1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Apr 02, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT 10 OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY NO. 2:20-CV-00181-SAB 11 THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE 12 AND AGRI-FOOD, a Canadian 13 governmental authority, 14 Plaintiff, 15 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION 16 VAN WELL NURSERY, INC., a FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 Washington Corporation, MONSON 18 FRUIT COMPANY, INC., a Washington 19 Corporation, GORDON GOODWIN, an 20 individual, and SALLY GOODWIN, an 21 individual, 22 Defendants. 23 24 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 25 That Plaintiff’s State Law and Lanham Act Claims Are Time-Barred, ECF No. 26 432. A hearing was held by video on the motion on March 27, 2025. Plaintiff was 27 represented by Jennifer Bennett, Daniel Short, Michelle Fischer, Cary Sullivan, 28 and John O’Donnell. Defendant Van Well Nursery was represented by Kent Doll. 1 The Goodwin Defendants were represented by Quentin Batjer. Defendant Monson 2 Fruit was represented by Mark Walters. 3 Motion Standard 4 Although Defendants captioned this motion as a Motion for Judgment as a 5 Matter of Law (“JMOL”), their briefing did not set forth any legal standard for the 6 motion. If they had, they may have realized that a JMOL in the case is not 7 authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, it seems Defendants 8 are arguing that the Court should rely on the bench trial proceedings, including 9 stipulated facts, the Court’s own Findings of Fact, and the parties’ Trial Exhibits 10 and Stipulations to establish certain facts to presumably rule in favor of their 11 statute of limitations and laches defenses. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do 12 not provide any authority for the Court to do so. 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 provides once a party has been fully heard on an issue 14 during a jury trial, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law 15 against the non-moving party only if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary 16 basis for a reasonable jury to find on that party for that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) 17 (emphasis added); Ritchie v. United States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 18 2006). As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[d]uring a jury trial, the jury—not the 19 judge—is the trier of fact. Because the district judge lacks the authority to resolve 20 disputed issues of fact under those circumstances, judgment as a matter of law is 21 appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find for a party on that claim.” Id. at 22 1023. This standard simply does not apply to findings made by the Court during a 23 bench trial. 24 It is clear Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 is not the proper standard to address 25 Defendants’ motion because there has not been a jury trial, and Plaintiff was not 26 given an opportunity to be fully heard on the issues that are being presented in this 27 motion, namely Defendant’s statute of limitations and laches defenses. 28 At the hearing, Defendants cited to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Moreover, in 1 presenting their JMOL, Defendants submitted a Statement of Undisputed Material 2 Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56(c)(1)(A). In their response, Plaintiff 3 addressed both the JMOL standard as well as standard for Motions for Summary 4 Judgment and was able to argue its motions applying both standards. As such, the 5 Court will review Defendants’ motion applying the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 standard. 6 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 7 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 8 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless 9 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a 10 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 11 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a 12 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 13 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond 14 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 15 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 16 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving 17 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of 18 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled 19 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a 20 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving 21 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party 22 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact. 23 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). When considering a 24 motion for summary judgment, a court may neither weigh the evidence nor assess 25 credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 26 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 27 Defendants’ Motion 28 1 Defendants ask the Court to find that the statute of limitations cut-off dates 2 are May 18, 2017,1 for the claims for conversion, tortious interference claims and 3 the Lanham Act claims, and May 18, 2016, for the Washington Consumer 4 Protection Act claims.2 If the Court agrees, these claims would be dismissed 5 because Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on May 18, 2020. 6 Defendants assert there is no dispute that at least as early as 2012, Plaintiff 7 knew the following: (1) Defendants Van Well and Goodwins claim to have 8 developed and advertised a new cherry variety they called “Glory;” (2) according 9 to Plaintiff’s internal scientific studies, Glory was genetically the same as Staccato; 10 and (3) Glory was asexually reproduced by Defendants from cuttings taken from 11 what Plaintiff believed to be a Staccato tree sold by Van Well to the Goodwins by 12 mistake. Defendants also assert that in January 2014, PICO sent a cease and desist 13 letter to Van Well, PICO knew as early as August 12, 2014, that Monson was 14 packing Glory fruit grown by others, and in 2016, PICO sent a notification letter to 15 Glory growers. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court should find that 16 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 17 Plaintiff’s Response 18 Plaintiff argues that its claims are timely, or at the minimum, there are 19 genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on this issue.
