Hernandez-Hernandez De Guzman v. Bondi

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SINTIA MURIEL HERNANDEZ- No. 23-1464 HERNANDEZ DE GUZMAN, Agency No. A201-688-834 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 3, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: MILLER, LEE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Sintia Muriel Hernandez-Hernandez de Guzman, a native and citizen of

Guatemala, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision

dismissing her appeal of an immigration judge’s order denying her applications for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and must

uphold the findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021) (quoting

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal. To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must show

a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. 8

U.S.C. § 1158; see Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2003). To

do so, she “must show that she has suffered from past persecution (which then

gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution) or that she has a ‘good

reason to fear future persecution by adducing credible, direct, and specific

evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of [future]

persecution.’” Id. at 1016 (quoting Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159

(9th Cir. 1999)).

Hernandez-Hernandez de Guzman made no arguments about past

persecution before the Board, so we decline to consider that issue. See Umana-

Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

2 23-1464 Hernandez-Hernandez de Guzman has not established a well-founded fear of

future persecution. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that her

subjective fear that her husband will take away her child is not objectively

reasonable. See Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016 (explaining that a well-founded fear of

persecution must be “both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable”)

(citation omitted). Although Hernandez-Hernandez de Guzman’s husband once

threatened to take away their daughter, he has not harmed Hernandez-Hernandez

de Guzman or their daughter, he has complied with a restraining order, and he has

not contacted her since she left Guatemala with their daughter in 2018. For the

same reasons, substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of her claim

for withholding of removal. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1230

(9th Cir. 2016).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. The

record does not compel the conclusion that Hernandez-Hernandez de Guzman will

be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the Guatemalan government if

removed. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014).

Given that the Guatemalan authorities issued a restraining order when Hernandez-

Hernandez de Guzman reported her argument with her husband, a reasonable

adjudicator would not be compelled to find that Guatemala would acquiesce in any

torture. See Ming Dai, 593 U.S. at 365.

3 23-1464 The temporary stay of removal will remain in place until the issuance of the

mandate, and the motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.

4 23-1464