Hernandez v. County of Monterey

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 21, 2023·No. 5:13-cv-02354·Unknown

Opinion

JESSE HERNANDEZ, et al., Case No. 13-cv-02354-BLF

Plaintiffs, ORDER RE ADMISNISTRATIVE v. MOTIONS TO FILE UNDER SEAL

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al., [Re: ECF 776, 787, 793] Defendants.

Plaintiffs filed this suit to obtain relief from Defendants’ alleged failure to provide inmates at the Monterey County Jail (“Jail”) with adequate medical and mental health care, reasonable accommodations for disabilities, and protection from violence. See Compl., ECF 1. The Court thereafter approved the parties’ Settlement Agreement. See Order For Final Approval of Settlement, ECF 494. Plaintiffs have filed a motion to enforce both the Settlement Agreement and the Implementation Plan developed by Defendant County of Monterey (“County”) and Defendant Wellpath, Inc. (“Wellpath”),1 which is set for hearing on August 24, 2023 (“Enforcement Motion”). See Enforcement Mot., ECF 788. This order addresses three administrative motions to seal briefing and documents filed in connection with Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion. First, Plaintiffs have filed a motion to consider whether to seal in their entirety more than thirty reports prepared by court-appointed neutral monitors tasked with determining Defendants’ compliance with the Settlement Agreement and Implementation Plan (ECF 776). Plaintiffs filed this motion based on Defendants’ assertion that the neutral monitor reports should be sealed. Plaintiffs themselves oppose sealing the neutral monitor reports in their entirety. However, Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly agree to the sealing of limited portions of the neutral monitor reports and other documents filed in connection with Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion. The second motion before the Court is the parties’ joint motion to seal limited portions of Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion and supporting evidence, including neutral monitor reports, to protect personal identifying information of inmates and care providers, as well as certain individual custody and medical records (ECF 787). The third motion before the Court is the parties’ joint motion to seal limited portions of Plaintiffs’ reply evidence to protect personal identifying information of inmates and care providers, as well as certain individual custody and medical records (ECF 793). For the reasons discussed below, the motion to seal the neutral monitor reports in their entirety is DENIED. The parties’ joint sealing motions, seeking to seal limited portions of the neutral monitor reports and other documents filed in connection with Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion, are GRANTED. “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Consequently, access to motions and their attachments that are “more than tangentially related to the merits of a case” may be sealed only upon a showing of “compelling reasons” for sealing. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2006). Filings that are only tangentially related to the merits may be sealed upon a lesser showing of “good cause.” Id. at 1097. In this district, all parties requesting sealing also must comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5. Under that rule, a party moving to seal a document in whole or in part must file a statement identifying the legitimate private or public interests that warrant sealing, the injury that will result 5(c)(1). A supporting declaration shall be submitted if necessary. Civ. L.R. 79-5(c)(2). Finally, the moving party must submit “a proposed order that is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material[.]” Civ. L.R. 79-5(c)(3). The sealing motions before the Court relate to Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion, in which Plaintiffs ask the Court to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Implementation Plan regarding Jail conditions. Because the requested enforcement goes to the heart of the relief sought in this lawsuit, the Court applies the compelling reasons standard for sealing rather than the good cause standard applicable to matters only tangentially related to the merits. A. Motion to Consider Sealing of Neutral Monitor Reports (ECF 776) Plaintiffs have filed a motion to consider whether to seal, in their entirety, more than thirty reports prepared by court-appointed neutral monitors tasked with determining Defendants’ compliance with the Settlement Agreement and Implementation Plan. Those reports, and other documents citing to the reports, are submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibits 1-49, 53, and 59 to the Trapani Declaration and Exhibits 3-4 to the Swearingen Declaration. Plaintiffs have conditionally filed those documents under seal, and have conditionally redacted their Enforcement Motion to the extent it contains findings and quotations from the neutral monitor reports. In Plaintiffs’ view, the neutral monitor reports should not be sealed in their entirety. Plaintiffs filed the motion to consider sealing the neutral monitor reports because Defendants take the position that they are confidential and should be sealed in their entirety. Where the moving party requests sealing of materials that have been designated confidential by another party, the designating party has the burden to establish that the materials should be sealed. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(f). Defendant County has filed a response to Plaintiffs’ motion, asserting that the neutral monitor reports should be sealed in their entirety for three reasons. First, the County argues that the neutral monitor reports fall within the Protective Order issued in this case. The Protective Order provides a mechanism whereby parties to this action may designate documents produced in discovery as “confidential” under certain circumstances, such as when the documents contain information protected from disclosure under state or federal law. See Protective Order, ECF 401. The neutral monitor reports were not produced in discovery and therefore do not appear to fall within the scope of the Protective Order. The County has not shown that it ever designated the neutral monitor reports as “confidential” pursuant to the Protective Order. Even if the County had done so, this Court’s Civil Local Rules expressly provide that “[r]eference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” Civ. L.R. 7-5(c). Second, the County contends that the court-appointed neutral monitors understood that their reports would be strictly confidential, and wanted the reports to be strictly confidential. The County submits the declarations of two neutral monitors, Bruce P. Barnett, M.D. and James D. Vess, Ph.D. See Barnett Decl., ECF 782-1; Vess Decl., ECF 782-2. Dr. Barnett states in his declaration that it was his understanding and intent that his reports would be confidential, and that understanding allowed him to be forthright in his statements. See Barnett Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. Dr. Vess makes identical statements in his declaration. See Vess Decl. ¶¶ 3-5. The County has not cited, and the Court has not discovered, any authority for the proposition that a court-appointed monitor’s desire for confidentiality constitutes a “compelling reason” for sealing. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that “a non-party’s reliance on a blanket protective order is unreasonable and is not a ‘compelling reason’ that rebuts the presumption of access.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183. Moreover, Plaintiffs submit Dr. Barnett’s supplemental declaration, clarifying that Dr. Barnett’s confidentiality concerns regarding his monitor reports relate solely to patient descriptors, the names of health care staff, and the like. See Barnett Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 2-4, ECF 786-1. Plaintiffs also submit the declarati

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