Herman v. Associated Elec. Co-Op., Inc.

994 F. Supp. 1147, 1998 WL 67316
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedFebruary 18, 1998
Docket2:97CV39-DJS
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 994 F. Supp. 1147 (Herman v. Associated Elec. Co-Op., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Herman v. Associated Elec. Co-Op., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1147, 1998 WL 67316 (E.D. Mo. 1998).

Opinion

994 F.Supp. 1147 (1998)

Alexis M. HERMAN, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiff,
v.
ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Defendant.

No. 2:97CV39-DJS.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Northern Division.

February 18, 1998.

*1148 Margaret A. Miller, Edward Falkowski, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Eugene E. Andereck, Rodric A. Widger, Andereck & Evans, Springfield, MO, for Defendant.

*1149 ORDER

The Secretary of Labor brings the instant action pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 818(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("Mine Act") seeking an injunction forbidding defendant from denying the Secretary's representatives entrance to and inspection of defendant's facility known as Thomas Hill Energy Center. Section 813 of Title 30 authorizes the Secretary to make warrantless inspections of "coal or other mines" for certain enumerated purposes. See also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981). The Secretary's complaint alleges that on June 23, 1997, defendant unlawfully denied Federal Mine Inspector Larry Maloney entrance to the Thomas Hill Energy Center preparation plant. In its answer and counterclaim, defendant denies that the power production facilities at the Thomas Hill Energy Center constitute a "mine" or perform the "work of preparing coal" so as to be subject to the Mine Act, and seeks a declaratory judgment consonant with its view. The parties have agreed to submit plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction to the Court on briefs and stipulated facts. Also before the Court is the Secretary's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Because the motion to dismiss the counterclaim raises issues concerning the Court's jurisdiction generally, the Court will first address that motion. The Secretary seeks dismissal of the counterclaim on the ground that the Mine Act allows the Secretary to seek relief in the district courts, see 30 U.S.C. § 818(a), but requires an employer to seek relief from the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, subject to review by a Court of Appeals, see §§ 815 and 816. The Supreme Court has upheld what appears to be the plain reading of this statutory scheme:

The Act expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction in only two provisions, §§ 818(a) and 820(j), which respectively empower the Secretary to enjoin habitual violations of health and safety standards and to coerce payment of civil penalties. Mine operators enjoy no corresponding right but are to complain to the Commission and then to the court of appeals. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 209, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994) (emphasis in original). The Court therefore readily concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over defendant's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment, which will be dismissed.

In any event, the same substantive issue is presented by both the complaint and the counterclaim. The Secretary indicates in her memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss that defendant has initiated administrative review of the validity of the citation issued to defendant for its refusal to permit MSHA inspection. An administrative law judge therefore has the same issue pending before him as is raised by the Secretary's complaint in this Court. Defendant's opposition to the motion to dismiss suggests that this Court should altogether defer to the administrative review pursuant to the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.

The Court concludes that no such deferral is necessary or warranted in this case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties... "Primary jurisdiction" ... applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.

United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956). The purposes to be served by the rule are decisional uniformity and maximizing the benefit of the specialized expertise of regulatory agencies. Id. 352 U.S. at 64. "In every case the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation." Id.

*1150 As further discussed below, the issue before the Court requires a legal determination to be made on stipulated facts, and is in the Court's view a determination largely controlled by precedent of both the Commission and Courts of Appeals. In these circumstances, the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court neither threatens the uniformity of decisions on the subject, nor treads on areas of particular administrative expertise. Furthermore, as noted above, the Court's jurisdiction over the Secretary's complaint for injunctive relief is expressly provided for in the regulatory scheme: "[t]he judge-made doctrine of primary jurisdiction comes into play when a court and an administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction over the same matter, and no statutory provision co-ordinates the work of the court and of the agency." Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. Brinke, 475 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.1973). Upon careful consideration, then, the Court deems this matter inappropriate for application of the primary jurisdiction principle.

In connection with the preliminary injunction motion, the parties have stipulated to the following facts which the Court deems relevant to its determination.

Stipulated Facts

1. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("AECI") was incorporated in 1961 for the primary propose of providing a reliable supply of electric power to its six transmission cooperative owners.

2. AECI owns, operates and maintains three electric power generating units or plants (collectively referred to as "the power plant") at a facility known as the Thomas Hill Energy Center, near the town of Clifton Hill, in Randolph County, Missouri. The units were placed in service in 1966, 1969, and 1982.

3. Before 1993, the three electric generating units were fueled with coal extracted and prepared at a surface mine adjacent to the power plant.

4. In January, 1994, AECI began to receive sub-bituminous coal from two mines located in the Powder River Basin in the State of Wyoming. These mines are the Rochelle Mine (MSHA Mine Identification No.

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