Hernandez v. Erskine

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hernandez v. Erskine

123 A.D.3d 883, 999 N.Y.S.2d 839

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 17, 2014

Docket2013-03008

StatusPublished

This text of 123 A.D.3d 883 (Hernandez v. Erskine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hernandez v. Erskine, 123 A.D.3d 883, 999 N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Siega!, J.), dated December 17, 2012, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine, to both of the plaintiff’s knees, and to the plaintiff’s right shoulder did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.P., Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Siega!, J.), dated December 17, 2012, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff’s spine, to both of the plaintiff’s knees, and to the plaintiff’s right shoulder did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.P., Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

123 A.D.3d 883, 999 N.Y.S.2d 839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hernandez-v-erskine-nyappdiv-2014.

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