Hernandez-Lopez v. Bondi

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICOLAS HERNANDEZ-LOPEZ, No. 21-249 Agency No. Petitioner, A206-899-456 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 22, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: CLIFTON, OWENS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Nicolas Hernandez-Lopez is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He petitions

for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order that dismissed an

appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review the BIA’s order and any parts of the IJ’s decision adopted by the

BIA. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1039–41 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). We

review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence.

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). Under the

deferential substantial evidence standard, the petitioner must show that the

evidence compels the conclusion that the factual findings are erroneous. Id.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Hernandez-

Lopez was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because he did not

establish that he experienced past persecution or maintained an objectively

reasonable fear of future persecution. See Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d

1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (asylum); see also Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458

F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (withholding of removal). As the agency

acknowledged, even though Hernandez-Lopez was threatened at knifepoint, he was

never physically harmed by gang members. See Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179,

1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[U]nfulfilled threats . . . constitute harassment rather than

persecution.”). Additionally, the agency noted that the threats were not of

immediate harm. Hernandez-Lopez further argues that the agency failed to

account for his age when evaluating the effects of these threats, but the agency did

consider his youth at the time of his mistreatment. Thus, in light of the lack of

2 21-249 physical harm or threat of immediate harm, substantial evidence supports the

agency’s finding that Hernandez-Lopez was not subject to past persecution.

2. The agency’s finding of no objectively reasonable fear of future

persecution is also supported by substantial evidence. The agency noted that the

last time gang members contacted his family was in 2018. Moreover, his family

still safely resides in Guatemala and continues to practice their religion—a fact that

“undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th

1052, 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021). Further, the agency found that, given his age

and ability to gain employment and care for himself, Hernandez-Lopez failed to

demonstrate an inability to relocate within Guatemala to avoid those threatening

him. See Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When

determining whether a fear is ‘well-founded,’ a court may consider evidence that a

person could safely move elsewhere in their home-country.”). Thus, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Hernandez-Lopez is not eligible for

asylum or withholding of removal.

3. Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that

Hernandez-Lopez was ineligible for CAT protection. To be eligible for CAT

protection, Hernandez-Lopez must establish, among other criteria, a clear

probability of torture by or with the acquiescence of a Guatemalan official. 8

C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). The agency found that, for the reasons

3 21-249 underpinning the denial of Hernandez-Lopez’s applications for asylum and

withholding of removal, Hernandez-Lopez failed to demonstrate an adequate

likelihood that Hernandez-Lopez would be tortured in Guatemala. Moreover, the

agency found that Hernandez-Lopez did not establish that the Guatemalan

government would acquiesce to gang members torturing him. The IJ pointed to

evidence in the country conditions reports demonstrating active steps by the

Guatemalan government to combat government corruption and gang violence. See

Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[A]

government does not ‘acquiesce’ to torture where the government actively, albeit

not entirely successfully, combats the illegal activities.”). Thus, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Hernandez-Lopez is ineligible for

CAT protection.

PETITION DENIED.

4 21-249