Hernandez v. Causey

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedSeptember 9, 2020
Docket2:17-cv-00123
StatusUnknown

This text of Hernandez v. Causey (Hernandez v. Causey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hernandez v. Causey, (S.D. Miss. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI EASTERN DIVISION

GABINO RAMOS HERNANDEZ PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-123-KS-MTP

PHILLIP CAUSEY, ET AL. DEFENDANTS ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [56]. Having considered the parties submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion [56] should be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff filed this action on July 20, 2017. See Complaint [1]. Plaintiff alleges that on July 20, 2016, Defendant Phillip Causey and other Immigration and Custom Enforcement Agency (“ICE”) officers responded to a request from Laurel, Mississippi, police officers to assist with translating Spanish in connection with a traffic stop of two Hispanic individuals, including Plaintiff. See [1]; Amended Complaints [5] [20]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Causey arrived at the scene and wrongfully shot him. Id. Plaintiff asserts that Causey violated his constitutional rights and committed tortious conduct under state law. Id. Plaintiff also asserts claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States for negligent training and supervision and for allowing Causey to utilize pretext to conduct illegal stops and seizures without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Id. On April 1, 2020, Plaintiff served his first set of interrogatories on the United States. See Notice [43]. On July 28, 2020, the government served its responses. See Notices [53]. That same day, the Court conducted a telephonic conference with the parties concerning disputes arising from the interrogatories and responses. The parties were unable to resolve their disputes. Thus, on August 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion [56], requesting that the Court compel the government to provide complete answers to certain interrogatories. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks complete answers to eight interrogatories, which the Court will group into three categories: Reports, ICE Operation, and Authority for Actions. Reports

Four of the interrogatories seek the identities of individuals who prepared specifically identified documents and the sources of the information contained in the documents. Interrogatory No. 2: Please identify the individual who prepared the . . . ICE Significant Incident Report [submitted on July 21, 2016] and the source of the facts and information contained therein.

Interrogatory No. 3: Please identify the individual who prepared the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, I16- ICE-BLX-15750 . . . and the source of all facts and information contained therein.

Interrogatory No. 10: Please identify the individual who sent the email of July 20, 2016, 11:08 PM . . . and the source of the information provided therein.

Interrogatory No. 12: Please identify the individual who prepared the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement Report of Investigation, No. 001, partially entitled “IMMGRTN ENF AGT 0402 Intentional Discharge of Service Weapon (minor injury), Laurel, Jones, MS” and the source of all facts and information contained therein . . . .

Concerning the identities of the individuals who prepared the subject reports and email, the government, in its Response [60], asserts that it has provided this information in response to Interrogatories Nos. 2, 10, and 12. As for Interrogatory No. 3, however, the government argues that the law enforcement privilege shields the name of this individual. The law enforcement privilege is a “qualified privilege protecting investigative files in an ongoing criminal investigation.” In re U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 459 F.3d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 2006). When considering whether this privilege applies, courts balance “the government’s interest in confidentiality against the litigant’s need for the documents.” Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir. 1991). In particular, courts consider the Frankenhauser factors. Id. at 570 (citing Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973)). The Frankenhauser factors include: (1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart government processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the

degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether the police investigation has been complete; (7) whether any interdepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available through other discovery or from other sources; (10) the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff’s case. Id.

In support of its argument, the government submitted a declaration from Darcia Rufus, an Assistant Counsel to the Inspector General, which states in part: For disclosure requests, it is DHS OIG’s policy to assert the law enforcement privilege over the names of OIG investigative employees who are GS-14s and below, which include Special Agents (SAs) and Assistant Special Agents-in- Charge (ASACs). By applying redactions to investigative personnel who are GS- 14 and below, OIG is able to protect its law enforcement function by protecting the agents from unwanted harassment based on their positions and ensuring that the release of their names will not have an adverse effect on OIG’s investigative abilities.

See Declaration [60-1].

The Court finds that the Department of Homeland Security’s policy, without more, is insufficient to justify application of the law enforcement privilege in this situation. The government does not specifically address the Frankenhauser factors and fails to explain why this specific individual would be subjected to undue harassment or explain why the release of his or her name would have an adverse effect on any investigation. On the other hand, Plaintiff explains his need for the information. According to Plaintiff, the report describes events which transpired immediately prior to and during the shooting, and information concerning how and

from where this information was gathered may be important to Plaintiff’s claims. The Court finds that the Frankenhauser factors weigh in favor of compelling the United States to disclose the information in question. Thus, the government is hereby directed to identify the individual who prepared the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, I16-ICE-BLX-15750. Concerning the source of information contained in these reports and email, the government asserts that it does not have any information beyond what is contained in the reports and email. The government also argues that production of this information is unnecessary because it has identified all of the individuals having first-hand knowledge of the events of July

20, 2016 and Plaintiff has deposed these witnesses. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that:

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Related

In Re United States Department of Homeland Security
459 F.3d 565 (Fifth Circuit, 2006)
Herbert v. Lando
441 U.S. 153 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc.
566 F.3d 324 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo
59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1973)

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Bluebook (online)
Hernandez v. Causey, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hernandez-v-causey-mssd-2020.