Compl. ¶ 5), the claim is subject to dismissal, as 4 Hernandez fails to allege any facts to support a finding her termination was based on her 5 sex; rather, Hernandez alleges she was terminated in retaliation for having reported that 6 James Cheng ("Cheng") engaged in "physical abuse" against a "disabled adult" (see 7 Compl. Ex. 1 ¶ 6.6).1 8 c. To the extent the claim is based on a theory that Hernandez's termination 9 was in retaliation for her having reported Cheng's alleged physical abuse of a disabled 10 person (see id.), the claim is subject to dismissal, as Hernandez fails to allege any facts 11 to support a finding that her report constituted opposition to "any practice made an 12 unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]" or that it pertained to "an investigation, 13 proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 14 c. To the extent the claim is based a theory that Cheng, during the course of 15 Hernandez's employment, subjected Hernandez to sexual harassment (see Compl. Ex. 1 16 ¶ 6.5), the claim is subject to dismissal, as Hernandez fails to plead any facts to support a 17 finding that Aveanna and GGRC, assuming they were her joint employers along with 18 Cheng, "knew or should have known" about Cheng's alleged conduct and "failed to 19 undertake prompt corrective measures within [their] control," see Global Horizons, 915 20 F.3d at 641 (setting forth showing necessary to hold joint employer liable for conduct of 21 another joint employer; holding "one joint employer is not automatically liable for the 22 actions of the other"). 23 d. In light of Hernandez's allegation that she was terminated in May 2022 and 24 that she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 25 Commission ("EEOC") on April 15, 2024 (see Compl. ¶¶ 7, 8), Hernandez's claim is time- 26

27 1 Hernandez alleges Cheng, who is not a defendant, was her employer, along with 1 barred,” as her charge was filed more than 300 days after her termination, see 42 U.S.C. 2 || § 2000e-5(e)(1),° and Hernandez alleges no facts to support a finding that an exception 3 || to the statute of limitations exists, see Udom v. Fonseca, 846 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 4 1988) (holding, "to invoke the benefit of [an exception to the statute of limitations], the 5 || plaintiff must allege facts that, if believed, would provide a basis for [the exception]"). 6 2. As Hernandez's Title VII claim is subject to dismissal, and the above-titled 7 || action remains at the early stages, the Court declines to exercise supplemental 8 || jurisdiction over Hernandez's state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing 9 || district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim .. . if. . . the 10 || district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction"); Carnegie- 11 Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (holding "in the usual case in 12 || which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be

2 13 || considered under the [Supplemental] jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy,

0 14 || convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction O 8 15 || over the remaining state-law claims"). Accordingly, Hernandez's state law claims are

Q 16 || hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to said claims being reasserted in an amended Cc 17 || complaint or in state court. 18 3. Hernandez is hereby afforded leave to amend. If Hernandez elects to file a 19 First Amended Complaint, she shall do so no later than December 13, 2024. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 || Dated: November 18, 2024 . MAKINE M. CHESNEY 22 United States District Judge 23 24 > For purposes of the instant motion, the Court assumes Hernandez's Title VII claim accrued on May 31, 2022. 29 3 Although the deadline to file a charge with the EEOC ordinarily is 180 days from 26 || the date of the alleged adverse employment act, the deadline is extended to 300 days from said date where the plaintiff first files a charge with a state agency. See id. Here, 97 || Hernandez, in her oppositions, states that, on January 27, 2023, she submitted a charge to California's Civil Rights Department. (See Pl.'s Opp. to Aveanna's Mot. at 2:16-17, 26; 2g || PI.'s Opp. to Golden Gate's Mot. at 3:24-25, 4:5.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bassey Udom v. Daniel Fonseca
846 F.2d 1236 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Eeoc v. Global Horizons, Inc
915 F.3d 631 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Hernandez v. Golden Gate Regional Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hernandez-v-golden-gate-regional-center-cand-2024.