Heriberto Estupinan Lopez v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 14, 2004
• Docket: 12-03-00018-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 12-03-00018-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

HERIBERTO ESTUPINAN LOPEZ,

§ APPEAL FROM THE 367TH

APPELLANT

V.

§ JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

§ DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Heriberto Estupinan Lopez ("Appellant") appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty-two years. Appellant raises three issues on appeal. We affirm.

Background On April 14, 2002, the complainant, D.T., contacted police and claimed that she had been sexually assaulted in her home. Lewisville police officer Jesus Flores ("Flores") was dispatched to the scene and obtained a written description made by D.T. of her attacker. Flores and Officer Richard Anders ("Anders") reviewed the description with other residents, and thereafter, sought to contact Appellant at his residence. ⁽¹⁾ After contacting Officer Eddie Barrett ("Barrett"), who interviewed D.T. at the hospital, Flores, Anders, and Barrett went to Appellant's residence and knocked on the door. Although at first there was no answer, Appellant later answered the door. Flores asked Appellant if the officers could enter. Appellant permitted the officers to enter, motioning them inside.

Once inside, the officers sought to question Appellant. ⁽²⁾ The officers first asked Appellant if he had been in his residence, to which Appellant responded that he had been in his home drinking with his four roommates, none of whom were present at the time the officers questioned Appellant. The officers next asked Appellant if he had any problems with any girls in the mobile home community, to which Appellant responded that he did not have any such problems.

The officers asked Appellant for permission to take a Polaroid picture of him for use in a photo lineup. Appellant did not object to their taking his picture. Appellant subsequently gave the officers oral and written consent to search the premises. During the search, Flores discovered a knife in the kitchen, which Appellant informed the officers he carried with him for protection.

Subsequently, Barrett asked Appellant if he was sure that he did not have any problems with a girl in the community. Flores testified that, in response to Barrett's question, Appellant motioned to Flores to step outside the residence with him, which Flores did. Once they were outside, Appellant explained to Flores that he was having an affair with a married woman who lived in the mobile home park. Appellant elaborated that he had gone to the woman's residence that morning and had had intercourse with her. Afterwards, Appellant continued, the woman demanded money from Appellant and told him that if he did not comply, she would "scream rape and tell her husband what was going on." Appellant explained to Flores that he tried to leave the woman's house, but she began to shove him. As the woman was shoving him, Appellant explained, the knife in Appellant's pocket cut the woman through his pants. ⁽³⁾

After Appellant completed his explanation to Flores, the officers asked Appellant if he would follow them in his own car to the police department to give a statement. Appellant told the officers that he had no means of transportation, and preferred that the officers give him a ride to the police department. Flores testified that he told Appellant, "[W]ell, you're not under arrest, we'll be happy to give you a ride to the police department. ⁽⁴⁾ Appellant was not handcuffed at any time.

Once at the police department, the officers provided Appellant with a voluntary statement form, which contained a Spanish translation of Appellant's Miranda ⁽⁵⁾ warnings. Flores testified that he orally reviewed the written Miranda warnings with Appellant and that Appellant indicated to Flores that he understood the warnings. Flores testified that Appellant gave the written statement freely and voluntarily. Appellant then made a written statement to police as to what had transpired that day. After Flores and Appellant reviewed Appellant's written statement, and Appellant was provided the opportunity to make any changes he deemed necessary, Barrett and Flores reviewed Appellant's statement, and thereafter, sought to further converse with Appellant about some perceived inaccuracies in his written statement. During the discussion, Barrett told Appellant that it was time to tell the truth. Appellant responded that he had "screwed up," and sought to change his written statement, which he was permitted to do on a new form.

In Appellant's second written statement, which also contained Miranda warnings, ⁽⁶⁾ Appellant stated that he had been out of his house drinking heavily, and had become intoxicated. Noticing that D.T.'s husband was leaving, Appellant entered D.T.'s home and attempted to have intercourse with her. When D.T. resisted, Appellant threatened her at knife point and proceeded to have intercourse with her. ⁽⁷⁾

Appellant was subsequently charged with aggravated sexual assault. During the ensuing jury trial, a hearing was conducted on Appellant's motion to suppress the statements he made to police. The trial court overruled Appellant's motion to suppress. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged and recommended punishment at imprisonment for twenty-two years and a fine of ten thousand dollars. The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury's recommendation, and this appeal followed.

Motion to Suppress

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argues that the statements Appellant gave in his home were a product of custodial interrogation and that the officers (1) failed to comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, section 3, inasmuch as Appellant's oral statements were not electronically recorded, and (2) failed to issue Appellant his Miranda warnings.

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. See Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Curry v. State, 965 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Hernandez v. State, 957 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, while conducting a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts. See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. The trial court is the exclusive finder of fact in a motion to suppress hearing, and as such, it may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of any witness's testimony. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Furthermore, when, as in the instant case, "the trial court fails to file findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record." State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). If the trial judge's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained. Id. at 856.

Neither the requirements of Article 38.22, section 3, nor the warnings required by Miranda are applicable absent custodial interrogation. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. Questions of whether an individual has been subjected to "custodial interrogation" under article 38.22 are to be construed consistently with that term's meaning under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Wicker v. State, 740 S.W.2d 779, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Anderson v. State, 787 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no pet.). Under the Fifth Amendment, a person is in custody when his freedom of action has been deprived in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. This determination is to be made from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant's position. See Anderson, 787 S.W.2d at 227 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)). The reasonable person standard presupposes an innocent person. See Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has outlined at least four general situations which may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, or (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. Concerning the first, second, and third situations, the restriction upon freedom of movement must amount to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention. Id. Concerning the fourth situation, the officers' knowledge of probable cause must be manifested to the suspect. Id. Such manifestation could occur if information substantiating probable cause is related by the officers to the suspect or by the suspect to the officers. Id. The fourth scenario does not automatically establish custody. Id. Rather, custody is established if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest. Id.

