Hernandez v. AFSCME California

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 20, 2019
• Docket: 2:18-cv-02419
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 LILIANA HERNANDEZ, MIRANDA No. 2:18-CV-02419 WBS EFB ALEXANDER, NATASHA JOFFE, MARIA 13 ISABEL HOLTROP, MARCO FEKRAT, EMIN GHARIBIAN, ROHIT SHARMA, 14 HECTOR ARROYO, and TIMOTHY MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PORTER, on behalf of themselves DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 15 and others similarly situated, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 16 Plaintiffs, 17 v. 18 AFSCME CALIFORNIA; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND 19 MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES; AFSCME LOCAL 3299, AFSCME LOCAL 2620, 20 and AFSCME LOCAL 3634, as individual defendants and as 21 representatives of the class of all chapters and affiliates of 22 the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 23 Employees; XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as 24 Attorney General of the State of California; ADRIA JENKINS-JONES, 25 in her official capacity as Acting Director of the 26 California Department of Human Resources; RALPH DIAZ, in his 27 official capacity as Acting Secretary of the California 28 Department of Corrections and 1 Rehabilitation; BETTY YEE, in her official capacity as State 2 Controller of California; PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 3 CORPORATION; LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION 4 AUTHORITY, 5 Defendants. 6 7 ----oo0oo---- 8 Plaintiffs are employees of the State of California and 9 brought this action against various affiliates of the American 10 Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”) 11 (collectively “the union defendants”), various officials of the 12 State of California, the Public Transportation Services 13 Corporation, and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 14 Transportation Authority (collectively “the state defendants”). 15 Plaintiffs allege that AFSCME Local 3299 and Local 2620 16 unlawfully deducted dues from their paychecks after they resigned 17 their union memberships. Before the court is the union 18 defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 89). 19 I. Factual Background 20 Plaintiffs Miranda Alexander, Natasha Joffe, and Maria 21 Holtrop became members of AFSCME Local 2620 by signing a 22 membership agreement that authorized their employer, the State of 23 California, to deduct monthly dues and remit them to the union. 24 (Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3; Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at 25 12, 14, 15 (Docket No. 94-1).) The agreement stated that the 26 authorization was “voluntary and not a condition of [plaintiffs’] 27 employment.” (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J, Exs. 4a, 4f, 4k, “Local 28 1 2620 Membership Agreements” (Docket No. 90).) The authorization 2 was “irrevocable . . . for a period of one year from the date of 3 execution,” “regardless of whether [plaintiffs] [were] or 4 remain[ed] a member of the Union.” (Id.) 5 Plaintiff Hector Arroyo became a member of AFSCME Local 6 3299 by signing a similar membership contract. (Resp. to Defs.’ 7 SUF at 8, ¶ 23.) Arroyo’s membership agreement committed Arroyo 8 “voluntarily to contribute” an amount equal to membership dues 9 for a period of one year even if Arroyo resigned his union 10 membership or “the law no longer require[d] nonmembers to pay a 11 fair share fee.” (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J, Ex. 2e, “Arroyo 12 Membership Agreement” (Docket No. 90-3).) The authorization 13 would renew each year unless Arroyo mailed the union a signed 14 revocation letter. (Id.) 15 Plaintiff Liliana Hernandez also joined AFSCME Local 16 3299 by signing a membership agreement. (Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at 17 3, ¶ 10.) The agreement did not provide for a commitment to pay 18 dues for any set amount of time, nor did it place restrictions on 19 when Hernandez could revoke her dues deduction authorization. 20 (See Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J, Ex. 1a, “Hernandez Membership 21 Agreement” (Docket No. 90-2).) 22 On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. 23 AFSCME Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), and held that no 24 payment to a union may be collected from an employee without the 25 employee’s clear affirmative consent. Id. at 2486. After the 26 Court announced its decision, plaintiffs contacted their 27 respective unions to resign their union membership and halt 28 payroll deductions of membership dues. (Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at 1 4, ¶ 13; 9, ¶ 26; 12, ¶ 43; 15, ¶ 50; 16, ¶ 57.) The unions 2 cancelled plaintiffs’ memberships. (Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at 5, ¶ 3 18; 8, ¶ 29; 13, ¶ 45; 14, ¶ 53; 15, ¶ 59.) Although plaintiffs 4 were no longer union members, each union continued collecting 5 membership dues from plaintiffs pursuant to their respective 6 membership contracts. (Id.) 7 Plaintiffs filed suit and asserted claims under 42 8 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state common law. Plaintiffs 9 concede that plaintiff Hernandez’ state common law claims fall 10 exclusively within the Public Employee Relations Board 11 jurisdiction and must be dismissed. (Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. 