Hermann v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 31, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-02557
StatusUnknown

This text of Hermann v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company (Hermann v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hermann v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company, (N.D. Tex. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION PAUL HERMANN, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:22-cv-2557-L § HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE § COMPANY d/b/a HEWLETT- § PACKARD FINANCIAL SERVICES § COMPANY, § § Defendant. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company d/b/a Hewlett-Packard Financial Services Company (“HPE”) has filed a Motion for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiffs Second Amended Notice of Oral Deposition of Defendants Corporate Representative. See Dkt. No. 54 (the “MPO”). HPE seeks an order preventing Plaintiff Paul Hermann from questioning HPE on all 51 topics in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Defendant Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). (The Second Amended Notice, served after the parties conferred regarding Hermann’s original topics, includes Topics 1-35 and 37-52 but omits a Topic 36.) HPE contends that Hermann is seeking to obtain discovery far beyond the proportional confines of this action and to take a duplicative deposition of his former manager Shannon Walker in an attempt to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1)’s 7-hour limit on a witness’s deposition testimony. HPE requests, in the alternative, that the Court limit the scope of the topics to questions not previously asked of Walker, limit the scope of the topics to the extent they are overly broad or duplicative of other discovery, or limit the timing and/or

geographic location of any corporate deposition to prevent further harassment. Hermann filed a response, see Dkt. Nos. 74 & 75, and HPE filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 83. To the extent and for the reasons explained below, the Court now grants in part and denies in part HPE’s MPO [Dkt. No. 54]. Legal Standards The Court has laid out the standards that govern a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(c) motion for protective order, and the Court incorporates and will apply – but will not repeat – those standards here. See McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 322 F.R.D. 235, 242-45 (N.D. Tex. 2016). Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1) and 30(b)(6), “[a] party who wants to depose a person by oral questions must give reasonable written notice to every other party,” and, “[i]n its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the

deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1), 30(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has explained in this context of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) deposition of a corporate representative that “Rule 30(b)(6) is designed to avoid the possibility that several officers and managing agents might be deposed in turn, with each disclaiming personal knowledge of facts that are clearly known to persons within the organization and thus to the organization itself.” Brazos River Auth. v. GE Ionics, Inc., 469 F.3d

416, 432-33 (5th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). “Therefore, the deponent must make a conscientious good-faith endeavor to designate the persons having knowledge of the matters sought by [the party noticing the deposition] and to prepare those persons in order that they can answer fully, completely, unevasively, the questions posed ... as to the relevant subject matters.” Id. at 433 (cleaned up). And “[t]he duty to present and prepare a Rule 30(b)(6) designee goes beyond

matters personally known to that designee or to matters in which that designee was personally involved. The deponent must prepare the designee to the extent matters are reasonably available, whether from documents, past employees, or other sources.” Id. (cleaned up). “For Rule 30(b)(6) to effectively function, the requesting party must take care to designate, with painstaking specificity, the particular subject areas that are

intended to be questioned, and that are relevant to the issues in dispute.” Dennis v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-3148-G-BN, 2017 WL 4778708, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2017) (cleaned up). And, so, “Rule 30(b)(6) requires that a party seeking to depose an organization ‘must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6)). “Otherwise, an overly broad Rule 30(b)(6) notice may subject the noticed party to an impossible task. If the noticed organization cannot identify the outer limits of the areas of inquiry noticed, compliant designation is not feasible.” Id. (cleaned up).

And, as recently amended, Rule 30(b)(6) requires that, “[b]efore or promptly after the notice or subpoena is served, the serving party and the organization must confer in good faith about the matters for examination.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). Analysis I. HPE’s general arguments to preclude or limit the deposition HPE’s suggesting that not one of the Second Amended Notice’s 51 Rule 30(b)(6) topics passes muster may be, at first blush, surprising.

But HPE maintains that it “will easily meet its burden to establish legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Hermann’s termination” and that Hermann understands that, too, and, so, is pressing forward in this litigation only “to pursue burdensome, duplicative, disproportionate, and harassing discovery of HPE to try to drum-up anything to support a finding of pretext.” HPE explains that, in seeking extensive Rule 30(b)(6) testimony from a corporate representative who Hermann

knows will be Walker on many of the topics, Hermann is pursuing a “tactic [that] is harassing and disproportionate to the needs of this single-plaintiff age discrimination case, particularly here where the strategy is clearly geared toward the improper second-guessing of the business decisions of Walker.” HPE then argues that, because “Hermann already took a full 7-hour deposition of Walker on September 11, 2024, and questioned him extensively regarding Hermann’s performance (including relative to the other FAMs on his team), the PIP, the Performance Warning, and Walker’s decision to terminate Hermann,” “Hermann should be precluded from deposing Walker on the exact same topics again at a Rule

30(b)(6) deposition.” To start, this latter argument fails to persuade. As the cases that HPE cites note, courts have “recognized a second deposition is not improper in the [] situation in which a deposition was first taken of a witness in an individual capacity and then a second deposition was sought of a witness in a representative capacity.” Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. UTEX Commc’ns Corp., No. A-07-CV- 435 RP, 2009 WL 8541000, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing cases).

And, because “deposition testimony under Rule 30(b)(6) is distinct from deposition testimony of other witnesses,” “discovery under Rule 30(b)(6) is not duplicative or cumulative simply because individual deponents have testified about the topics noticed in the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice.” MC Trilogy Tex., LLC v. City of Heath, Tex., No. 3:22-cv-2154-D, 2024 WL 1641233, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2024). On the Second Amended Notice, Walker is not the noticed deponent for this

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) deposition; HPE is. And, so, the deposition is subject to a separate

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