Neely, Justice:
This appeal was granted to determine the proper interpretation of a pension contract administered by the defendant, The Prudential Insurance Company of America, known as Group Annuity Plan No. GA-267. The plaintiff, Harold V. Henson, originally brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Kanawha County, West Virginia, to recover annuity payments which he alleged were due to him by virtue of a contract entered into in 1949 between his former employer, Lewis-Hubbard Corporation, and Prudential, the object of which was to provide retirement income for Lewis-Hubbard’s employees. The Court of Common Pleas entered judgment in favor of Prudential. Henson sought an Appeal and Writ of Error in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County which was denied. Henson then appealed to this Court and we granted a Writ of Error in order to determine the rights of the respective parties to this insurance contract. As the Court finds that this case is exclusively concerned with the interpretation of a contract of insurance, and as the Court further finds that the Court of Common Pleas was correct in determining that the plaintiff did not have vested rights to past service benefits under the contract, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha [853]*853County denying an Appeal and Writ of Error from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.1
In March 1949 plaintiff was an employee of 26 years standing with Lewis-Hubbard and remained with Lewis-Hubbard until he resigned in August 1955 at the age of 57. The original contract between Prudential and Lewis-Hubbard was entered into in 1949, and, as amended in 1955, governs the resolution of this case. Under the provisions of the 1949 and 1955 contracts, Lewis-Hubbard made contributions to purchase both future service and past service benefits for its employees. The money contributed for future (or participating) service was segregated and credited to accounts for individually named employees. Funds for the purchase of past service benefits (or for benefits based upon service before the March 1949 contract) were contributed at a rate between six and ten percent of the total accumulated cost of such benefits per year. At the end of each year, the amounts accumulated were used to purchase past service benefit annuities, to the extent of the funds available for such purchase, for the oldest employees nearest retirement. The procedure of using the past service contribution made by Lewis-Hubbard to buy annuities for the oldest employees in each year for whom such benefits had not [854]*854previously been purchased was continued for each year for which contributions for this purpose were made.
On March 1, 1960, Lewis-Hubbard requested a suspension of contributions for past service benefits and under the terms of the contract Prudential agreed to such a suspension. Prudential further agreed to accept less than the minimum contribution for the past service benefits for the year 1959, but as part of this agreement, Prudential insisted that Lewis-Hubbard comply with the plan requirement that if any employees retired during the suspension period, past service annuities would be purchased for them if they were entitled to the same, but that no other past service annuities would be purchased. Approximately $116,000 had been contributed by Lewis-Hubbard as past service contribution and this amount was used to purchase past service benefits for the employees of Lewis-Hubbard in accordance with the contract provision to buy an annuity for the oldest employee first and then for the next oldest employee and so forth until the fund expired. The last benefit purchased from the past service contribution was in March 1959, at which time the fund was exhausted, and as plaintiff was too young to have had an annuity purchased for him from this fund, no annuity was purchased for him.
The suspension period ran for two years from March 1, 1960 to February 28, 1962, and upon expiration of the suspension period Lewis-Hubbard notified Prudential that it would not make any further past service contributions under the plan. The plaintiff became 65 on September 7, 1962; however, at that time there remained no funds on deposit with Prudential to be used for the purpose of past service benefits for the plaintiff, and by the terms of the suspension agreement, no such benefits could be purchased for any employee of Lewis-Hubbard after the suspension period. In April 1963, Lewis-Hubbard notified Prudential that it would cease to be an employer under the plan, and long before the institution of this action Lewis-Hubbard stopped doing business.
[855]*855In July 1961, approximately $23,935.78 unused employer credit had been accumulated in Lewis-Hubbard’s account. This credit was the result of cancellation of certain future service benefits because the employees concerned left Lewis-Hubbard before their rights under the plan became vested. The plaintiff argues that under the terms of the contract this $23,935.78 of unused employer credit should have been used to purchase a past service benefit annuity for the plaintiff; however, the plaintiff did not prove that even if the $23,935.78 were available for application to the purchase of past service benefit annuities, that he would be the employee next in line by virtue of age to receive a paid-up annuity under the contract.