12 J. at 15 (Docket No. 94).) Plaintiffs also agree that, because 13 the union no longer deducts dues from plaintiffs’ paychecks, 14 plaintiffs’ claims against the state defendants for declaratory 15 and injunctive relief are moot and must be dismissed. (Resp. to 16 State Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 (Docket No. 95).)1 17 Accordingly, the only issue before the court is plaintiffs’ claim 18 that the continued deduction of fees after plaintiffs resigned 19 their union membership violates plaintiffs’ First Amendment 20 rights, actionable under § 1983. 21 II. Discussion 22 A. Under Color of State Law 23 A party may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy 24 deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of 25 the United States only when that deprivation takes place “under 26 color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 27 1 The court therefore will grant the state defendants’ 28 Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 91). 1 any State or Territory.” See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 2 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Further, “[b]ecause the [Fourteenth] 3 Amendment is directed at the States, it can be violated only by 4 conduct that may be fairly characterized as ‘state action.’” Id. 5 “Section 1983’s under-color-of-state-law requirement and the 6 Fourteenth Amendment's ‘state action’ requirement are closely 7 related.” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 8 1989). “[C]onduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the 9 Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of 10 action under color of state law.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.18. 11 Here, plaintiffs must meet both requirements. Accordingly, to 12 determine if plaintiffs may sustain this claim under Section 13 1983, this court evaluates whether the conduct at issue 14 constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. See 15 Collins, 878 F.2d at 1148. 16 B. State Action 17 A plaintiff satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment’s state- 18 action requirement if “the conduct allegedly causing the 19 deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the 20 State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see also Caviness v. Horizon 21 Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). 22 “This fair attribution test has two components: a state policy 23 and a state actor.” Roudybush v. Zabel, 813 F.2d 173, 177 (8th 24 Cir. 1987). The state policy component requires that the 25 deprivation be caused “by the exercise of some right or privilege 26 created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state 27 or by a person for whom the State is responsible.” Lugar, 457 28 U.S. at 937. The state actor component requires that “the party 1 charged with the deprivation be a person who may fairly be said 2 to be a state actor.” Id. Plaintiff must meet both prongs for 3 there to be state action. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 4 1151 (9th Cir. 1989). There is no precise formula for discerning 5 state action: “Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances 6 can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be 7 attributed its true significance.” Burton v. Wilmington, 365 8 U.S. 715 (1961)). 9 1. State Policy 10 “A state policy may be inferred from either a state 11 statute or a well-settled custom or practice.” Roudybush v. 12 Zabel, 813 F.2d 173, 176 (8th Cir. 1987) (internal citations 13 omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the state-imposed “rule of 14 conduct” is Senate Bill No. 866, which establishes that 15 “[d]eductions may be requested by employee organizations . . . 16 from the salaries and wages of their members, and public 17 employers shall honor these requests.” See Cal. Gov. Code § 18 1152. Defendants, on the other hand, rely on Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 19 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2013), to argue that the court must look to 20 “the source of the alleged constitutional harm” in evaluating 21 this first prong. See id. at 994. The source of the 22 deprivation, defendants argue, is instead the membership 23 contracts that plaintiffs signed, which authorized the dues 24 deductions at issue. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 10.) 25 This court agrees with plaintiffs and finds that a 26 state rule of conduct, Senate Bill 866, was a cause of the 27 alleged constitutional harm. Even assuming that the Ohno court 28 intended to create a legal test, the language in Ohno does not 1 require the court to identify the most important, the most 2 obvious, or the one single source of the deprivation. Indeed, 3 “[t]he state policy requirement ensures that the alleged 4 deprivation is fairly attributable” –- not exclusively 5 attributable -– “to a state policy.” Collins, 878 F.2d at 1151. 