Here, based on our review of the record, and considering it in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we conclude that the restrictions placed upon Appellant's freedom of movement did not amount to the degree associated with an arrest. At most, Appellant was under investigative detention when the officers questioned him at his home, which does not constitute custodial interrogation. See Anderson, 787 S.W.2d at 228.

The record reflects that Appellant motioned to Flores go outside on the porch to speak with Appellant, and that Flores complied. Further, the officers asked Appellant to follow them in his own car to the police department to give a statement. After Appellant told the officers that he had no means of transportation, and preferred that the officers give him a ride to the police department, Flores told Appellant, "[W]ell, you're not under arrest, we'll be happy to give you a ride to the police department." Flores explained that if someone was in custody, he would not be given the opportunity to drive his own car to give a statement. Finally, Appellant was not handcuffed at any time. We hold that the statements made by Appellant at his home were not the product of custodial interrogation.

Appellant also argues that subsequent statements, both oral and written, he made at the police station were tainted by the illegality of the interrogation that took place at Appellant's home. Essentially, Appellant argues that a "domino effect" of illegality tainted all statements Appellant made later that day. Appellant further argues that the oral statements he made at the police station violated Article 38.22, section 3 as they were not electronically recorded. First, since we have concluded that no custodial interrogation occurred at Appellant's home, there is no illegality by which Appellant's subsequent statements could have become tainted. Second, Appellant has the burden to prove that he was in custody. See Brown v. State, 725 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987), judgm't vacated on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In his brief, Appellant's argument that he was in custody focuses solely on the officers' investigation at Appellant's home. No argument is made by Appellant that he was in custody when he voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station to give a statement. Thus, by neglecting to argue on appeal whether he was in custody at the police station, Appellant has waived the issue on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). As such, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's first issue is overruled.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second and third issues, Appellant argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance during the punishment stage of trial in that he failed to object to certain statements made by the prosecuting attorney during jury argument. Specifically, Appellant argues that the following statement by the prosecuting attorney warranted objection by his trial counsel:

[Defense Counsel] is a very good man. And I treasure him. But he mentioned the Bible.[ ⁽⁸⁾] Okay. I'm mentioning the Bible to you. How about the book of Leviticus, chapter 62, verse 25? And please don't get angry with me if you don't follow this; just listen to me. Where God says any man who would force himself on a woman in a field when she cries out for help is deserving of - do you know what the word is? - death. That's the word for a rape. That's the word for aggravated rape. That's the punishment laid out in the Bible for aggravated rape.

And I will tell you another thing, too. That was the punishment for aggravated rape a hundred years ago and 50 years ago, and it's only until now that we get so, oh, we're just so touchy-feely, we're so rehabilitation-oriented, we're so, oh but now we're going to make the punishment lighter and lighter. And you can see our society has certainly not improved.

Appellant further argues that the prosecuting attorney concluded his argument by alluding to the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for aggravated sexual assault, suggesting that "the verdict that should be in this case isn't even on the page."

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-step analysis articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984). The first step requires the appellant to demonstrate that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To satisfy this step, the appellant must identify the acts or omissions of counsel alleged to be ineffective assistance and affirmatively prove that they fell below the professional norm of reasonableness. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The reviewing court will not find ineffectiveness by isolating any portion of trial counsel's representation, but will judge the claim based on the totality of the representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

To satisfy the Strickland standard, the appellant is also required to show prejudice from the deficient performance of his attorney. See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To establish prejudice, an appellant must prove that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In any case considering the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, we begin with the strong presumption that counsel was effective. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). We must presume counsel's actions and decisions were reasonably professional and were motivated by sound trial strategy. See id. Appellant has the burden of rebutting this presumption by presenting evidence illustrating why his trial counsel did what he did. See id. Appellant cannot meet this burden if the record does not affirmatively support the claim. See Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (inadequate record on direct appeal to evaluate whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance); Phetvongkham v. State, 841 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed) (inadequate record to evaluate ineffective assistance claim); see also Beck v. State, 976 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. ref'd) (inadequate record for ineffective assistance claim, citing numerous other cases with inadequate records to support ineffective assistance claim). A record that specifically focuses on the conduct of trial counsel is necessary for a proper evaluation of an ineffectiveness claim. See Kemp v. State, 892 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd).

In the case at hand, the record is silent as to the reasons underlying Appellant's counsel's decision not to object to the jury argument of the prosecuting attorney. As such, Appellant cannot overcome the strong presumption that his counsel performed effectively and, therefore, has not met the first prong of Strickland because the record does not contain evidence concerning Appellant's trial counsel's reasons for choosing the course he did. Thus, we decline to hold that Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective. Appellant's second and third issues are overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant's issues one, two, and three, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

SAM GRIFFITH

Justice

Opinion delivered April 14, 2004.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

1. Officer Aaron Sherwood was also present at the scene.

2. The record reflects that English is not Appellant's native tongue. Flores translated the questions asked to Appellant into Spanish.

3. Flores testified that he never mentioned the subject of rape to Appellant at any time.

4. Flores further testified that if someone was in custody, he would not be given the opportunity to drive his own car to give a statement.

5. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

6. The record reflects that Flores read through the form with Appellant.

7. Flores testified that Appellant stated that he threatened to kill D.T. if she refused to have intercourse with him.

8.

Defense counsel argued, "... remember, we look at the Bible, Jesus fell three times and he got up. The same opportunity that this man and any one of us have to get up and show the people that we can do better ..."