The Court finds that the accumulated $23,935.78 (except for a small portion which was used to purchase past service benefits for an employee named Sneed) was properly used under the terms of the policy to purchase future service benefits for employees who became eligible for such benefits during the time the past service contribution provisions were under suspension. Accordingly there were no funds available to purchase past service benefits for Mr. Henson in September 1962 when he became 65, and Prudential was not obligated to pay his past service benefits.
Provision IV, Paragraph 3(b) of the contract2 provides that the employer may make past service contributions [856]*856for the purchase of past service annuities. This paragraph also provides that the employer may at any time discontinue payment of past service contributions, without prejudice to the continuance of the contract in all other respects.
Paragraph 3(c) of the same Provision IV3 provides that [857]*857the accumulation of past service contributions received during each contract year shall, subject to the terms of the next paragraph, be applied at the end of such contract year toward the completion of the purchase of the amount of past service annuity for which participants are then qualified in the order of nearness to their respective normal annuity dates. Paragraph 3(c) further provides that if a participant attains his effective annuity date and the past service annuity for which he is then qualified has not been completely purchased, the accumulation, if any, of past service contributions, shall then be applied toward the completion of the purchase of that participant’s annuity, and any additional past service contribution which may be required as consideration to complete such purchase shall, unless payment of employer’s past service contributions has been discontinued in accordance with Paragraph 3(b), be immediately due and payable by the employer.
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Neely, Justice:
This appeal was granted to determine the proper interpretation of a pension contract administered by the defendant, The Prudential Insurance Company of America, known as Group Annuity Plan No. GA-267. The plaintiff, Harold V. Henson, originally brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Kanawha County, West Virginia, to recover annuity payments which he alleged were due to him by virtue of a contract entered into in 1949 between his former employer, Lewis-Hubbard Corporation, and Prudential, the object of which was to provide retirement income for Lewis-Hubbard’s employees. The Court of Common Pleas entered judgment in favor of Prudential. Henson sought an Appeal and Writ of Error in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County which was denied. Henson then appealed to this Court and we granted a Writ of Error in order to determine the rights of the respective parties to this insurance contract. As the Court finds that this case is exclusively concerned with the interpretation of a contract of insurance, and as the Court further finds that the Court of Common Pleas was correct in determining that the plaintiff did not have vested rights to past service benefits under the contract, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kanawha [853]*853County denying an Appeal and Writ of Error from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.1
In March 1949 plaintiff was an employee of 26 years standing with Lewis-Hubbard and remained with Lewis-Hubbard until he resigned in August 1955 at the age of 57. The original contract between Prudential and Lewis-Hubbard was entered into in 1949, and, as amended in 1955, governs the resolution of this case. Under the provisions of the 1949 and 1955 contracts, Lewis-Hubbard made contributions to purchase both future service and past service benefits for its employees. The money contributed for future (or participating) service was segregated and credited to accounts for individually named employees. Funds for the purchase of past service benefits (or for benefits based upon service before the March 1949 contract) were contributed at a rate between six and ten percent of the total accumulated cost of such benefits per year. At the end of each year, the amounts accumulated were used to purchase past service benefit annuities, to the extent of the funds available for such purchase, for the oldest employees nearest retirement. The procedure of using the past service contribution made by Lewis-Hubbard to buy annuities for the oldest employees in each year for whom such benefits had not [854]*854previously been purchased was continued for each year for which contributions for this purpose were made.
On March 1, 1960, Lewis-Hubbard requested a suspension of contributions for past service benefits and under the terms of the contract Prudential agreed to such a suspension. Prudential further agreed to accept less than the minimum contribution for the past service benefits for the year 1959, but as part of this agreement, Prudential insisted that Lewis-Hubbard comply with the plan requirement that if any employees retired during the suspension period, past service annuities would be purchased for them if they were entitled to the same, but that no other past service annuities would be purchased. Approximately $116,000 had been contributed by Lewis-Hubbard as past service contribution and this amount was used to purchase past service benefits for the employees of Lewis-Hubbard in accordance with the contract provision to buy an annuity for the oldest employee first and then for the next oldest employee and so forth until the fund expired. The last benefit purchased from the past service contribution was in March 1959, at which time the fund was exhausted, and as plaintiff was too young to have had an annuity purchased for him from this fund, no annuity was purchased for him.