6 The court must instead determine whether the exercise of a state- 7 created right or a state rule of conduct is so uninvolved as to 8 make the challenged activity “so ‘purely private’” that it “falls 9 without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Burton, 365 U.S. 10 at 725. The distinction is subtle but nontrivial. Defendants 11 can always find private actions that contributed to the alleged 12 deprivations. See, e.g., Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 877 F.3d 13 833 (9th Cir. 2017) (alleging that incorporating a federal right 14 into a contract is a private action that does not implicate state 15 action). But those private actions should not suffice to take 16 the conduct outside of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment 17 where state action was also involved. Accordingly, this court 18 finds that the garnishment of wages of nonmembers involved the 19 application of a state-created rule of conduct and was therefore 20 not so purely private. 21 The court’s conclusion is consistent with precedent. 22 The Ninth Circuit has rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the 23 source of deprivation is the private membership agreement. In 24 Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 877 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2017), 25 plaintiffs’ contracts with AT&T “included arbitration 26 agreements.” Id. at 836. After plaintiffs sued AT&T for false 27 advertisement, “AT&T moved to compel arbitration in light of the 28 Supreme Court’s ruling . . . that the [Federal Arbitration Act] 1 preempts state law deeming AT&T’s arbitration provision to be 2 unconscionable,” and plaintiffs opposed the motion on First 3 Amendment grounds. Id. Like the union defendants here, AT&T 4 argued that “AT&T’s enforcement of a private agreement” did not 5 satisfy the state-policy prong. See Br. of Def.-Appellee AT&T 6 Mobility LLC, No. 1616915, 2017 WL 2212991, at *21 (9th Cir. May 7 15, 2017); see also id. at 844 n.7. The Ninth Circuit rejected 8 the argument because “[t]he alleged constitutional deprivation 9 arose because AT&T exercised its federally created right to 10 compel arbitration under the FAA, and ‘[u]ndoubtedly the State 11 was responsible for the statute.’” Roberts, 877 F.3d at 844 n.7. 12 Roberts is instructive here. Although the membership 13 agreements are private contracts drafted by the union, the 14 alleged constitutional deprivation arose because the union 15 defendants used the state-created rule that compels the state to 16 garnish wages pursuant to those agreements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 17 1152; see also Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 880 F.2d 1108, 1117 18 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]here is little doubt that the 19 first prong under Lugar has been satisfied” where plaintiff 20 challenged the content of a private hospital’s bylaws but state 21 law required hospitals to draft bylaws). As in Roberts, there is 22 no question that “the State was responsible for the statute” that 23 ultimately caused the garnishment of wages. See Roberts, 877 24 F.3d at 844 n.7. 25 Indeed, although case law on the state policy prong is 26 admittedly limited, the use of state-imposed procedures seemingly 27 qualifies as state action. In Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 28 (8th Cir. 1983), for example, private defendants garnished 1 plaintiffs’ auction sale pursuant to South Dakota’s garnishment 2 law. The court found that there was “no question that the first 3 requirement of the Lugar state action test [was] met [because] 4 the state created the procedural scheme by which the defendants 5 were able to garnish the plaintiffs’ property.” Id. at 848; cf. 6 Roudybush, 813 F.2d at 177 (finding no state policy where 7 plaintiffs “disavow any claim . . . that the process by which 8 [plaintiffs] were deprived of their property . . . conformed to a 9 permanent and well-settled practice of the State.”). Here, union 10 defendants could not have deprived plaintiffs of their rights 11 through their membership agreements alone. Just as in Buller, 12 the union defendants used the state-created procedural scheme, 13 Section 1152, to collect the membership dues now at issue. This 14 use of state procedures suffices to meet the first prong. See 15 also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (“The [state 16 action] test is not the form in which state power has been 17 applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact 18 been exercised.”). 19 By contrast, cases where the state policy prong is not 20 satisfied are entirely inapplicable because they involve either 21 allegations that the defendant violated state law, see, e.g., 22 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 940 (finding that defendants “were acting 23 contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State,” so 24 their conduct “could not be ascribed to any governmental 25 decision”); Collins, 878 F.2d at 1153 (“[Plaintiffs’] challenge 26 fails [the Lugar test] because their claim depends upon the 27 violation of California’s citizen’s arrest statute.”); Roudybush, 28 813 F.2d at 177 (finding that plaintiff’s “allegations are 1 antithetical to a claim that the appellees’ actions are 2 attributable to a state policy” where “[t]hey claim that the 3 appellees intentionally violated state policy”), or cases where 4 defendants did not rely on any state policy to deprive 5 plaintiffs, see, e.g., Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 6 N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that, if 7 Defendants had a “policy of only providing religious materials 8 and rabbi visits to individuals that Defendants determined were 9 Jewish,” it was “their own” and not the state’s); Ohno, 723 F.3d 10 at 994 (“[Plaintiff] challenges the constitutionality of . . . 