Hernandez Perez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 9, 2025
• Docket: 24-4896
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VIRGINIA HERNANDEZ PEREZ, No. 24-4896 Agency No. Petitioner, A202-017-130 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 7, 2025** Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: BENNETT, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Virginia Hernandez-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for cancellation of removal

and denying her motion to remand. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). and we deny the petition.

1. To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an applicant must establish

that “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a

qualifying relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We review the agency’s hardship

determination for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996,

1005 (9th Cir. 2025). Under the substantial evidence standard, “the administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 1002 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with and incorporates specific

findings of the IJ while adding its own reasoning, we review both decisions.”

Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Hernandez-

Perez’s removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

for her four minor daughters. To constitute exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship, the hardship must be “out of the ordinary and exceedingly uncommon,”

Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006, and it must be “‘substantially different from,

or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation’ of a

‘close family member,’” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 222 (2024) (brackets

omitted) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001)).

The agency found that (1) Hernandez-Perez’s children would stay in the United

2 24-4896 States under the care of their father and grandparents; (2) the father and

grandparents were employed and could financially support the children; and (3) the

grandparents, both lawful permanent residents, could take the children to visit their

mother in Mexico. Although Hernandez-Perez’s six-year-old daughter, Dalila, was

diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and struggled with

communication and learning, the agency found that Dalila would remain in the

United States, covered by state health insurance, and would “continue to have

access to treatment and any medication that she may need.” These facts do not

compel a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Hernandez-

Perez’s sparse testimony about the impact of her own anxiety and her argument

that she would be unable to immigrate back to the United States for at least ten

years do not rebut the presumption that “the BIA thoroughly considers all relevant

evidence in the record.” Szonyi v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 2019).

2. We review the BIA’s denial of the motion to remand for abuse of

discretion. Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023). “The

BIA abuses its discretion when it ‘act[s] arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to

law.’” Id. (alteration in original). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying

Hernandez-Perez’s motion to remand after determining that she failed to establish

prima facie eligibility for relief. Prima face eligibility for cancellation of removal

requires “a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have

3 24-4896 been satisfied.” Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2023)

(quoting In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1308 (BIA 2000)). Although

Hernandez-Perez submitted new evidence of Dalila’s diagnosis with posttraumatic

stress disorder and social communication disorder after the hearing, the BIA

concluded that this evidence did not alter the hardship determination given the IJ’s

findings that Dalila would continue to have access to medical resources and the

family support network in the United States. The BIA did not abuse its discretion

in so concluding. The IJ already heard testimony about Dalila’s underlying

symptoms, and the formal diagnosis is not “‘qualitatively different’ from the

evidence presented at the previous hearing” to warrant remand. Najmabadi v.

Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d

942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004)).

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-4896