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1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Apr 02, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 9 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT 10 OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY NO. 2:20-CV-00181-SAB 11 THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE 12 AND AGRI-FOOD, a Canadian 13 governmental authority, 14 Plaintiff, 15 v. ORDER DENYING MOTION 16 VAN WELL NURSERY, INC., a FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 Washington Corporation, MONSON 18 FRUIT COMPANY, INC., a Washington 19 Corporation, GORDON GOODWIN, an 20 individual, and SALLY GOODWIN, an 21 individual, 22 Defendants. 23 24 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 25 That Plaintiff’s State Law and Lanham Act Claims Are Time-Barred, ECF No. 26 432. A hearing was held by video on the motion on March 27, 2025. Plaintiff was 27 represented by Jennifer Bennett, Daniel Short, Michelle Fischer, Cary Sullivan, 28 and John O’Donnell. Defendant Van Well Nursery was represented by Kent Doll. 1 The Goodwin Defendants were represented by Quentin Batjer. Defendant Monson 2 Fruit was represented by Mark Walters. 3 Motion Standard 4 Although Defendants captioned this motion as a Motion for Judgment as a 5 Matter of Law (“JMOL”), their briefing did not set forth any legal standard for the 6 motion. If they had, they may have realized that a JMOL in the case is not 7 authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, it seems Defendants 8 are arguing that the Court should rely on the bench trial proceedings, including 9 stipulated facts, the Court’s own Findings of Fact, and the parties’ Trial Exhibits 10 and Stipulations to establish certain facts to presumably rule in favor of their 11 statute of limitations and laches defenses. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do 12 not provide any authority for the Court to do so. 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 provides once a party has been fully heard on an issue 14 during a jury trial, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law 15 against the non-moving party only if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary 16 basis for a reasonable jury to find on that party for that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) 17 (emphasis added); Ritchie v. United States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 18 2006). As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[d]uring a jury trial, the jury—not the 19 judge—is the trier of fact. Because the district judge lacks the authority to resolve 20 disputed issues of fact under those circumstances, judgment as a matter of law is 21 appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find for a party on that claim.” Id. at 22 1023. This standard simply does not apply to findings made by the Court during a 23 bench trial. 24 It is clear Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 is not the proper standard to address 25 Defendants’ motion because there has not been a jury trial, and Plaintiff was not 26 given an opportunity to be fully heard on the issues that are being presented in this 27 motion, namely Defendant’s statute of limitations and laches defenses. 28 At the hearing, Defendants cited to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Moreover, in 1 presenting their JMOL, Defendants submitted a Statement of Undisputed Material 2 Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56(c)(1)(A). In their response, Plaintiff 3 addressed both the JMOL standard as well as standard for Motions for Summary 4 Judgment and was able to argue its motions applying both standards. As such, the 5 Court will review Defendants’ motion applying the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 standard. 6 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 7 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 8 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless 9 there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a 10 verdict in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 11 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a 12 genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 13 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond 14 the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 15 trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 16 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving 17 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of 18 Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled 19 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a 20 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving 21 party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party 22 cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact. 23 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). When considering a 24 motion for summary judgment, a court may neither weigh the evidence nor assess 25 credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 26 justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 27 Defendants’ Motion 28 1 Defendants ask the Court to find that the statute of limitations cut-off dates 2 are May 18, 2017,1 for the claims for conversion, tortious interference claims and 3 the Lanham Act claims, and May 18, 2016, for the Washington Consumer 4 Protection Act claims.2 If the Court agrees, these claims would be dismissed 5 because Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on May 18, 2020. 