11 Japanese tort law, . . . [not] a right privilege, or rule of 12 conduct imposed by a domestic governmental entity of 13 individual.”). Plaintiffs allege that the union defendants 14 garnished plaintiffs’ wages pursuant to, and not in contravention 15 of, Section 1152. Accordingly, neither of these lines of cases 16 applies here. 17 Finally, to find that the union’s garnishing of wages 18 in reliance on the state’s procedure is not state action would 19 seem inconsistent with Janus itself. The Supreme Court in Janus 20 discussed in detail how “compelled subsidization of private 21 speech seriously impinges on First Amendment rights.” 138 S. Ct. 22 at 2464. The First Amendment, however, “is a guarantee only 23 against abridgement by government.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 24 507, 513 (1976). If no state action were found here, it would 25 follow that the same conduct that was at issue in Janus, namely 26 the state extracting fees at the request of a union from 27 nonconsenting persons to fund political speech, was not state 28 action and did not violate the First Amendment. In other words, 1 if there was no state action in this case, the union could direct 2 state employers to violate Janus without facing liability under 3 Section 1983. The court decliknes to endorse such a conclusion 4 and instead finds that plaintiffs satisfy the state-policy prong. 5 2. State Actor 6 “The state actor requirement ensures that not all 7 private parties ‘face constitutional litigation whenever they 8 seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with 9 the community surrounding them.” Collins, 878 F.2d at 1151. 10 “The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining 11 whether a [non-governmental person’s] actions amount to state 12 action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; 13 (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus 14 test.” Ohno, 723 F.3d at 995 (quoting Tsao v. Desert Palace, 15 Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiffs proceed 16 under only the joint action test. 17 Under the joint action test, “courts examine whether 18 state officials and private parties have acted in concert in 19 effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” 20 Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002). “[P]rivate 21 actors can be state actors if they are ‘willful participant[s] in 22 joint action with the state or its agents.” George v. Pac.-CSC 23 Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1996). A party may 24 be a state actor “because he is a state official, because he has 25 acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state 26 officials, . . . because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to 27 the State,” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, or because there is “[a]n 28 agreement between government and a private party.” George, 91 F. 1 3d at 1231. 2 Under this test, the court finds that the union 3 defendants were state actors. The state established a law that 4 compelled the state to garnish wages in response to the unions’ 5 requests. The statute does not require any particular action 6 from unions. In requesting the state to continue extracting 7 dues, the union defendants therefore were “willful participant[s] 8 in joint action with the state.” See George, 91 F. 3d at 1231. 9 The membership agreements alone were insufficient for the unions 10 to extract membership dues. The unions necessarily relied on the 11 state and its procedures to extract the dues and therefore 12 “obtained significant aid from state officials.” See Lugar, 457 13 U.S. at 937. Moreover, there is a clear agreement between the 14 union defendants and the state that the unions will request the 15 extraction of dues and the state will comply with that request. 16 The actions at issue were not coerced, unilateral, or accidental. 17 The union defendants worked with the state to execute the 18 extraction of wages from plaintiffs. 19 Defendants’ characterization of the state’s action as 20 mere “acquiescence” is incorrect. Defendants argue that the 21 state did not influence “the content of the membership 22 agreements.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 13.) Defendants also 23 cite Belgau v. Inslee, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1000, where the court 24 found no joint action because the unions did not “‘affirm[], 25 authorize[], encourage[], or facilitate[]’ the contents of the 26 agreements.” See id. at 1013-14. The action at issue, however, 27 is not the drafting of the membership agreements. The alleged 28 deprivation of rights involves both the union’s request to 1 continue the garnishment of wages pursuant to the membership 2 agreement and the subsequent extraction of those wages by the 3 state. Again, neither the agreement drafted by the union, nor 4 the request by the union, alone deprived anyone of any rights. 5 The state had to act in concert with the union defendants and, at 6 the very least, “facilitated” the enforcement of the agreements. 