The suspension period ran for two years from March 1, 1960 to February 28, 1962, and upon expiration of the suspension period Lewis-Hubbard notified Prudential that it would not make any further past service contributions under the plan. The plaintiff became 65 on September 7, 1962; however, at that time there remained no funds on deposit with Prudential to be used for the purpose of past service benefits for the plaintiff, and by the terms of the suspension agreement, no such benefits could be purchased for any employee of Lewis-Hubbard after the suspension period. In April 1963, Lewis-Hubbard notified Prudential that it would cease to be an employer under the plan, and long before the institution of this action Lewis-Hubbard stopped doing business.
[855]*855In July 1961, approximately $23,935.78 unused employer credit had been accumulated in Lewis-Hubbard’s account. This credit was the result of cancellation of certain future service benefits because the employees concerned left Lewis-Hubbard before their rights under the plan became vested. The plaintiff argues that under the terms of the contract this $23,935.78 of unused employer credit should have been used to purchase a past service benefit annuity for the plaintiff; however, the plaintiff did not prove that even if the $23,935.78 were available for application to the purchase of past service benefit annuities, that he would be the employee next in line by virtue of age to receive a paid-up annuity under the contract.
The Court finds that the accumulated $23,935.78 (except for a small portion which was used to purchase past service benefits for an employee named Sneed) was properly used under the terms of the policy to purchase future service benefits for employees who became eligible for such benefits during the time the past service contribution provisions were under suspension. Accordingly there were no funds available to purchase past service benefits for Mr. Henson in September 1962 when he became 65, and Prudential was not obligated to pay his past service benefits.
Provision IV, Paragraph 3(b) of the contract2 provides that the employer may make past service contributions [856]*856for the purchase of past service annuities. This paragraph also provides that the employer may at any time discontinue payment of past service contributions, without prejudice to the continuance of the contract in all other respects.
Paragraph 3(c) of the same Provision IV3 provides that [857]*857the accumulation of past service contributions received during each contract year shall, subject to the terms of the next paragraph, be applied at the end of such contract year toward the completion of the purchase of the amount of past service annuity for which participants are then qualified in the order of nearness to their respective normal annuity dates. Paragraph 3(c) further provides that if a participant attains his effective annuity date and the past service annuity for which he is then qualified has not been completely purchased, the accumulation, if any, of past service contributions, shall then be applied toward the completion of the purchase of that participant’s annuity, and any additional past service contribution which may be required as consideration to complete such purchase shall, unless payment of employer’s past service contributions has been discontinued in accordance with Paragraph 3(b), be immediately due and payable by the employer.
The provisions state clearly that the employer had the option in the first instance to initiate past service benefit contributions, and that, if such contributions were to be made, each annual contribution would be payable at the end of each year to the participants then eligible for past service benefits. The contract further provides that the employer could discontinue the past service benefit [858]*858provision of the contract at any time. Lewis-Hubbard did make annual payments for past service benefits for 11 years, i.e. from 1949 to and including 1959, totaling approximately $116,000. During this same period, according to exhibits on behalf of Prudential, the company annually purchased past service annuities for employees becoming eligible for annuities up to the gross total amount of approximately $116,000. Payments of past service contributions were then suspended by the employer for a 2 year period and discontinued entirely on March 1, 1962. In September 1962, none of these direct past service contributions remained from which to provide an annuity for plaintiff.
The employer had, however, become entitled to a credit of approximately $23,900 from the payments made by it into the future service benefit protection portion of the plan. Plaintiff asserts that under the terms of Provision XX, Paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the contract4 this sum of [859]*859money had to be applied to the purchase of past service benefits, thus making funds available for the purchase of this annuity when he became eligible in September 1962. The Court finds that Provision XX, Paragraph 2(a)(ii) read in conjunction with Provision V, Paragraph 2(a) and (b)5 fully supports Prudential’s contention that the employer, having discontinued payments of past ser[860]*860vice contributions, had the right to use this credit which was generated from the future service benefits for further future service benefits, and that plaintiff has no right under Provision XX, Paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the contract to require the application of these funds to the past service provision of the policy.
Accordingly the judgment of the Circuit Court of Ka-nawha County is affirmed.
Affirmed.