6 Defendants assert there is no dispute that at least as early as 2012, Plaintiff 7 knew the following: (1) Defendants Van Well and Goodwins claim to have 8 developed and advertised a new cherry variety they called “Glory;” (2) according 9 to Plaintiff’s internal scientific studies, Glory was genetically the same as Staccato; 10 and (3) Glory was asexually reproduced by Defendants from cuttings taken from 11 what Plaintiff believed to be a Staccato tree sold by Van Well to the Goodwins by 12 mistake. Defendants also assert that in January 2014, PICO sent a cease and desist 13 letter to Van Well, PICO knew as early as August 12, 2014, that Monson was 14 packing Glory fruit grown by others, and in 2016, PICO sent a notification letter to 15 Glory growers. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court should find that 16 Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 17 Plaintiff’s Response 18 Plaintiff argues that its claims are timely, or at the minimum, there are 19 genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on this issue. It 20 asserts that (1) equitable estoppel precludes Defendants’ limitation defense; (2) 21 Defendants are not entitled to rely on laches, and (3) Defendants’ JMOL motion is 22 improper. 23
24 1 The parties agree that a three-year statute of limitation applies to Plaintiff’s 25 claims of conversion and tortious interference claims and the claims under the 26 Lanham Act. 27 2 The parties agree that a four-year statute of limitation applies to the Washington 28 Consumer Protection Act claim. 1 Legal Framework 2 1. State Law Claims 3 A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state, 4 including the state’s statute of limitations. Nevada Power Co. v. Monsanto Co., 5 955 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1992) (“[F]ederal courts exercising diversity 6 jurisdiction are to use state statutes of limitation.”). Federal courts must abide by a 7 state’s tolling rules, which are integrally related to statutes of limitations. Albano v. 8 Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, 634 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2011). 9 Under Washington law, the general rule is that a cause of action accrues and 10 the statute of limitations begins to run when a party has the right to apply to a court 11 for relief. Hudson v. Condon, 101 Wash.App. 866, 874 (2000). This right to apply 12 for relief arises when the plaintiff can establish each element of the action. Id. The 13 discovery rule operates to toll the date of accrual until the plaintiff knows or 14 through the exercise of due diligence, should have known all the facts necessary to 15 establish a legal claim. Giraud v. Quincy Farm and Chemical, 102 Wash. App. 16 443, 108-09 (2000). Unless the facts are susceptible to only one reasonable 17 interpretation, it is up to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff has met this 18 burden. Id. 19 2. Lanham Act Claims 20 The Lanham Act contains no explicit statute of limitations. Jarrow 21 Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2002). “Laches 22 is an equitable time limitation on a party’s right to bring suit.” Boone v. Mech. 23 Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1979). Laches is a valid defense to 24 Lanham Act claims. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 304 F.3d at 835. A party asserting 25 laches must show that it suffered prejudice as a result of the plaintiff’s 26 unreasonable delay in filing suit. Id. 27 If a Lanham Act claim “is filed within the analogous state limitations period, 28 the strong presumption is that laches is inapplicable; if the claim is filed after the 1 analogous limitations period has expired, the presumption is that laches is a bar to 2 suit.” Id. The presumption of laches is triggered if any part of the claimed wrongful 3 conduct occurred beyond the limitations period. Id. In determining the presumption 4 for laches, the limitations period runs from the time the plaintiff knew or should 5 have known about its cause of action. Id. 6 Pretrial Order 7 In April 2024, the parties filed a Pretrial Order. In it Defendants identified 8 the following Issues of Fact3: 9 1. Whether AAFC knew or should have known it had a claim for conversion 10 and/or tortious interference before May 18, 2017; and if so, whether Van 11 Well made false assurances to SVC and/or AAFC regarding Glory and that 12 the statute of limitations should be tolled based on equitable principles. 13 2. Whether AAFC knew or should have known that it had a claim or 14 violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act before May 18, 2016; 15 and if so, whether Van Well made false assurances to SVC and/or AAFC 16 regarding Glory and that the statute of limitations should be tolled based on 17 equitable principles. 18 // 19