7 Because the state had to act for the deprivation to 8 occur, defendants’ argument that the deprivation resulted from 9 decisions made by only the unions does not apply. In the union 10 context, “actions taken pursuant to the organization’s own 11 internal governing rules and regulations are not state actions.” 12 Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago, 570 F.3d 811, 13 817 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that a union’s decision to bar 14 plaintiffs from membership was not state action). By contrast, 15 where the union was “acting in concert . . . with the [state]” or 16 “with powers delegated to it by the [state] or state law,” the 17 union’s action is state action. Id. Here, the union defendants 18 and the state have acted in concert. Further, the union 19 defendants can command the state to deduct dues only because the 20 state has granted them the power to do so. See Cal. Gov. Code § 21 1152. The deduction of dues by the state is not merely an 22 internal decision by the union. It involves significant state 23 involvement and transforms the unions’ conduct into state action. 24 Accordingly, the court concludes that the state-actor prong is 25 satisfied. 26 C. Valid Contract 27 Plaintiffs argue that their membership agreements are 28 not valid contracts and therefore do not require them to pay 1 dues. The court disagrees. 2 Under California law, “the essential elements for a 3 contract are (1) ‘[p]arties capable of contracting’; (2) ‘[t]heir 4 consent’; (3) ‘[a] lawful object’; and (4) ‘[s]ufficient cause or 5 consideration.” U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 6 457, 462 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1550). 7 Defendants contest the consent and consideration elements. 8 1. Consent 9 Plaintiffs argue that the membership agreement is not a 10 contract because only one party signed it, and therefore only one 11 party has consented. Notably, plaintiffs cite no cases finding 12 that only a signature can show consent. Indeed, a signature is 13 not a requirement under California law. See Cal. Civ. Code § 14 1550. 15 Further, mutual consent “may be manifested by written 16 or spoken words, or by conduct.” Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio 17 Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014). It is undisputed that 18 after each of the plaintiffs joined the unions, the unions 19 treated each plaintiff as a member and conformed to the 20 provisions in the agreements. Indeed, the issue in this case is 21 precisely that the unions did as the agreement provides. The 22 union defendants’ conduct therefore demonstrates consent. 23 2. Consideration 24 Plaintiffs contend that there is nothing the union 25 could do that would breach the agreement and thus the agreement 26 is void for lack of consideration. Defendant concedes, however, 27 that in exchange for their promise to pay dues, plaintiffs 28 received the right to vote in officer elections and in contract- 1 ratification referenda. (Resp. to Defs.’ SUF at 7-8, ¶ 25; 10- 2 11, ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs also received access to the AFSCME 3 Advantage Program, which provides cell phone, auto, 4 entertainment, and travel discounts. (Decl. of Bridget Hughes at 5 3, ¶ 7). Further, plaintiffs and their family members were 6 entitled to take advantage of the AFSCME Free Collee Program. 7 (Id.) Failure to provide any of these benefits would breach the 8 agreement. Accordingly, the court finds that the agreements were 9 supported by consideration and were therefore valid contracts. 10 D. Valid Waiver 11 Plaintiffs argue that even if the contract is valid, it 12 does not adequately waive plaintiffs First Amendment rights. 13 Plaintiffs allege that, because prior to Janus plaintiffs did not 14 know they had the option not to join the union, their choice to 15 join the union was coerced. In their view, because plaintiffs 16 joined involuntarily, they were forced to support views they did 17 not want to support. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that 18 plaintiffs voluntarily signed their membership agreements and are 19 therefore bound by the contracts. 20 The First Amendment right at issue in Janus was the 21 right not to be “compel[ed] to mouth support for views [one] 22 find[s] objectionable.” See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463. Any 23 payment to a union, either in the form of dues or agency fees, 24 “provide[s] financial support for a union that ‘takes many 25 positions during collective bargaining that have powerful 26 political and civic consequences.’” See id. at 2464 (quoting 27 Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 310-311 (2012)). A 28 union’s extraction of fees from an employee who has not agreed to 1 support such positions thus constitutes a “compelled 2 subsidization of private speech.” Id. The Janus Court therefore 3 held that “[n]either an agency fee nor any other payment to the 4 union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages . . . unless the 5 employee affirmatively consents to pay.” 