Hermann v. Yater

631 N.E.2d 511, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 312, 1994 WL 97337
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 29, 1994
Docket30A04-9311-CV-408
StatusPublished
Cited by46 cases

This text of 631 N.E.2d 511 (Hermann v. Yater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hermann v. Yater, 631 N.E.2d 511, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 312, 1994 WL 97337 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-Appellants E. Conn Hermann and Connie M. Hermann (collectively the Hermanns) appeal from an order of the Hancock Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants-Appellees David G. Yater and Pattee L. Yater (collectively the Yaters). We affirm.

ISSUE

We re-state the issue as follows: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary *513 judgment against the Hermanns on the issues of actual fraud and constructive fraud.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Yaters are owners and developers of the Hickory Hills Subdivision in Greenfield, Indiana. On or about June 21, 1990, the Hermanns entered into a contract with the Yaters to purchase an unimproved parcel of real estate in the subdivision. 1 At the time of closing the Hermanns were not ready to begin building.

Approximately two years after the closing, the Hermanns applied to the Hancock County Board of Health for a building permit, including a septic permit. Their application was denied upon a determination that based on the soil borings that had been done, the lot was not suitable for a septic system due to an unacceptable substance in the soil. Essentially, the Hermanns had plans drawn up for their new home, closed on the sale of their old home, and then discovered that their lot was not suitable for a septic system and therefore that they could not build on it.

The Hermanns initiated this action by bringing suit against the Yaters alleging constructive fraud in Count I and actual fraud in Count II. The essence of the Hermanns complaint is that they were denied a septic permit for the property after representations were made to them by the Yaters, through their agent, that a home could be built and a septic system maintained on the land. The Yaters filed a motion for summary judgment. 2 After hearing the testimony of one witness and the argument of counsel, the trial court granted the motion by written order. The Hermanns appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is an appropriate disposition if the "designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law. T.R. 56(C); Fawley v. Martin's Supermarkets, Inc. (1993), Ind.App., 618 N.E.2d 10, 12, trans. denied.

Relying on specifically designated evidence, the moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing: (1) that there are no genuine issues of material fact; and (2) that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Babinchak v. Town of Chesterton (1992), Ind.App., 598 N.E.2d 1099, 1101, reh'g denied. Only when these two requirements are met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to set forth specifically designated facts showing the existence of a genuine issue. T.R. 56(E); Id. at 1101.

On appeal we are bound by the same standard as the trial court and we must consider only those matters which were designated at the summary judgment stage. T.R. 56(C);, Campbell v. Criterion Group (1993), Ind.App., 613 N.E.2d 423, 428, on reh'g (1993), Ind.App., 621 N.E.2d 342. On appeal however, the party that lost in the trial court has the burden to persuade the appellate tribunal that the trial court erred. Id. Summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the evidentiary matter designated to the trial court. T.R. 56(C); Fawley, 618 N.E.2d at 12. Our role is to closely scrutinize the trial court's determination in order to assure that the Hermanns were not improperly denied their day in court. Campbell, 613 N.E.2d at 428.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The issue before the trial court and the issue before us is whether the allegations contained in the Hermanus' complaint present any genuine issues of material fact. The complaint contained two counts: Count I alleging constructive fraud and Count II alleg *514 ing actual fraud. The elements of constructive fraud are as follows:

(1) a duty owing by the party to be charged to the complaining party due to their relationship, (2) violation of that duty by the making of deceptive material misrepresentations of past or existing facts or remaining silent when a duty to speak exists, (8) reliance thereon by the complaining party, (4) injury to the complaining party as a proximate result thereof, and (5) the gaining of an advantage by the party to be charged at the expense of the complaining party.

Block v. Lake Mortgage Co., Inc. (1992), Ind.App., 601 N.E.2d 449, 451, reh'g denied (quoting Pughs' IGA v. Super Food Services, Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 1194, 1197, reh'g denied, trans. denied ). The elements of actual fraud are as follows:

(1) a material misrepresentation of past or existing fact by the party to be charged which (2) was false, (8) was made with knowledge or in reckless ignorance of the falsity (4) was relied upon by the complaining party, and (5) proximately caused the complaining party injury.

Id.

In the present case, the parties designated to the trial court the portions of the record upon which they relied in support of and in opposition to summary judgment. The trial court relied on the following designated materials in determining that the Yaters were entitled to judgment as a matter of law: the deposition of Mr. Hermann, the deposition of Mrs. Hermann, the affidavit of Dr. David Yater, the affidavit of Rick Roudebush, the testimony of Roger Wilson, the affidavit of Mr. Hermann, the affidavit of Amy Klene and the arguments of counsel. We look to these designated portions of the record in determining whether to affirm or reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

To obtain summary judgment as to the constructive fraud or fraud claim, the Yaters need only show that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the Her-manng' claim. Hardy v. South Bend Sash & Door Co. (1992), Ind.App., 603 N.E.2d 895, 901, reh'g denied, trans. denied (citing Sanders v. Townsend (1987), Ind.App., 509 N.E.2d 860, 862, reh'g denied, trans. denied, Aff'd in part, Vacated in part, Sanders v. Townsend (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 355).

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Bluebook (online)
631 N.E.2d 511, 1994 Ind. App. LEXIS 312, 1994 WL 97337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hermann-v-yater-indctapp-1994.