Hermida v. Gestera

23 P.R. 92
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 28, 1915
DocketNo. 1297
StatusPublished

This text of 23 P.R. 92 (Hermida v. Gestera) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hermida v. Gestera, 23 P.R. 92 (prsupreme 1915).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Aldrey

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs in this case alleged before the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, that they were residents of New York; that during the year 1907 they lent various sums of money amounting to $800 to the defendant, Teótimo Gestera, who admitted that he owed the same and agreed to pay it, but lias not done so either in whole or in part although it is due and demand for payment has been made upon him on various occasions since January, 1908. The complaint concludes with the prayer that the defendant be adjudged to pay to the plaintiffs the said sum of $800, with interest from January, 1908, and $250 for attorney fees and costs.

Defendant answered denying the complaint generally and alleging that neither during the year 1907 nor at any other time had the plaintiffs lent him sums of money amounting to $800; that he had not admitted that he owed that amount or agreed to pay the same, and that no demand had ever been made upon him for its payment. As new matter the answer alleged that during his stay in New York the plaintiffs advanced him money on different occasions, but that he repaid the whole amount, which never reached the sum of $800, and is not now indebted to them in any amount.

The case went to trial and the court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, from which the defendant took the present appeal. -

The grounds relied on for a reversal of the judgment are the following errors alleged to have been committed by the lower court:

“1. The admission of depositions of the plaintiffs.
‘ 12. The admission of. defendant’s letter to the plaintiffs.
“3. The admission in evidence of the testimony of witness Ges-tera 'that he had stated on another occasion that he owed the plaintiffs the. sum of $800 and giving it the force of an admission of the debt.
“4. Admitting questions as to the contents of a written instru[95]*95ment before the same had been offered and introduced in evidence and its relevancy and admissibility determined.
‘*5. In finding that the plaintiffs had proved their ease and adjudging that the defendant should pay $800 as principal, with interest from January, 1908, and the costs, disbursements, and attorney fees.”

In support of their action the plaintiffs introduced their own depositions taken in New York; a letter written to them by the defendant; several checks drawn by the plaintiffs to the order of the defendant and endorsed by him and paid by the bank upon which they were drawn, as well as the testimony of the defendant himself.

Various grounds are alleged in support of the contention that the trial court committed the first of the errors assigned, they being repetitions of the objections made at the trial to the reading of the depositions. From the manner in which the bill of exceptions and statement of the case are drawn up we do not know whether the depositions were or were not admitted in evidence when the defendant objected to their being read, but in any event it appears that he raised the objections before they were read at the trial, the object being to prevent their introduction in evidence.

One of the grounds is that before the depositions were offered in evidence and their validity discussed the defendant should have been allowed to examine them in order to formulate his objections regarding their admissibility — that is, as to whether they fulfill the legal requirements or not.

The appellant cites no rule of law in support of his contention. We are of the opinion that it is not necessary to show the depositions to the adverse party before offering them in evidence, because the proper time for the adverse party to examine them and raise his objections to their admission in evidence is when they are offered by the other party.

But there is no doubt that the defendant examined them and had an opportunity to object to their admission because he made several objections which the court overruled. Said ■objections consisted in that neither the commission issued [96]*96to the commissioner nor the forwarding of the depositions to the court conformed to the provisions of section 140 of the Law of Evidence, because the commission does not state that the depositions should he certified to by the commissioner and returned to the secretary of the court under sealed cover, nor were they returned in such manner.

The depositions were certified to by the commissioner because it is stated at the foot thereof that they were read to the witnesses before being signed by them, which is sufficient according to the holding in the case of Williams v. Chadbourne, 6 Cal. 559.

The depositions were mailed to the secretary of the court in a closed envelope, and although the appellant contends that the envelope should have borne the seal of the commissioner, this would not be a ground for rejecting the depositions when the commissioner certifies to their identity. It would be a mere irregularity in the absence of any suspicion that the depositions had been tampered with. Chadwick v. Chadwick, 59 Mich. 87, 26 N. W. 288; 13 Cyc. 959.

The following objections were raised: (a) The depositions do not show that they were written by the commissioner or by another person at his request; (6) that it is not shown who wrote them; (c) it is not shown whether they were taken in the presence of the commissioner; (d) that the commissioner does not certify to them for the court; (e) that it does not appear upon their face that they were taken separately, but that the contrary appears. We will say that although the depositions admitted in this case do not state by whom they were written, notwithstanding that omission the court admitted them at its discretion and in the absence of proof to the contrary it must be taken for granted that the fact that the commissioner did not state that he authorized another person to write them is due to the fact that he wrote them himself. The mere fact that the handwriting in the depositions is not like that of the commissioner, without any evidence to impugn the regularity of his conduct, [97]*97is insufficient to exclude the same. State v. Kimball, 50 Me. 409; Piper v. White, 56 Pa. St. Rep. 90.

The same rule is applicable to the fact, that the deposir lions failed to state that they were taken before the commissioner, especially' in the present case in which he certified that the witnesses appeared before him, that he administered oaths to them, that he read their testimony to them, .-and that they ratified the same., '

The forwarding of the depositions to the secretary of the court is sufficient to show that the commissioner took, them for the court, especially as it appears therefrom that he acted as its commissioner.

As to the last objection that it does not appear that the depositions were taken separately because they are similar, while it is more regular to take depositions separately when there are two or more witnesses, nevertheless it is not inr-proper to permit one witness to adopt the answers of the other. 13 Cyc. 937, and cases there cited.

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Related

State v. Kimball
50 Me. 409 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1861)
Williams v. Chadbourne
6 Cal. 559 (California Supreme Court, 1856)
Chadwick v. Chadwick
26 N.W. 288 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1886)

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Bluebook (online)
23 P.R. 92, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hermida-v-gestera-prsupreme-1915.