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 6 When nonmembers agree to pay, they are “waiving their First 7 Amendment rights.” Id. The waiver “must be freely given and 8 shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.” Id. 9 The Janus waiver requirement is inapplicable here. The 10 plaintiff in Janus never agreed to become a union member and 11 never agreed to pay union fees. Indeed, the concern in Janus was 12 the “deduct[ions] from a nonmember’s wages” without 13 “affirmative[] consent[].” Id. at 2486. By contrast, “the 14 relationship between unions and their voluntary members was not 15 at issue in Janus.” Cooley v. Cal. Statewide Law Enf’t Ass’n, 16 No. 2:18-CV-02961-JAM-AC, 2019 WL 331170, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 17 25, 2019). This is because in consenting to make a payment to 18 the union, an employee is consenting to financially support the 19 union and its “many positions during collective bargaining,” see 20 id. at 2464, and therefore his speech is not compelled. Because 21 dues deductions do not violate a voluntary member’s First 22 Amendment right not to be compelled to speak, the Janus waiver 23 requirement does not apply to voluntary members. See Belgau v. 24 Inslee, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1016-17 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“Janus 25 does not apply here -- Janus was not a union member, unlike the 26 Plaintiffs here, and Janus did not agree to a dues deduction, 27 unlike the Plaintiffs here.”). 28 Here, plaintiffs voluntarily joined the union. “Where 1 the employee has a choice of union membership and the employee 2 chooses to join, the union membership money is not coerced. The 3 employee is a union member voluntarily.” Kidwell v. Transp. 4 Commc’ns Int’l Union, 946 F.2d 283, 293 (4th Cir. 1991); see also 5 Anderson v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 503, 400 F. Supp. 3d 6 1113, 1116-18 (D. Or. 2019) (“To the extent that Plaintiffs may 7 argue they were ‘coerced’ into membership, the Court does not 8 agree.”). Plaintiffs concede at oral that it was cheaper to 9 remain a nonmember than to join the union. Cf. Cooley, 2019 WL 10 331170, at *2 (“[Plaintiff] knowingly agreed to become a dues- 11 paying member of the Union, rather than an agency fee-paying 12 nonmember, because the cost difference was minimal. That 13 decision was a freely-made choice.”); see also Seager v. United 14 Teachers Los Angeles, No. 219CV00469JLSDFM, 2019 WL 3822001, at 15 *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019) (finding that plaintiffs signed 16 similar agreement voluntarily). Indeed, as discussed above, 17 plaintiffs were aware of the benefits that come with union 18 membership and “voluntarily chose to pay membership dues in 19 exchange for [those] benefits.” Babb v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 378 20 F. Supp. 3d 857, 877 (C.D. Cal. 2019). 21 Further, as counsel for plaintiffs agreed at oral 22 argument, “[t]he fact that plaintiffs would not have opted to pay 23 union membership fees if Janus had been the law at the time of 24 their decision does not mean their decision was therefore 25 coerced.” Crockett v. NEA-Alaska, 367 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1008 (D. 26 Alaska 2019); Anderson, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1117 (“That 27 Plaintiffs’ alternative to union dues -- i.e., agency fees -- was 28 later found unconstitutional when it failed to include a First 1 Amendment waiver does not change this analysis.”); Smith v. 2 Bieker, No. 18-CV-05472-VC, 2019 WL 2476679, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 3 June 13, 2019) (finding a valid agreement, even if plaintiffs did 4 not know they could choose not to pay dues at the time of 5 signing, because “changes in intervening law – even 6 constitutional law – do not invalidate a contract”) (citing Brady 7 v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). Because this case is 8 about voluntary members, the union defendants have not violated 9 plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Accordingly, defendants do 10 not need to show a Janus waiver to enforce the agreement. 11 What is left is an attempt by plaintiffs not to be 12 bound by valid contracts. This court finds no constitutional 13 objection to the performance of the membership agreements. Even 14 if there were one, “the First Amendment does not confer . . . a 15 constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise 16 be enforced under state law.” Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 17 U.S. 663, 672 (1991); see also Fisk v. Inslee, 759 F. App’x 632, 18 633 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the First Amendment does not 19 preclude the enforcement of plaintiffs’ voluntary union 20 membership contracts); Belgau, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1009. The 21 court therefore holds that the union defendants were entitled to 22 enforce the membership agreements. 23 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that union defendants’ Motion 24 for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 89) be, and the same hereby is, 25 GRANTED. 26 IT IS ALSO ORDERED that state defendants’ Motion for 27 Summary Judgment (Docket No. 91) be, and the same hereby is, 28 GRANTED. 1 As all claims have now been dismissed, the Clerk of 2 Court shall enter final judgment in favor of all defendants. 3 Dated: December 19, 2019 orhbteomn 7h. (hi. ‘ WILLIAM B. SHUBB 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19