20 3 1. Plaintiff identified its own statement of the question of fact: 1. Whether AAFC 21 knew or should have known it had a claim for conversion and/or tortious 22 interference before May 18, 2017; and if so, whether Van Well made assurances to 23 SVC and/or AAFC regarding Glory and that AAFC relied on those assurances in 24 choosing when to file this lawsuit. 25 2. Whether AAFC knew or should have known it had a claim for conversion and/or 26 tortious interference before May 18, 2017; and if so, whether Van Well made 27 assurances to SVC and/or AAFC regarding Glory and that AAFC relied on those 28 assurances in choosing when to file this lawsuit. 1 Analysis 2 As an initial matter, Defendants seemingly agreed previously that there are 3 genuine issues of material fact regarding when the statute of limitations expired, 4 given their representations in the Pretrial Order. Based on the timing of the instant 5 motion, it appears Defendants now believe that new facts were established at the 6 bench trial to show that a reasonable jury could only find that the statute of 7 limitations expired in 2016 or 2017. Defendants’ position does not have 8 evidentiary support. 9 On the contrary, the record demonstrates a reasonable jury could only find 10 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Van Well and Goodwin did not accrue until, 11 at the earliest, June 8, 2017, when Van Well told SVC, who later told Plaintiff, that 12 Van Well intended to sell the Glory cherries. And this was after Plaintiff and Van 13 Well reached an agreement that Van Well would stop selling Glory. 14 Similarly, a reasonable jury could only find Plaintiff’s claims against 15 Monson could not and did not accrue until May 31, 2018. First, no reasonable jury 16 could find Plaintiff’s claims against Monson accrued when SVC allegedly learned 17 that Monson packed Glory fruit for third-party growers. Plaintiff’s claims against 18 Monson are not based on the packing of the Glory cherries. Rather, they are based 19 on the planting of the Glory trees, which apparently did not occur until 2016. Even 20 then, there is nothing in the record that shows that Plaintiff knew about the 21 planting. On the contrary, the record indicates it was only in October 2017 that 22 SVC had any inkling Van Well intended to sell Glory trees to Monson for delivery 23 in 2018. And it was only confirmed in late February or early March 2018 by Van 24 Well that Glory trees would be delivered to Monson that Spring. It was not until 25 May 31, 2018, that Monson confirmed with SVC it had planted Glory, and SVC 26 immediately told Plaintiff. A reasonable jury could only find SVC and Plaintiff had 27 no notice of Monson’s planting of Glory trees before May 31, 2018, and therefore, 28 the claims against Monson did not begin to accrue until then. 1 Defendants argue a reasonable jury could find that the statute of limitations 2 began running in 2012, when Plaintiff first conducted a genetic study comparing 3 Glory to Staccato; or in 2013 and 2014, when Plaintiff conducted additional 4 genetic studies; or in January 2014, when PICO sent a cease and desist letter to 5 Van Well; or on January 20, 2016, when SVC sent a notification letter to Glory 6 growers. 7 None of these dates establish Plaintiff knew or should have known of any 8 specific claim against any particular Defendant, and therefore no reasonable jury 9 could find that the claims began to accrue 2012, 2013, or 2014. These dates came 10 before Van Well represented it was not going to propagate or sell Glory trees until 11 the identity was resolved and before Van Well rescinded its agreement with 12 Gordon Goodwin. The January 20, 2016, letter came after Van Well had already 13 destroyed its Glory trees and rescinded its rights. Moreover, the letter was sent to 14 growers (other than Defendants) requesting they inform SVC how many Glory 15 trees they had and asking that they sign a non-propagation agreement. It is 16 immaterial that the growers were allowed to keep the trees in their orchards. 17 Here, no reasonable jury could find for Defendants on their defense of 18 laches. Because Plaintiff’s claims were filed within the analogous statute of 19 limitations, laches would not serve as a bar to Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims. 20 Conclusion 21 Here, there is no reason to submit to the jury the question of when Plaintiff’s 22 claims accrued because a reasonable jury could only reach one conclusion, that is, 23 that Plaintiff’s claims are timely. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“One of the 24 principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of 25 factually unsupported claims or defenses.”) As such, Defendants’ Motion for 26 Summary Judgment is denied. 27 // 28 // 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 432, is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to enter 5|| this Order and to provide copies to counsel. DATED this 2nd day of April 2025.
8 9 10 Sfraleyld Ecc rhar 1D Stanley A. Bastian 3 Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY TIMCMENT —0O